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LIABILITY FOR BAD FAITH AND THE PRINCIPLE WITHOUT
A NAME (YET)
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM*

***
In this article, Kenneth Abraham examines the concept of liability for bad
faith practices on the part of insurers. Abraham asserts that liability for
bad faith is a concept that has existed for roughly half a century despite its
inability, as of yet, to be recognized as part of the formal body of insurance
law. Abraham details what has been, to some extent, a transmogrification
with respect to the bad faith claim handling practices of the insurance
industry. What once could be dismissed as nothing more than the
occasional isolated incident, or “screw up,” can now be characterized by
incidences of systemic bad faith. Abraham provides four examples, each
one highlighting some form of systemic bad faith practice undertaken by an
insurer. Abraham closes with a discussion of the uniqueness of the insurerconsumer relationship and how that relationship creates obligations of fair
dealing for insurers which simply do not exist for other private enterprises.
***
In 1994 the TEXAS LAW REVIEW devoted an entire Symposium
issue to the developing law governing insurers’ liability for bad faith.1 My
contribution to that Symposium was called “The Natural History of the
Insurer’s Liability for Bad Faith.”2 The organizers of this Conference have
asked me to revisit my piece, and to make some observations about the
*

David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law. This Article is a slightly revised version of my
presentation at “Bad Faith and Beyond: A Conference on the Law of Claims
Practices,” held at Rutgers-Camden Law School on February 29, 2012.
1
Symposium, Law of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1203 (1994).
2
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad
Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295 (1994). Robert H. Jerry, II, wrote a piece for that
Symposium commenting on my Article, entitled The Wrong Side of the Mountain:
A Comment on Bad Faith’s Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (1994). Dean
Jerry has been generous in preparing a piece commenting on this Article as well.
See Robert H. Jerry, II, Bad Faith at Middle Age: Comments on Abraham,
“Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle without a Name (Yet),” 19 CONN. INS.
L.J. 13 (2012).
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development of liability for bad faith in the eighteen years since then.
I will do exactly that. But I also want to try to situate the
developments in bad faith law over the past two decades within a larger
context. I want to suggest that liability for bad faith reflects a broader
principle. This is a principle that, as my title suggests, does not yet have a
name, but that treats insurers as having obligations that are more
demanding than those imposed on ordinary contracting parties, though not
as demanding as those we impose on governments. An obligation to handle
claims fairly is one of the obligations that flows from this principle, though
it is not the only one.
In the modern state, insurance often falls in between these two
poles of private contract and governmentally-provided entitlement.
Insurance is brought into being by private contract, but our political system
relies on insurance to promote economic well-being and to serve as a social
safety net. In a series of separate doctrines and practices insurance law
recognizes this, but it has not yet articulated a single principle that reflects
what connects them.
I.

THE RISE OF SYSTEMIC BAD FAITH CLAIMS

In my 1994 Article I argued that liability for bad faith had by then
become a mature field. I suggested that, whereas the field had been much in
the flux of early development during the preceding several decades, it was
by then becoming stable. I cited a number of reasons for this conclusion, in
addition of course to the fact that the field was at that point over thirty
years old, and arguably older.3 Thirty or more years seemed to me to be
about the amount of time it takes most sub-fields of law to reach at least the
beginning of maturity.
In an Article published a decade later, Douglas Richmond
chastised me in the opening sentence of his piece for what he took to be my
implication that liability for bad-faith was not a severe threat for insurers.4
To that charge I would reply here that there is a difference between an
unstable threat and a stable one. My point was that the field had matured
from early instability to the point where it was now merely posing a stable
threat to insurers. After all, insurers are in the business of dealing with
stable problems. In fact, they sell protection against stable, predictable
problems. So what I took to be increasing stability in the field of liability
3

See Abraham, supra note 2, at 1295-1308.
Douglas R. Richmond, Bad Insurance Bad Faith Law, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 1 (2003).
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for bad faith seemed to me to be a salutary development for insurers.
To continue the metaphor, I would say that the field is now in
middle age, and like many who are at that stage of development,
unanticipated difficulties have arisen, some of one’s own doing and some
the fault of others. From the vantage point of 2012, the most striking
feature of the field as it stood in 1994 was that it was almost entirely
concerned with claims for what I would call “sporadic” or “isolated” bad
faith. A single claim person or group of claim personnel had allegedly
misbehaved. Sometimes it was alleged that this misbehavior had violated
the standards of the insurer in question, and sometimes it was not. And it
may well be that at trial the plaintiff made an effort to blame not only the
individual claims personnel who had misbehaved, but also to blame their
employer, the insurer. But the unstated premise that hung over the majority
of bad faith claims in the years running up to 1994 was that these were
isolated incidents; that they departed from what ordinarily occurred; and
that they reflected a divergence between what the insurer as an entity
intended to occur and what had actually occurred. In short, these cases
involved, or were thought to involve, screwups.
There still are a lot of these cases. To draw an analogy to products
liability, most of the reported cases involved allegations of what appeared
to be something like “manufacturing defects.” Long ago the law of torts
decided that there should be liability for injuries caused by manufacturing
defects–departures of an individual product unit from the manufacturer’s
intended design. Claims for sporadic bad-faith handling of a claim are
analogous. It is true that in many instances manufacturers’ design
specifications are more precise and more detailed than an insurer’s
prescribed claims handling practices. But the logical structure of
manufacturing defect suits and of sporadic bad-faith claims is parallel.
A new type of claim, however, has emerged in the last two
decades. These claims have been based on what some observers have
called institutional, or systemic, bad faith.5 These are more like design
defect claims in products liability. They do not involve allegations that
there was a single screwup in the handling of a particular claim. Rather,
these are cases in which the insurer is alleged to have adopted a companywide policy of handling claims in a manner that the plaintiff argued
constituted bad-faith, even if there was only one actual plaintiff in the bad5

See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining Institutional Bad
Faith in Insurance, 46 TORT & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1 (2010); James A. Varner, Tiffany
R. Drust & Debra T. Herron, Institutional Bad Faith: The Darth Vader of ExtraContractual Litigation, 57 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163 (2007).
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faith suit.
II.

FOUR EXAMPLES

I want now to give you four examples. Several, but not all, involve
claims for bad-faith claims handling, and one does not involve claims
handling at all. But each of them involve what might be called bad faith,
and help to make the point that I will develop after I describe them.
In State Farm v. Campbell, the nation’s largest auto insurer was
alleged to have had a national scheme of taking cases to trial in order to
meet the corporate fiscal goal of capping payouts on claims, nationwide. 6
This scheme was referred to as State Farm’s Performance, Planning and
Review or “PP& R” policy. The suit alleged bad faith against a State Farm
liability insurance policyholder after State Farm refused to settle a tort suit
against him and the jury returned a verdict in excess of his policy limits.7
He sued State Farm, and the jury in his bad-faith case returned a verdict of
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive
damages.8 These verdicts were reduced, in part by a decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court, but in the end they were still substantial.
Based on my conversations with them, I can say that the people at
State Farm continue to deny that the company had the particular policy that
was found to have led to the bad faith claims handling in that case. They
have engaged in at least one retreat that I know of in which they
brainstormed about how to ensure that the actions that took place in that
case do not happen again. They think of what happened as a screwup, as a
misapplication of company policy rather than as an application of policy.
That will often be the insurer’s perception in these institutional, or systemic
bad-faith cases. But what makes these cases different from sporadic badfaith cases is that the institutional bad-faith cases are not litigated only
about whether an acceptable policy was misapplied in a particular
claimant’s case. They are litigated, at least in part, over the question
whether there was a company-wide policy that was rotten to the core.
My second example comes from the first-party side and involves
UNUM Provident, a disability insurer. UNUM apparently, or at least
allegedly, had a policy of what can plausibly be called cheating in the
handling of what it referred to as “subjective” disability claims.9 These are
6

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003).
See id. at 414.
8
Id. at 415.
9
For an account, see Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d
7
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claims based on mental or emotional disorders whose existence cannot be
proved by concrete medical evidence. Basically, UNUM allegedly decided
not to pay these claims but instead to require insureds to provide objective
medical evidence that they had a disability, which they ordinarily could not
do. UNUM set targets for resolving these claims based on its own profit
goals and regardless of the merits of the claims themselves. They allegedly
did this, among other things, by setting claim closure targets that were
endorsed by high level management and the Board of the company.
A third example hasn’t resulted in any damages claims that I know
of, although there may have been a few. This is the contingent commission
controversy of 2003 and 2004. As you will recall, certain insurers, AIG
among them, were revealed to have been secretly paying brokers
commissions that were contingent on the subsequent claim and loss
experience of the brokers’ clients – the policyholders to which the insurers
issued policies. There is now a literature addressing whether contingent
commissions should or should not be permitted, but no one that I know of
has argued that it was okay to keep them secret.10 The issue is whether an
obligation on the part of brokers to disclose the existence of a contingent
commission arrangement is sufficient, or whether, instead, such
commissions ought to be prohibited outright, at least for the consumer
segment of the market, or for all applicants, whether consumer or
commercial.
This is not an example of bad-faith claims handling. But it is an
example of a practice that at least arguably was in bad faith. It was a secret
deal between the broker and the insurer to whom the broker was steering
applicants for insurance. I have cited this example, not because I
necessarily want to argue that there should be a cause of action of some
sort against either the broker or the insurer for damages caused by the
wrong, but to suggest that there is a broader principle underlying bad-faith
claims than may appear. Liability for bad-faith claims handling is about
more than bad-faith claims handling. But first, on to my fourth example.
In the early 1990s, Allstate Insurance Company became concerned
about its profit levels. It hired McKinsey & Co., and (to oversimplify a bit)
these consulting geniuses had the deep insight that Allstate could increase
its profits if it paid less for claims. McKinsey recommended the redesign of
1168 (D. Nev. 2008).
10
See, e.g., J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of
Insurance Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359 (2006); Daniel Schwarcz,
Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723 (2009).
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a number of different claim processes. Jay Feinman described this whole
process and the different redesigns very effectively in his book, DELAY,
DENY, DEFEND.11 One of the claim process redesigns, with the acronym
“MIST,” standing for “minor impact soft tissue”12 – mostly whiplash – had
as its purpose cutting down on payments for this kind of claim, and taking
cases to trial if a satisfactory settlement could not be negotiated. This
policy applied to both Allstate’s own policyholders making Uninsured
Motorists claims, and to third-party suits against Allstate’s own liability
insurance policyholders. Some of the guidelines for claim valuation were
computerized and some claims personnel allegedly adhered slavishly to
what the computer told them to do.
Now there is nothing necessarily wrong with using computer
programs to guide claim valuation, and nothing wrong with trying to cut
back on claim payments if they are too high. It certainly is unwise, and it
might even be bad faith, to rely only on what a computer tells you a claim
is worth. But that was not what was fundamentally wrong with what
Allstate is alleged to have done. If you have an acceptable metric for
deciding whether you are currently paying too much for a given category of
claims, then that metric might appropriately be used to guide claim
valuation. I’m not sure what an acceptable metric would be, since it is not
as if there is some objective, freestanding value to a tort claim. But let’s
suppose hypothetically that in principle there could be such a metric. For
example, if Allstate could have gotten the data, the average of what GEICO
and Nationwide paid for these claims in analogous cases might have been
an appropriate metric for Allstate.
But that’s not what Allstate allegedly did. It didn’t use some
acceptable metric for valuing claims. Its metric allegedly was how much
less it needed to pay in order to make its desired profit. An insurer can
certainly set premium rates on this basis. It can decide how much to charge
you for coverage based in part on how much it needs to charge in order to
make an acceptable profit. Once you have paid for coverage, however,
you’re entitled to have the Uninsured Motorist claims you make, and
lawsuits that are brought against you, settled based on some kind of
principle other than how much profit your insurer wants to make.
Now I’m well aware that many of the victims of this practice by
Allstate were not its own policyholders, but people who brought suit
against Allstate’s policyholders. And we know that the question whether a
11

JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES
DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 56-103 (2010).
12
Id. at 31.
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liability insurer is liable for bad faith to a party who brings suit against the
insurer’s policyholder is largely settled. This is what is sometimes referred
to as the Royal Globe problem, after the 1979 California case holding that
there is such a duty.13 But the Royal Globe rule is dead, and with the
exception of a very few isolated cases, that is not the law. It might be that
conduct like Allstate’s violates a state’s Unfair Claim Practices Act and
warrants a regulatory fine, but it would be a stretch to imagine that there
could be a cause of action by a non-policyholder against Allstate for
damages resulting from its practices.
III.

A BROADER PRINCIPLE?

Those are my four examples. Now let’s take stock. All involve
institutional, or systemic bad faith. One case – State Farm v. Campbell, is a
third-party bad-faith case in which the conventional bad faith remedy was
available. A second, UNUM Provident, was a set of first-party bad faith
cases in which the conventional bad-faith remedy was available. A third,
the contingent commission controversy, did not directly involve claims at
all, and while the conduct in question might generate civil liability, it is
more likely to be restitutionary liability than the kind of liability for
extracontractual damages that is threatening enough to deter misconduct.
An insurer or a broker won’t be deterred from capturing an undeserved
gain through a contingent commission if the only remedy for doing so is
that it has to refund the commission or pay it to the policyholder. So fines
were necessary in that situation. My last example did involve misbehavior
in the claims process, by Allstate, but many of the victims were third
parties who did not have a cause of action for any damages they may have
suffered as a result of the misbehavior.
What links these examples together, I think, is not merely that each
involved something that we would be willing to describe as “bad faith.”
There are two additional links. First, the bad- faith behavior in all these
examples involved, or allegedly involved, something systematic or
institutional rather than being an isolated screwup. And second, the badfaith behavior in each instance is something that we probably would
tolerate, and have the common law tolerate, if it were a different sort of
business enterprise that engaged in this behavior. If a building contractor
adopted a systematic policy of charging for every minor change from an
architect’s working drawings, because it had decided that its profits were
insufficient, we would not consider this an occasion for legal intervention.
13

Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
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If an auto parts retailer had a secret deal with some manufacturers that it
would be paid an annual rebate that increased if products liability suits
against the manufacturer decreased, we would consider this no business of
those who purchased the auto parts in question, even if this affected which
customers were influenced to buy which kinds of parts. These would be
examples of harsh, slightly unsavory dealing, but that’s about it.
On the other hand, suppose that the government engaged in these
kinds of behaviors. Then we would probably consider them to be
constitutional violations. Suppose the government decided to adopt a more
stringent test for disability under the Social Security Act, not because it had
been misapplying the statute, but because it concluded that it was paying
too much out in benefits. That would almost certainly violate beneficiaries’
right to due process of law. Or suppose that the U.S. Army secretly paid its
own recruiters higher bonuses for recruits who signed up for the Corps of
Engineers rather than for Artillery training, because the costs of providing
medical care for the former were lower than for the latter. We would think
that the due process rights of the recruits had been violated, because they
had a right to know whether they were being steered to the Corps of
Engineers by the recruiters’ financial interest in the particular enlistment
choice they made.
If some of you disagree with my admittedly shallow constitutional
analysis, I hope that at least you agree that we would find the government’s
actions in these hypotheticals far more blameworthy than the analogous
behavior in the hypotheticals involving private enterprise. We expect far
less of most private enterprises in the way of fair dealing and fair process
than we expect of government. Customers deal with private enterprises in
arms-length transactions where self-interest is expected to be operative.
People deal with government as constituents or citizens where government
is expected to be concerned with the welfare and fair treatment of those
whom its actions and decisions affect.
By now it should be obvious where I am headed. Insurance
companies do not fit into either of the categories we have for determining
how much fairness we expect from an enterprise or institution. We expect
more of insurers than we expect of ordinary private enterprises, though we
may not expect as much of insurers as we expect of government. That is
what links the four different examples of bad faith that I offered earlier,
even though some are governed by the law of bad faith and some are not.
In each instance our sense of what makes an insurer’s behavior wrongful
turns in part on the core nature of insurance and insurance companies.
Insurers owe, or ought to owe those with whom they deal, a higher
obligation of fair dealing than ordinary private enterprises typically owe
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those with whom they deal. As critical legal theory taught us decades ago,
the public-private distinction tends breaks down in such instances.14
This notion is already reflected, though somewhat selectively and
only partly expressly, at various places in the law governing insurance.
First and foremost, of course, the law of bad faith is a reflection of the
notion that insurers owe their policyholders higher duties than ordinary
contracting parties owe their customers. There is also the occasional
judicial assertion, which typically doesn’t go very far or is rejected on
appeal, that insurers are fiduciaries or quasi-fiduciaries. And of course
there is the very practice of administrative regulation of the terms of
insurance policies. In my view the justification for insurance regulation
must not only be the typical one that is given for economic regulation –
market failure or market imperfections. In addition, I think that we regulate
insurance, and that there is support for regulation, so that regulators will
have the opportunity to ensure that the requisite level of fair dealing occurs,
whether or not it would be provided by a perfectly operating market.
For example, we place limits on the characteristics that insurers can
use in creating premium classifications,15 and to me that looks for all the
world like a version of equal protection’s prohibition of legislation that
employs suspect categories. In fact, that kind of insurance regulation
actually goes farther than constitutional equal protection would require.
Similarly, in at least a few cases, the courts may be on the lookout for
coverage defenses that insurers assert as subterfuges, when the insurers
cannot prove their actual basis for denying the claim. For example,
defenses based on exclusions or conditions that obviously do not apply, but
which the insurers assert anyway when they suspect but cannot prove fraud
in the application for coverage or deliberate wrongdoing such as arson.16
14

See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
15
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 144-56 (5th
ed. 2010).
16
That may well be what happened in Heller v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of U.S., 833 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1987), where a disability insurance policy
covered lost income resulting from the “complete inability of the Insured, because
of injury or sickness, to engage in the Insured’s regular occupation.” Id. at 1255.
The policyholder was a cardiologist who specialized in invasive procedures and
contracted carpel tunnel syndrome, a condition affecting the dexterity of his hand
and fingers, nine months after he purchased the policy. Id. The insurer denied
coverage on the ground that, because the insured refused to consent to have
surgery for the condition, he had violated the policy requirement that he be under
the “regular” care of a physician. Id. at 1257. But it might just as easily have
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This looks to me to be an awful lot like a common law version of a due
process requirement.
If I am correct, then the law governing liability for bad-faith
handling of insurance claims is not an isolated exception to the law of
insurance contracts, but just one manifestation of a broader and deeper
principle that runs through this entire body of law: the notion, partly
embodied in legal doctrine, partly in administrative regulation, and partly
in a more general legal ethos, that more in the way of regularized and
consistent treatment of applicants and insureds, and more in the way of fair
process, can be expected of insurers than we have a right to expect of most
other private enterprises.
Admittedly, this is only an underlying principle or value, what I
have elsewhere called a “regulative ideal.”17 There is not a body of legal
doctrine that systematically reflects the principle. Indeed, I would have to
say that at present the principle is only selectively reflected in legal
doctrine. For example, we don’t have a body of legal doctrine that protects
all those who were disadvantaged by Allstate’s conduct, and administrative
regulation doesn’t completely fill the gap either. Some might say that I am
therefore misidentifying a principle, or seeing a principle where it doesn’t
exist. Fair enough. I am not trying to close debate about this, but to open up
debate by offering a conceptual insight to be tested against our intuitions
and against the law as it stands. If I am capturing our intuitions correctly
but I am not accurately describing the law as it stands, then we can either
adjust our intuitions or we can consider changing the law.
Moreover, I have been painting with a very broad brush. It seems
pretty clear that we should expect the law governing the two forms of
insurance that are most essential to individual well-being, health insurance
and consumer auto insurance, to more systematically reflect the principle
than the law governing other, less essential forms of insurance. There is
also room for distinguishing generally between consumer and commercial
insurance. Sizable corporate policyholders’ dealings with their insurers are
in many respects identical to their dealings with other private enterprises,
and do not need as much legal regulation of the sort that I have been
denied coverage on the ground that the insured was still able to “engage” in his
“regular occupation". The insurer’s stated basis for denying coverage was so likely
to fail that the alternative of suspected fraud is a far more plausible explanation for
the insurer’s fighting the claim all the way to its unsuccessful appeal to the Seventh
Circuit.
17
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 63 (1998).
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describing. If insurance law could manage, predictably and inexpensively,
to distinguish between individuals and small businesses, on the one hand,
and large enterprises, on the other hand, that might make sense. But that’s
an issue for another day.
IV.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, I think that we should more frequently be thinking
about insurers as distinctive enterprises with a set of obligations that are
neither those of private parties nor those of government. Some scholars
have called this conception, or something like this, “insurance as
governance.”18 That is not right, however, among other reasons because it
implies an element of democratic or participatory control – as in labor
unions or homeowners associations – that is not present in insurance and
that we probably don’t want to be present in insurance. I’m not talking
about turning stock insurance companies into mutuals. Nor am I talking
about the coercive power of insurers, their capacity to “govern” the
behavior of their policyholders. I am not talking about negative rights
against insurers, but positive rights. Not freedom from something, but
freedom for something. And also I don’t think that conceiving of insurance
as a product gets us very far on this score, though it may be a useful
construct for some purposes.19 The fair process that we expect from
insurers we don’t expect and should not expect from the makers of chain
saws.
The character of the principle I discern in insurance law is one of
obligation resting on the nature and contemporary importance of insurance,
not resting on the consent and trust that are part of governance. Few
individuals trust their insurers or consent to anything meaningful in
connection with their purchase of insurance. What might we call the
obligations reflected in this principle? Quasi-constitutional? Good faith?
Fair treatment? I don’t think that any of these names fit, but I don’t have a
better one. Maybe we should have a naming contest. In any event, I do
know this: although the principle may not have a name yet, the principle is
lurking in our law, and recognition of the principle’s existence will enhance
18

See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE, & DEAN BARRY,
INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003).
19
See Daniel B. Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffery
W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813
(2009).
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our understanding of what insurance law is, and what insurance does.

BAD FAITH AT MIDDLE AGE: COMMENTS ON “THE
PRINCIPLE WITHOUT A NAME (YET),” INSURANCE LAW,
CONTRACT LAW, SPECIALNESS, DISTINCTIVENESS, AND
DIFFERENCE
ROBERT H. JERRY, II*

***
In this article, Robert Jerry expounds on Professor Abraham’s
article on insurer liability for bad faith by pointing out that the concept of
institutional bad faith is not a new phenomenon, but rather, one that is as
old as the insurance industry itself. Jerry focuses on Abraham’s depiction
of the “specialness” and “distinctiveness” of insurance, while exploring
additional instances of “rotten to the core” systemic bad faith dating as far
back as the nineteenth-century. Much like Abraham did in his article on
bad faith, Jerry uses these examples of systemic bad faith to further his
assertion that the insurance industry, due to its “specialness,” is held to
higher standards of care than other realms of “ordinary business.”
***
In “Liability for Bad Faith and The Principle Without a Name
(Yet),” Professor Kenneth Abraham discerns an original and compelling
way to express one of the core insights upon which much of the modern
law of insurance is built: that insurance has special characteristics not
found in the other things, services, information, etc. which individuals and
institutions value and acquire, and that the law governing insurance
transactions is itself special, distinctive, and different.1 Through the
decades, this insight has been expressed, if not always entirely accurately,
in a number of different ways: insurance is a special kind of chattel or

* Dean and Levin, Mabie and Levin Professor, Fredric G. Levin College of
Law, University of Florida. This paper is based upon a presentation originally
given at the Rutgers Bad Faith & Beyond Conference: A Conference on the Law of
Claims Practices, in Camden, New Jersey, on February 29, 2012, available at
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/bad-faith-beyond (last visited July 22, 2012). I want to
express thanks to Lindsay Cohen, L’13, for her research assistance.
1
See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle without a
Name (Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2012).
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quasi-chattel;2 insurance, as an aleatory contract instead of a commutative
contract, involves an uneven exchange of values that leads to the “peculiar
legal aspects” of the contract;3 the relationship between insurer and insured
is fiduciary, or quasi-fiduciary, in nature;4 an insurance contract is more
than an “ordinary contract” and insurance law is more than “ordinary
contract law”;5 insurance contracts are imbued with heightened obligations
of good faith and fair dealing;6 in insurance contracts the duty of good faith
is a “one way street,” unlike general contracts where the duty runs both
directions;7 and so on.
2

7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 34
(3d ed. Jaeger 1963). See Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d
413, 424 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (describing “equally valid” analysis that treats
insurance policy as “in the nature of a special chattel rather than a contract”).
Imagining insurance as a chattel leads to the argument that insurance policies
contain an implied warranty of fitness for an intended purpose, but implied
warranty analysis has not gained traction in the insurance cases.
3
EDWIN M. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 62 (2d ed. 1957).
4
See Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 531 (3d Cir.
1997) (insurer’s duty of good faith toward insured is predicated on fiduciary
relationship created when the contract is formed); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d
565, 571 (Ariz. 1986) (relationship between insurer and insured is not fiduciary
relationship, but has some elements of a fiduciary relationship). Cf. Lyerla v.
AMCO Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Illinois law, no
fiduciary relationship exists between insurers and insureds). For more discussion,
see Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their
Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1 (2000).
5
See, e.g., Victor v. Turner, 496 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
(“[I]nsurance industry transactions with consumers are not governed by ordinary
contract law.”); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 737, 744 (2000) (“Insurance is a contractual relationship, but courts and
legislatures have developed a body of insurance law that is distinct from the
mainstream of contract.”); Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in
Insurance Contracts, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 105, 113 (“[I]nsurance law’s
rules, including interpretive rules, were designed to distinguish the insurance
industry from other fields of contract law.”) (citation omitted).
6
See, e.g., Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (“[B]ecause of the ‘special relationship’ inherent in the unique nature of an
insurance contract, the insurer’s obligations attendant to its duty of good faith are
heightened.”); Nugent v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 752 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56
(D.D.C. 2010) (insurance contracts have special characteristics that “warrant
heightened liability” for breach of the duty of good faith) (citation omitted).
7
See, e.g., Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W. 2d 203 (Iowa
1995) (Iowa does not recognize tort action for “reverse” bad faith by insurer
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The common theme running through the foregoing expressions
emerges from the unique characteristics of insurance itself. All contracts
involve transfers of risk in some way, typically at the margin of some other
sale or exchange, but what distinguishes insurance contracts is the fact that
they exist for the purpose of transferring risk. Courts have sought to
capture this idea, usually when deciding the boundaries of state regulatory
authority over transactions that have the look and feel of insurance but may
be something else, in the principle that to constitute an insurance contract,
the transfer and distribution of risk must be the “principal object and
purpose” of the contract,8 the very essence of the exchange that gives the
contract its “distinctive character.”9 Because the party casting off risk
through an insurance contract has such an extreme amount of reliance on
the presumed enforceability of the contract and puts so much financial and
emotional well-being at stake in the transaction, all in circumstances where
the insurer knows from the beginning of the magnitude and importance of
this investment (indeed, the insurer markets the product through assurances
of security to the insureds), the protections afforded by law to this party
must be safeguarded with utmost rigor. Through the years, these ideas have
presented themselves in insurance law through pro-insured results and
outcomes that would ordinarily not be predicted if the laws of contract, tort,
agency, equity, or remedies were applied in their expected ways.
Working in ground well plowed by others for decades, Professor
Abraham finds a new and creative way to describe insurance law’s
“specialness.” He invites us to visualize placing insurance law on a
continuum: insurance law puts obligations on insurers that are more
rigorous than what are placed on ordinary contracting parties, but less
rigorous than the principles under which we test the actions of governments
and state actors. The lens that Professor Abraham uses to capture this
insight is systemic or institutional bad faith.
The law of bad faith is the thread in insurance law where insurers
can be held liable in tort for bad faith performance of the contractual duties
they owe insureds; “[t]he tort duty contemplates that insurers must deal
fairly with insureds and conduct their affairs in good faith.”10 As Professor
against insured who brings frivolous bad faith claim against insurer); Douglas R.
Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under Construction,
But Not Yet Open, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95 (1996).
8
See Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
9
See GAF Corp. v. Cnty. School Bd., 629 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1980).
10
ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 156 (5th ed. 2012).
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Abraham explains, systemic, institutional bad faith is the most recent
evolution in this thread. The cases in which the law of bad faith was
routinely applied after the doctrine’s emergence and development in the
1970s and 1980s typically involved an individual insured’s claim that the
insurer in the specific claims processing sequence in which the insured and
insurer were involved committed breaches in claims handling that caused
damage to the insured, and this damage can be remedied adequately only
under the remedial regime of tort law.
In contrast, the institutional or systemic bad faith claim involves a
situation where an insured takes a dispute over a single loss and challenges
the insurer’s practices and procedures as those occurred in claims
processing for all similarly situated claimants, essentially arguing that the
insurer’s practices were designed to reduce, or perhaps even eliminate, fair
payments to all claimants.11 Thus, the notion is that institutional bad faith is
a new kind of bad faith claim that has emerged in the past couple of
decades, and policing these questioned systemic practices under the law of
bad faith represents an expansion of the territory in which bad faith law
operates.12
Although the bad faith cases of recent years in which plaintiffs
allege systemic or institutional insurer bad faith conduct are departures
from the circumstances in which bad faith was alleged in the past, this does
not mean that claims against insurers for institutional, systemic misconduct
are new. Professor Abraham refers to these alleged systemic practices as
ones that are “rotten to the core”;13 I would suggest that allegations of
11

See Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining Institutional Bad Faith
in Insurance, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 1 (2010) (“Essentially, the
theory of institutional bad faith allows a plaintiff to expand a dispute over a single
loss into a widespread attack on an insurance company's practices and procedures”;
citing MICHAEL R. NELSON ET AL., EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LITIGATION AGAINST
INSURERS § 2.11, at 2-59 (2009)); James A. Varner, Tiffany R. Drust & Debra T.
Herron, Institutional Bad Faith: The Darth Vader of Extra-Contractual Litigation,
57 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163, 163 (2007) (“Institutional bad faith is
the ‘Ebola’ virus of extra contractual litigation . . . . [I]t can . . . grow explosively
and wreck not only litigation management budgets, but can also seriously deplete
corporate equity and shareholder value.”).
12
Richmond observes that “[t]here. is a surprising lack of case law on
institutional bad faith given the frequency with which such allegations are made.
This disparity is probably attributable to the fact that carriers settle many
institutional bad faith cases to avoid discovery costs and potentially severe damage
exposure.” Richmond, supra note 11, at 4 n.8.
13
See Abraham, supra note 1, at 12.
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systemic, “rotten to the core” insurer practices have been made for decades,
with the major and important difference between those older allegations
and the more modern ones is that the earlier claims did not have a law of
bad faith in which the allegations could be packaged and presented. If these
practices existed today and were being challenged today, they would be
packaged in the same wrapping in which the modern systemic, institutional
bad faith claims are alleged.
If the amount of litigation and commentary in the literature in the
early twentieth century are reliable guides, one of the prominent early
examples of systemic, institutional bad faith conduct by insurers involved
insurers’ delay in action on applications. Like today, insurers took the first
premium payment with the application, but did not issue the policy until a
period of time passed during which the insurer evaluated whether to accept
the risk. During this period the insurer would have use of the insured’s
money, but, in the absence of a binder providing temporary coverage, the
applicant had no protection. Even with a temporary written binding receipt,
the coverage was often so conditional that the applicant who suffered a loss
during the period the binder was in force received no compensation. Many
binders by their terms purported to eliminate coverage if the application
would be unacceptable to the insurer’s underwriting department. The
frequency of ex poste determinations of ineligibility was itself a matter of
concern for insureds, and the longer the insurer could delay acting on
applications, the less exposure the insurer would have on the risk. Yet if no
loss occurred during the period between application and policy issuance,
the policy’s coverage upon issuance would be backdated to the time of the
application, so the insurer engaged in this practice essentially received a
payment for nothing. Delaying action on the application lengthened the
period during which this imbalance existed. Like a number of other insurer
practices that caught the attention of the public, legislators, regulators, and
the Armstrong Commission, this practice was one of those that was “rotten
to the core,” and it was one that, apparently, was institutional and systemic.
Courts confronting this practice in the early twentieth century had
considerable trouble regulating insurers’ delay in acting on applications
because the legal doctrines of that time were inapplicable.14 Unless a
temporary binder was issued, there was no contract between applicant and
insurer to which contract law principles could be applied; furthermore,
14

For examples of cases declining to hold the insurer liable for delay in acting
on an application, see Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 121 So. 487, 489
(Miss. 1929) (fact that insurer is granted franchise to do business in the state does
not impose upon them a duty to consider promptly all who apply).
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there was no basis for finding that the insurer had taken action that would
create a contractual obligation. The applicant made the offer to form the
contract with the application; if the application was not accepted, no
contract was formed. Courts correctly described the insurer’s inaction on
the application as “silence,” but under the rules of contract law, silence did
not constitute acceptance absent special circumstances,15 none of which
existed in the typical fact pattern. Construing the insurer’s retention of the
premium as a promise to be bound was not a plausible interpretation of the
usual circumstances. Estoppel, as it was understood both then and now
under the label “equitable estoppel,” did not fit because there was no false
or misleading statement inducing reliance.16 Promissory estoppel as a basis
for recognizing the existence of a contract was a doctrine in its infancy; yet
the insurer made no promise that might induce detrimental reliance, which
was essential from the beginning of the doctrine’s history to finding an
enforceable promise in the absence of offer, acceptance, and a
consideration that was the object of a bargained-for exchange.17
As we now know, many courts attempted to regulate the insurer
misbehavior, and these courts, looking for ways to extend the established
doctrines of that era, approved the principle of imposed responsibility
grounded in the recognition of a duty to act.18 The circularity of this
15

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981)
(“Acceptance by silence is exceptional. Ordinarily offeror does not have power to
cause the silence of the offeree to operate as acceptance. . . . The exceptional cases
where silence can be acceptance . . . [are] those where the offeree silently takes
offered benefits, and those where one party relies on the other party’s
manifestation of intention that silence may operate as acceptance.”).
16
The elements of equitable estoppel are generally described as: (1) belief and
reliance on a representation; (2) a change of position because of the representation;
(3) detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position. See, e.g., Cothern v.
Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1249 (Miss. 2000) (discussing elements in context
of former supervisor’s action against employer); Lybbert v. Grant Cnty., 1 P.3d
1124, 1128 (Wash. 2000) (discussing elements of equitable estoppel in context of
county’s effort to assert insufficient service of process as affirmative defense).
17
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (elements of
promissory estoppel are a promise and substantial reliance that is actual and
reasonably foreseeable, in circumstances where enforcing the promise is necessary
in the interests of justice).
18
See, e.g., Boyer v. State Farmers’ Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 121 P. 329, 331 (Kan.
1912) (hail insurance policy that issued policy day after crop was destroyed by
hailstorm is liable in damages due to unreasonable delay by its soliciting agent in
forwarding the application); Wilken v. Capital Fire Ins. Co. of Lincoln, 157 N.W.
1021, 1022-23 (Neb. 1916) (bank’s delay in returning application was act of agent
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reasoning begs the question of exactly where this duty came from. Some
courts found it in the idea that a company doing business under a franchise
assumes a duty toward the public,19 but why this would be so is not
obvious. Presumably the intended logic underlying this conclusion is that
the protection afforded the franchise through its enforcement by the state
created a reciprocal obligation – essentially, a quid pro quo – on the part of
the franchise holder to serve the state, i.e., the public, with prompt action
on the public’s requests, applications, etc. Failure to do so breached the
duty, and damages caused by the breach could be remedied in tort.
This reasoning sounded plausible and authoritative, and, expressed
as a rationale for a decision, seemed to have its anchor in other more
familiar legal principles with which we are comfortable. But as frequently
illustrated during the centuries in which the common law has evolved, new
reasoning when applied to other similar situations can cause extreme
havoc. For example, if the existence of the insurance franchise is what
establishes the duty, the duty to act must presumably exist in the business
activities of other kinds of corporations and business organizations
operating under franchises. An obvious example is a bank; thus, does it
follow that a bank which receives an application for a loan and delays
acting upon it breaches the duty to act and thereby commits a tort?20
Of course, if we sense that this goes too far and that a bank should
not be liable for delay in acting on an application for a loan, we are
challenged to explain why a franchise to engage in the insurance business
imposes a more robust duty to act without delay. Taking up the challenge,
we would argue that “ordinary business” is not the same as the insurance
business. Banks and other lenders acting on applications for loans are
engaged in “ordinary business,” like those who sell products, services,
licenses, information, and so forth. These products, services, etc. are not the
of insurer, and insurer is responsible for damage caused by delay in acting on
application); Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1930)
(under Wisconsin law, insurance company may be liable for delay in passing upon
application).
19
See Duffy v. Bankers’ Life Ass’n, 139 N.W. 1087, 1090 (Iowa 1913)
(insurance company “holds and is acting under a franchise from the state”).
20
See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.
1993) (affirming district court’s finding that “the Bank had no fiduciary duty to
accept or respond promptly”); Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817
So. 2d 665, 681 (Ala. 2001) (“‘There is . . . no tort liability for nonfeasance for
failing to do what one has promised to do in the absence of a duty to act apart from
the promise made.’” (quoting Morgan v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107,
114 (Ala. 1985))).
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same as insurance -- which is special, distinctive, and different. Because
insurance is special, the duties that attach to the corporation or business
organization engaging in the insurance business are greater. If the principle
we use to justify finding a duty to act would also make those engaged in
“ordinary business” liable, then we must be applying the wrong principle to
the problem arising in the “ordinary business.” Insurance is special; it is
distinctive; it is different. The insurance business is imbued with the public
interest in a way that “ordinary business,” such as the business of banks
making loans) is not.
Interestingly, the framework just described is exactly where the
law is landing in the early twenty-first century. On the issue of whether
lenders ought to have liability in tort for negligent delay in processing an
application for a loan, it is easy to see that an applicant for a loan could be
harmed with the loss of favorable financing terms due to the passage of
time during which the lender delays. Yet the consensus, at least thus far,
from cases that date back to shortly after the explosion in insurance bad
faith litigation, is that recognizing tort liability for lenders in the financial
industries is problematic, and, except for rare exceptions that have not
garnered a strong following,21 courts have not embraced the idea.22 It
appears that the insurance business is special, but the lending business is
not, and the more rigorous analysis applied to insurance industry practices
by insurance law is not something that is or will be applied in similar
fashion in the lending industry.
Thus, perhaps the decisive reason for recognizing an insurer’s tort
duty to act promptly on an application for insurance is not the existence of
the franchise but is instead the existence of a relationship imbued with the
public interest. To what other analogous situations might this principle
apply? Consider markets for employment: it is certainly in the public
interest that those who are able to work have jobs that enable them to earn
salaries or wages sufficient to support themselves and their dependents. But
are we willing to use public interest analysis to create a rule that employers,
many of whom obviously do not operate under franchises, are obligated to
act promptly on applications for employment? The answer is, apparently,
no. So here, as with lending, we conclude that employment,
notwithstanding its obvious importance, is “ordinary business” -- or it is
21

See Jacques v. First Nat. Bank of Md., 515 A.2d 756, 762 (1986) (bank that
agrees to process application for loan owes customer duty of reasonable care in
processing and determination of the application).
22
See Nan S. Ellis & John A. Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently
Processing Loan Applications, 92 DICK. L. REV. 363, 366-68 (1988).
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not “business” at all under some kind of conclusory rule that “employment
is labor, and business is business.” As we keep delay in acting upon
applications for employment out of the realm where courts will provide a
remedy, we embrace the idea that insurance is somehow special,
distinctive, different, and in need of a different legal framework than what
applies to other “ordinary” business practices in other markets,
notwithstanding the obvious importance of the transactions that occur in
those other markets.
The foregoing, of course, is exactly Professor Abraham’s point.
Upon a close look, the decades-old recognition of the insurer’s tort duty to
act promptly on applications comes from the legal system’s negative
reaction to institutional, systemic, rotten-to-the-core bad faith practices that
compromise the value of seeking and securing insurance protection. In
other words, insurers have a responsibility to act promptly on applications;
this obligation is embedded in the nature of the insurance business, where
security from the risks of loss is the subject of the bargain; damage is
foreseeable in the absence of the insurer’s reasonably diligent action on the
application; negligent retention of the application without prompt action
sounds like a tort; and courts are comfortable finding a tort-based duty to
act promptly on an insurance application, with damages flowing from the
breach of this duty. If the delay in acting on the application cases had arisen
in the late twentieth and early twentieth-first century, they surely would
have been pleaded as bad faith cases, consistently with the other examples
referenced by Professor Abraham and other commentators. Reduced to its
essence, the practice of insurer delay in responding to applications appears
to have been a systemic, institutional practice sharing the “rotten to the
core” characteristics of the practices that have produced the bad faith
claims processing litigation of recent years. The law’s response to the older
practices reveals the specialness and distinctiveness of insurance as
profoundly as the modern responses continue to demonstrate.
In addition to the duty to act on applications, there are other
examples in the past of what we would today label institutional, systemic
bad faith. Of the four modern examples of institutional, systemic bad faith
discussed by Professor Abraham, the one involving contingent
commissions does not involve bad faith claims processing. How much is
wrong with contingent commission arrangements and the manner in which
such secret commission deals should be regulated are unresolved questions
today; the regulatory options range from disclosure of the arrangements on
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the one hand to outright prohibition on the other.23 This controversy is
reminiscent of a past widespread industry practice – premium and
commission rebating -- where the question was whether to regulate and, if
so, how. Early in the twentieth century, the question of whether premium
and commission rebating was valid was settled in the legislative arenas
with the answer “no.”24 This history is revealing on the subject of insurance
law’s specialness, distinctiveness, and difference.
The anti-rebate statutes have their roots in the rapid expansion of
the life insurance industry in the late nineteenth century, and it is fair to
characterize that period of expansion as endemic with high pressure sales
tactics, deceptive trade practices, and very high agent commissions.25 In
this wild-west market, agents created a variety of ways to refund portions
of their commissions to customers, and rebating gradually became
perceived as an evil that led to inequality and discrimination among
applicants, with the privileged getting good deals unavailable to the general
public. Rebating came to be considered a threat to the integrity of the
insurance business, and insurance regulators acting in the public interest
sought to prohibit it. That rebating of commissions in the insurance setting
is an untoward business practice remains the prevailing view today.
Yet, interestingly enough, rebates of commissions, payments, or
other consideration through renegotiated business arrangements are met
with less hostility when they occur outside the insurance business. In real
estate transactions, for example, it is common for a person represented by a
broker during negotiations with a prospective buyer over price to
simultaneously renegotiate the commission to be paid her agent in the
transaction. Similarly, cash-back rebates when a consumer buys a product
and meets certain eligibility conditions are not seriously questioned as
unfair price discrimination, and cash-back rebates for making purchases
with a credit card are virtually the norm. By analogy to these practices, one
can legitimately wonder what would be wrong with negotiating an

23

See generally, Hazel Beh & Amanda M. Willis, Insurance Intermediaries,
15 CONN. INS. L.J. 571, 591-94 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The
Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 321-23
(2007).
24
For discussion of the history of this practice, see Robert H. Jerry, II &
Reginald Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation of Insurance Agent
Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under State Constitutions, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 776-80 (1990).
25
See Constitutionality of Ins. Anti-Rebate Law, 1996 Alaska Op. Att’y Gen.
(Apr. 22).
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individualized commission with an insurance agent based on the value of
the agent’s services and the prospective insured’s interest in using them.
Yet as a matter of statutory law, the insurance agent is required to
decline summarily any such request for a refund of a portion of the
commission on the grounds that doing so would be illegal.26 Whether this
regulatory framework is wise is a question for another day (and if
contingent commissions are declared illegal, the wisdom of that prohibition
will also continue to be debated). The fact remains, however, that a practice
tolerated in other contexts is prohibited in insurance, reminding us that
insurance is special, distinctive, and different. What we tolerate in other
business settings with regard to commission splitting, rebating, etc. is not
tolerated in insurance under the reasoning that this would create
impermissible inequities among classes of purchasers and might even
threaten the solvency of insurers if premium rebates became too common.
This has the effect of treating insurance as a quasi-public good; just as
similarly situated consumers should pay the same rates for water,
electricity, or fire protection, similarly situated consumers should not be
able to strike back-room deals that change the price paid for the same
product, and insurers should not be able to engage in systemic, institutional
practices that advantage a privileged few at the expense of the many. This,
again, is precisely the point made by Professor Abraham:
[T]the bad faith behavior in each instance is
something that we probably would tolerate, and
have the law tolerate, if it were a different sort of
business enterprise that engaged in this behavior.
. . . If an auto parts retailer had a secret deal
with some manufacturers that it would be paid an
26

See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So. 2d 1210, 1221 (Fla. 2000)
(declaring anti-rebate statutes unconstitutional “to the extent they prohibit title
insurance agents from rebating a portion of their risk premium”); Dep't of Ins. v.
Dade Cnty. Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1986)
(holding the Florida statute unconstitutional “to the extent they prohibit rebates of
insurance agents' commissions”). The California rebate law was repealed by
Proposition 103 in 1988. See, The McCarran-Ferguson Act Before the Antitrust
Modernization Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2006) (statement of Jay Angoff, Of Counsel,
Roger
Brown
&
Associates),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Angoff.pd
f (last visited July 22, 2012). Despite the invalidity of the statutes in those two
states, there are no readily available indications that consumers are seeking to
negotiate rebates or commission returns with agents, brokers, or insurers.
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annual rebate that increased if products liability
suits against the manufacturer decreased, we
would consider this no business of those who
purchased the auto parts in question, even if this
affected which customers were influenced to buy
which kinds of parts. These would be examples
of harsh, slightly unsavory dealing, but that’s
about it.27
This point is correct not only with respect to the examples discussed by
Professor Abraham but also with respect, in the insurance setting, to the act
of rebating itself.
Another example of institutional, systemic bad faith from the past
is found in claims processing regulations created in the early twentieth
century. Insurers’ use of the defense of misrepresentation has a long and
interesting history, but the portion of the narrative relevant here involves
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century practice where life insurers
frequently alleged misrepresentation by the applicant when a claim for
proceeds was filed many years after the policy had been issued. In these
circumstances, the beneficiaries had great difficulty refuting, and would
perhaps be unable to refute, the insurer’s assertion of the defense. Aware
of the mismatch between beneficiaries and the insurer in this setting, many
insurers took advantage and pressed the disparity to their financial
advantage, or at least so the common wisdom ran. This systemic,
institutional, “rotten-to-the-core” practice led to the widespread enactment
of incontestability statutes early in the twentieth century. If a similar kind
of regulation exists in another contracting context, it is obscure. Once
again, this systemic, institutional insurer practice, and the regulatory
response to it, illustrates that insurance has a special, distinctive status
among the relationships, products, and services that consumers purchase
and acquire. Not surprisingly, the law governing insurance recognizes this
specialness and assumes the characteristics and dimensions of a body of
law operating in its own field with its own principles and rules.
I like the statement “[l]ife is uncertain”28 because it expresses in
three words the basic truth upon which all of the business and law of
insurance, not to mention most human behavior, is based. I also like
Professor Leonard Moldinow’s observation that “our clear visions of

27
28

See Abraham, supra note 1, at 13.
Robert H. Jerry, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 9 (1st ed. 1987).
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inevitability are often only illusions.”29 Blending these two insights yields a
third: In life and in law, one can always look back and say “there are many
different ways this could have unfolded.” Just as the core insight that
insurance law is special, distinct, and different can be articulated in
different ways,30 the path through which this core insight is manifested in
the law could have evolved differently than it did, and there are multiple
paths that its future evolution might take. Looking backwards, we might
observe that the core insight has been in the middle of some jurisprudential
currents that flowed parallel to those of insurance law during most of the
twentieth century. A notable example is the analysis of Friedrich Kessler
presented in his 1943 article in the Columbia Law Review on standardized
forms,31 arguably the most prominent of the early explorations of the
challenges standardization poses to the principles of contract law. Kessler
used insurance policies as his principal example, discussed the problem of
insurers’ delay in acting on applications, and presented what was probably
the first articulation of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.32 Early in
the article, Kessler explained how courts had succeeded in reaching just
decisions in construing ambiguous claims against the policies’ drafters –
even in cases where there was no ambiguity. He then observed that these
techniques, however, were unable to address a problem arising in contract
formation – delay in acting on an application. He observed that courts
29

LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS
RULES OUR LIVES 218 (2008).
30
See supra pp. 1-2.
31
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
32
Kessler plainly recognized “reasonable expectations” permeates “our whole
law of contacts,” and embraced the notion that contract terms should be rewritten
to fulfill reasonable expectations. Id. at 629, 637. However, credit for recognizing
the doctrine of reasonable expectations is given to Professor Robert Keeton, who
while a professor at Harvard Law School wrote a seminal article titled Insurance
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
Professor Keeton’s thesis was that many courts had applied familiar rules to the
end of not enforcing clear contract language based on one of the parties'
“reasonable expectations” of coverage. Id. This two-part article is a remarkable
work that brought together a large number of related principles, all of which serve
to demonstrate why insurance and the law governing it are special. Kessler,
however, put squarely on the table the notion that with standardized contracts, “[i]t
can hardly be objected that the resulting task of rewriting, if necessary, the contents
of a contract of adhesion is foreign to the function of common law courts.”
Kessler, supra note 31, at 637 (emphasis added).
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seeking to solve this problem had invoked a tort law duty to act promptly
on an application as the solution.
Kessler’s broader point was essentially to advocate, like some
other scholars of that era, that contract law be divided into dual
frameworks: one for negotiated contracts between parties with roughly
equal information and bargaining power, and one for contracts created
through the use of standardized forms. He wrote:
[Here is the] basic issue with which the courts in the
insurance cases are confronted. It is: can the unity of the
law of contracts be maintained in the face of the increasing
use of contracts of adhesion? The few courts which allow
recovery in contract and the many which allow recovery in
tort feel more or less clearly that insurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion, and try to protect the weaker
contracting party against the harshness of the common law
and against what they think are abuses of freedom of
contract. The courts denying recovery, on the other hand,
cling to the belief that an application for insurance is not
different from any other offer, and they are convinced that
efforts to build up by trial and error a dual system of
contract law must inevitably undermine the security
function of all law, particularly since courts are ill
equipped to decide whether and to what extent an
insurance contract has compulsory features.33
Kessler favored a dual system where standardized contracts received
heightened regulation. Importantly, a major reason he came to that
conclusion was because he understood that insurance involved a different
kind of contract, where the subject of exchange was more important than
the ordinary commodities exchanged in other contracts. To preserve and
promote this value, he proposed that the law of torts be used to “nullify
those parts of the law of contracts which in the public interest are regarded
as inapplicable.”34
Professor Abraham’s continuum, where insurance law rests in the
middle between ordinary contract law on the one hand and government
regulation on the other, is entirely consistent with Professor Kessler’s
observation that contract law’s unity was not sustainable, and that
33
34

Kessler, supra note 31, at 636 (emphasis added).
Id.
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standardized contracts (e.g., insurance contracts) needed a different system
of governance than ordinary contracts freely negotiated between parties of
roughly equivalent bargaining power. Kessler’s embrace of tort principles
to deal with the problem of an insurer’s delay in acting on applications was
essentially the equivalent of putting the tort-driven new principles of the
“new contract law” in the center of the continuum.
Later in the twentieth century, Professor Robert Keeton addressed
the question of the insurers’ delay in acting on an application in his 1971
Basic Text on Insurance.35 He began with an overview of the limitations of
existing estoppel, contract, and tort doctrines to address the harm caused by
insurers’ delay.36 Having catalogued various reasons these doctrines were
inadequate to address the issue, he advanced arguments for “a somewhat
broader liability than that imposed in tort.”37 His initial argument was
essentially an economic efficiency rationale without the dressing of the
vocabulary of law and economics; he essentially suggested that insurers
could spread the risk of delay’s harm across premium-paying insured more
efficiently.38 His second argument came back to the fundamental premise
that insurance law is different, distinctive, and special. Invoking and citing
Kessler, he observed that insurance transactions almost always involve “the
standardized mass contract” and “courts should develop a different set of
doctrines for such cases, rather than allowing technical doctrines of
contract law to defeat liability when public interest would be served by
imposing it.”39 Moreover, just as “railroad companies have been required
to furnish transportation to all qualified passengers and shippers, . . . an
insurance company might similarly be regarded as a public service
company, under a legal duty to insure upon reasonable terms all properly
qualified applicants.”40 Keeton wrote that the case law as of 1971 had not
yet reached the ‘insurance as public service company’ principle, but he
believed a ‘different kind of contract law’ was already being applied, even
if courts “seldom expressed [it] in this way.”41
Bad faith has now reached middle age. With the helpful insights of
Professor Abraham, we can now see in bad faith’s evolution additional
evidence that insurance law is special, distinctive, and different, and we
35

ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW (1971).
Id. at 45-48.
37
Id. at 48.
38
Id. at 48-49.
39
Id. at 49.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 50.
36
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have another way to express it. As a result, “our understanding of what
insurance law is, and what insurance does” is, in fact, now deeper.42

42

See Abraham, supra note 1, at 13.

THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW—A PRIMER
RONEN AVRAHAM1
***
This article presents a law and economics perspective on the topic of
insurance law as a whole. In doing so it provides both an overview major
topics in insurance law as well as a discussion on the major themes of the
economic analysis of insurance law and its leading cases. The paper also
presents a theoretical framework—the two islands functional approach—
that can help solve insurance law puzzles. Ultimately, this paper could
help any insurance law judge, lawyer, or student as well as any legislature
to correctly conceptualize and solve the legal problems facing courts and
insurance lawyers alike.
***
Imagine two islands.
These two islands are identical in almost every way—from their
white sand beaches, to their elaborate hotels, to their coconut oil powered
insurance text book printing facilities. The only difference between the
islands is the insurance regime for automobile accidents. On the first island,
everyone buys first-party insurance. This means that if you are involved in
a car accident you file a claim with your own automobile insurance
company which will pay for your damages. On the second island, however,
everyone is required to buy third-party liability insurance, and first-party
insurance is not available. This means that if you are involved in car
accident you file a claim with the insurance company of the person who hit
you. Which island would you prefer to live on?
On the first island, you enjoy the benefit of choosing your own
insurance. You can ensure that you buy from a company that is reliable and
will pay for any harm you incur in the case of an accident. You can also
guarantee you have as much coverage as you want, so driving your Bentley
around town is a less harrowing prospect. But not everything is great about
this island. You may, in fact, not drive carefully enough, knowing that after
all you are fully insured, or almost so. And what about the fact that being a
1

Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor in Law, University of Texas School of
Law. I thank Kyle Logue, Ariel Porat, Uriel Procaccia, Daniel Schwarcz, Peter
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victim of an accident—even one that is not your fault—may raise your
premiums because it is your insurance company that is paying for the
damage? A first-party insurance regime may also penalize the poor, whose
cars may be less inwardly safe, since insurance premiums would reflect not
only the likelihood of the insured being harmed in an accident but also the
magnitude of the harm, and unsafe cars do not adequately protect drivers.
A first-party insurance regime could also incentivize drivers to buy more
outwardly dangerous cars—cars with ramming guards, or behemoth trucks
that would do grave damage to another car in an accident—but would leave
the driver and her vehicle relatively unharmed, resulting in lower
premiums.
Now let’s look at the second island. Since third-party liability
insurance premiums reflect not the potential of harm to you, but the
potential for you to negligently harm others, they only penalize you for
being negligent in an accident, not for simply being in an accident. This
incentivizes drivers to not drive negligently and might lead to a safer
driving environment. Third-party liability insurance may also incentivize
cars that are more outwardly safe. However, it also puts the insured at the
mercy of other drivers—who may be incentivized to buy minimum
coverage from less than reliable operators—potentially becoming
judgment-proof for large-scale accidents. If you are hit by a driver without
enough coverage, you may have to bear a large portion of your harm
yourself.
There is a lot more to be said, but for now let us pause and think:
can you tell which island is better? Without a more nuanced theoretical
analysis and a wealth of empirical evidence it is difficult, if not impossible,
to decide. The purpose of this article, in fact, is not so much to answer this
question – which has been discussed by Guido Calabresi almost three
decades ago2 – but rather to provide a theoretical framework helpful to
answering this and similar questions. This framework can provide judges
and policy makers a first approximation to determine the best normative
solution, from a law and economics perspective, for many different
insurance law disputes. Since insurance law is heavily embedded in
insurance theory, the latter being primarily the economics of insurance, my
hope is that by explaining the foundations of insurance theory readers will
find it easier to understand insurance law. More precisely, this article
2

See Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability
Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 833 (1984).
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intends to present the theoretical and practical difficulties posed by
insurance law and to propose a conceptual framework—the two islands
approach—as a way to better conceptualize the shortcomings and
inefficiencies of insurance law’s various doctrines.
The theoretical framework presented here should help transform
the way courts interpret insurance contracts (in short, subjective and
objective interpretation of the parties’ intentions) to a simple thinking tool
which allows courts first, to identify the relevant variables and second, to
determine the optimal solution. Even when the framework cannot provide a
definite answer, it at least provides a road map for asking the relevant
questions to focus the analyst’s attention on the relevant missing empirical
data.3
The standard insurance dispute arises because the insurer denied
coverage, relying on the language of the contract, or a general principle of
insurance law, such as lack of insurable interest. How can we know
whether the denial is justified? The tension in such situations is between
the ex-post and the ex-ante, between providing coverage to the insured who
had suffered a loss, and not distorting the insured’s (and the insurer’s)
incentives to minimize loss.
If the denial of coverage serves a sound function in the insurance
market, then it should be upheld. For example, if the denial of coverage
eliminates insureds’ strategic behavior while not creating a larger problem
of insurers’ strategic behavior, then it is probably justified. Such is the
exclusion, for example, on coverage of liability for intentional torts.
Another example would be the exclusions of coverage for automobile
accidents from homeowners insurance which could be justified in that
insurers ensure the pool of homeowner insureds contains similar risks,
eliminating cross subsidization of those without cars of those with cars,
which, as we will see below, might lead to inefficient risk classification. If
the administrative costs in determining the validity of an exclusion are too
high, a bright-line rule might be appropriate. Other times, when
administrative costs are not a problem, a case-by-case approach which
evaluates a specific exclusion is ideal.
3

Others have previously argued American courts should use a more normative
approach when deciding insurance law issues. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products
Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (arguing courts should treat insurance litigation similar
to how products liability litigation is treated, and do so by looking to the value of a
given policy term).
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I call the approach proposed here “the two islands functional
approach” because it requires the analyst to focus on the function of the
coverage denial. The analyst ought to compare two states of the world—
two islands—one where the relevant exclusion exists and one where it does
not. Much like in the opening example for this paper, on these islands,
everything else is the same except for whether or not the denial of coverage
exists. Sometimes, one island is clearly superior to the other. On other
occasions, the superiority of any given solution depends on (sometimes
missing) empirical evidence.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 begins
with an overview of insurance and the relationship between the contracting
parties, discusses some historical and conceptual background to insurance,
and then explains why we need insurance at all. Section 2 starts dealing
with impediments to the efficient insurance contract. It discusses the most
important impediments—those evolving from the double-sided asymmetric
information between the parties. Section 3 discusses other impediments to
efficient contracting such as transaction costs and externalities. It highlights
more complicated factors which differentiate the sale of insurance and the
sale of other goods—such as the existence of agents and the conflict of
interest it brings about. At measured intervals throughout Sections 2 and 3 I
use the Two Islands Functional Approach to evaluate one of the solutions
to insurance impediments. These illustrations are not meant to be
exhaustive, as that would be impossible, but rather to demonstrate how the
approach can be used to assist a judge or other decision maker. Section 4
concludes.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE
A.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURER AND INSURED

Insurance is a legal mechanism by which the insured pays a
premium to purchase from an insurer some financial protection against a
future potential loss. The goal of this transaction is to provide the insured
protection from financial risks to her assets, health, and life, or from third
party claims, while incentivizing her to guard against those risks.
In many ways, insureds, purchasers of insurance, are like other types of
consumers in their need for some type of legal protection against sellers, in
this case insurance companies, or insurers. However, insureds may even be
in a worse position than other consumers because insureds do not buy
anything tangible that they can use immediately and return to the store if
they do not like it. An insured cannot return his health insurance and begin
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comparison-shopping once he is in a hospital. Rather, insureds purchase a
promise for future financial protection in the case of a covered occurrence.
The problem is that the product sold, insurance coverage, is not usually
well defined in the minds of insureds. What exactly is covered under the
policy? What type of “protection” will be delivered? What constitutes an
“occurrence” which triggers coverage? Not only are all of these left
undefined in the minds of insureds, but they are all widely litigated
questions. That there are so many hidden characteristics in the product of
insurance compared with other goods and services, and that as a result there
is a lot of room for insurers’ strategic behavior, suggests that insureds
require even more protection than other consumers.
But that is just part of what is unique about insurance. Perhaps
unlike other types of consumer contracts, the sellers/insurers deserve some
protection as well.
Sellers in other industries usually price their product or service
based primarily on the cost of its production and the seller’s market power.
While the market equilibrium price is determined by the supply and
demand for the product, the seller’s costs of production are almost never
correlated with consumers’ demand for the product. Consumers’ demand,
in turn, is a function of their preferences, available substitutes, and a host of
other factors. But in insurance markets, things are different. An individual’s
risk type— her hidden characteristics or level of engagement in strategic
behavior—determine not only the demand but also directly affect the cost
of the product.4 While sellers in other consumer contracts may be exposed
to some small financial risk if a consumer’s check bounces, or to some
legal risk if their product is defective, that risk is limited. In contrast, the
cost of production of insurance coverage crucially depends on the insured’s
strategic behavior and hidden characteristics. In the health insurance
market, for example, it is the insured’s lifestyle and dietary choices, and in
the automobile insurance market, the insureds driving decisions. Thus,
insurers are not only exposed to the risks regular sellers are exposed to, but
also to a much greater risk of systematically under-pricing their product
due to asymmetry of information between them and their insureds
regarding their insureds’ strategic behavior or hidden characteristics.
However, one has to remember that unlike insureds, insurers are well aware
of the asymmetric information problem and the risks it carries and they

4

Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and
Empirics in Pictures, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 115 (2011).
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have developed various means, to be detailed below, to combat this
problem.
But that is still not the entire story.
The reason why insurers deserve some protection goes deeper. In
regular goods and services industries a financial collapse of a seller will
lead to losses only for the various entities it contracted with, such as its
employees, shareholders, suppliers, etc. It will not lead to a great loss to its
existing customers. Existing customers might be harmed if they need to
replace, upgrade, or repair their goods, but they usually do not lose the
money they initially spent on the product. In contrast, when an insurance
company cannot deliver on its promise, some customers will be left with
large uncompensated losses while others will lose the money paid for the
covered period. Many of them will no longer be able to find coverage
elsewhere, and those who would might have to pay a much higher
premium. While this may be a problem in other industries where money is
paid in advance, ordinarily it is not as pronounced as in insurance, where
contracts may last for decades. This suggests that in addition to the normal
social welfare reason to ensure contracts are efficient (more on this below),
there is a strong consumerist reason to ensure insurance contracts are
sustainable—therefore guaranteeing that insurance companies do not
collapse and cause insureds to forfeit their premiums. This, in turn, means
that there is a consumerist reason for the contracts to be efficient. Efficient
contracts—those made with perfect information and low transaction
costs—are those that maximize social welfare while still sustaining the
company providing the contract.
Hidden characteristics and strategic behavior are much greater risks
in the insurance industry than in most other sales industries. Both the seller
and the consumer may have hidden characteristics or engage in strategic
behavior. But because of the abstract nature of the good, the negative effect
of the characteristics is much more pronounced in an insurance contract.
The risk of double-sided hidden characteristics and strategic behavior is
that the contract between the parties will not be efficient and the costs of
these unknown risks will not be properly allocated. In particular, as will be
explained below, these informational impediments give rise to problems of
adverse selection, reverse adverse selection, moral hazard, and reverse
moral hazard.
The economic analysis approach to insurance law employs the
efficient insurance contract paradigm. According to this paradigm,
insurance law should be viewed as doing not much more than protecting
insureds and insurers from contracting inefficiently due to transaction costs
primarily in the form of each other’s strategic behavior and hidden
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characteristics. That is, at least, the approach this article takes in addressing
the problems posed by these informational asymmetries and destructive
incentives, as well as other economic inefficiencies such as administrative
costs, negative externalities, correlated risks, non-competitive pricing and
irrational behavior.
This article adopts an ex ante outlook toward the evaluation of
insurance disputes, refocusing the discussion from the facts of a particular
case—where tragic events can often cloud a court’s judgment—to how a
ruling would affect the overall pool of insureds and society at large. This
can be seen in the applications of the Two Islands Functional Approach
throughout the paper.
B.

SOME HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

In the historical record, the first instances of insurance date back to
the Babylonians in the fourth millennium B.C. Insurance plans and the law
have interacted since at least the time of Hammurabi’s Code, which
included references to primitive private insurance contracts. Public
insurance policies first appeared during the time of ancient Rome,
including the government’s underwriting of merchants’ losses due to
storms or capture at sea. Private risk spreading was common from ancient
times to the post middle-ages through friendly societies that spread the cost
of some risks among their members. Such societies existed in what is
currently China, India, Greece, Israel, Italyand other countries in medieval
Europe, providing insurance against illness, death, marine and fire risk, and
even legal liabilities. And of course, rudimentary risk-sharing arrangements
such as share-cropping have been common throughout history. While not a
formal insurance, these arrangements served many of the same purposes. 5
Today’s modern insurance industry provides a wide variety of products.
These products can be classified in multiple ways. First, the classification
may focus on who bears a loss. For example, first-party insurance covers
losses sustained by the actual holder of the insurance policy. Health-care
insurance is an example. If an insured gets sick and has to pay for care,
thus bearing the loss, the insured herself is reimbursed. Third-party
insurance, on the other hand, covers losses caused by the holder onto
others, when the holder could be exposed to legal liability for causing that
5

DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE
RISK MANAGER 27-28 (2002). For ancient Israel, see Babylonian Talmud, Baba
Kama 117.
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loss. Malpractice liability insurance is an example. If a lawyer makes a
mistake and causes his client a loss, the lawyer’s insurer pays the client
who actually had to bear the loss.6
Another way to categorize insurance is by the type of loss insured.
Health insurance protects against costs associated with health care.
Malpractice liability insurance protects against costs associated with
malpractice. Likewise, life insurance covers costs associated with the loss
of life and property insurance covers damage to property.
The modern industry is also surrounded by a broad institutional
infrastructure. The institutions are those common to all areas of the law:
legislatures, regulators, and courts. In the United States, insurance is
largely governed by state rather than federal law.7 While laws may
prescribe or prohibit certain behavior by insureds or insurers—such as
requiring people to have coverage, or requiring insurers to provide
coverage—mostly legislatures create regulatory schemes and delegate
rulemaking authority to agencies and commissioners. The role insurance
commissioners or agencies perform varies widely by jurisdiction.
Generally, the administrative function is divided into rulemaking—such as
creating requirements for certain types of coverage—and enforcement—
ensuring insurers follow the rules. Courts also participate in the policing.
They have a large role in defining the contractual relationship between
insureds and insurers and between the insurance companies and the
regulators.8

C.

6

SOME FUNCTIONS OF INSURANCE

It is possible to see liability insurance as first party insurance. The lawyer is
forced to pay for the harms she caused, and the liability insurer is merely repaying
the lawyer for this personal loss. Nonetheless, it is common practice to classify
liability insurance as third-party insurance, and treat the loss being insured against
as that of the outside party.
7
Though the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 are major exceptions.
8
Michelle Boardman, Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1105, 1107 (2006) (contending that most policy language, specifically boilerplate
language so prevalent in policies, is targeted at courts, not the insureds); see also
Schwarcz, supra note 1 (arguing there is a role for courts in the regulation of
insurance, and that role should mirror products liability law).
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The underlying theme to all these historical developments and
theoretical principles is that individuals have a natural tendency to
recognize and be concerned about risk, whether to themselves, others, or
their property.9
Indeed, the vast majority of individuals, at least in the context of
possible large future losses, tend to respond to risk with risk aversion—the
preference for certainty over uncertainty with regard to future losses. Risk
aversion, a concept developed by the Swiss mathematician Daniel
Bernoulli, explains why an individual would rather pay $10,000 for an
insurance premium than $1,000,000 for a loss that occurs with a one in
hundred chance. More generally, a risk-averse individual will pay a small
premium now to protect against potentially large, but uncertain losses in
the future, when in all likelihood the total premiums paid will be more than
the eventual loss. While risk aversion has been traditionally considered a
near universal condition, risk neutrality (indifference to certainty or
uncertainty with regard to future losses) and risk-affinity (preferring
uncertainty over certainty) are also possible preferences.10
One of the most important developments in modern insurance came in the
formalizing of the basic principle of insurance in 1713 by Jacob Bernoulli,
who was Daniel Bernoulli’s uncle. The idea was that the sample mean for a
probabilistic set nears the expected mean for an occurrence or process in
9

Though recent work has looked at the fact that insureds do a relatively poor
job of buying insurance they should buy, and refraining from buying insurance
they should not buy. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance DecisionMaking and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS
64 (2005); see also Kyle D. Louge, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How The
Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2001-2002) (identifying reasons
for under-insuring in the life insurance context and suggesting the best legal
response).
10
Some like to root risk aversion on the observation that people have
diminishing marginal utility from money. But that is not a very helpful
observation, because, among other things, people demonstrate great heterogeneity
in levels of risk aversion in different contexts; A simpler approach is to consider
risk aversion part of people’s preferences, which determine their demand for
insurance. But see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (advocating an
alternative approach to the risk aversion hypothesis); Kahneman and Tversky’s
work was later incorporated into legal theory. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein
& Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998).
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the population as the sample size increases. For example, if the average risk
of an insured getting a certain type of cancer is 5%, then the larger the pool,
the closer the pool’s cancer rate will be to 5%. This is known as the law of
large numbers. The obvious extrapolation to be made is that pooling of
risks reduces the risk per insured, as long as these risks are not perfectly
correlated. This principle is apparent in all the instances of insurance
practices described below.
Insurance policies utilize the law of large numbers to reduce
uncertainty for risk-averse individuals. The first step in that process is risk
transfer, by which the risk of a certain event is shifted from one party to
another.11 The law of large numbers, discussed above, allows an insurer to
predict with reasonable certainty the aggregate losses it will pay in a given
year—assuming that neither adverse selection nor moral hazard, both
discussed below, bias the analysis—and to adjust its premiums accordingly.
Thus premiums offered by an insurer equal the value of the risk of loss,
plus administrative fees and profit to the insurer. Insureds are willing to
pay the excess over the value of the risk due to their risk aversion.12
Risk aversion by itself, however, cannot fully explain the existence of the
entire insurance industry. For example, even companies which may be
large enough to not be considered risk averse at all, indeed large enough to
be able to buy the insurance company, purchase insurance coverage. These
large companies do not need insurance to transfer risk as they are large
enough to remain exposed to many of their dissimilar, independent risks
11

Nearly every contract or transaction transfers risk in some way, such as the
risk that a seller’s costs will go up and make the transaction unprofitable for her. If
a buyer contracted for the right of specific performance—by explicitly or implicitly
paying a premium—then she is insured against any increase in the seller’s costs
because the buyer has already paid for the right to the receive the goods. See
Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric
Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies, 8 AM. L. ECON. REV. 523
(2006). Insurance arrangements are somewhat unique in that the risk to be
transferred is explicitly recognized by the arrangement—i.e. the risk that the
policy-holder will fall ill or that her home will be flooded. Of course, this is true of
other forms of insurance. For example, derivative financial instruments are tied to
particular risks, such as changes in value of securities or commodities or even
weather events.
12
Premiums are also determined based on expected and incurred investment
profits or losses, and the competitiveness of the markets. The expected rate of
return for investments affects the premium that an insurance company needs to
charge to maintain its margins. For simplicity I ignore that fact.
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and cancel them out on their own—a strategy called risk diversification.13
These large companies are considered more risk-neutral and capable of
self-insurance than individuals, yet those companies typically carry very
large insurance policies.14 So there must be another explanation besides
risk-aversion for the existence of insurance and, in fact, there are many of
them.15
One of the simplest and most fundamental functions served by an
insurer is the process of information gathering and knowledge production.
In a way, all other functions of the insurer rely on its ability to gather data
about the risks it intends to insure, including the frequency, severity, and
variance thereof, and to translate that data into policies and premiums. This
is why, as will be discussed below, the insurance industry is given some
immunity from federal antitrust laws.
Another explanation for why corporate entities purchase insurance
policies is the cheap claim-handling service provided by insurers,
particularly with regard to legal liability of corporations and healthinsurance coverage for their employees. The insurance company saves the
corporation administrative costs associated with receiving, processing,
negotiating, and paying out claims.16
Insurance also lowers negotiation costs between transacting parties
as it allows them to not have to worry about detailing various risks in the
contract between them. Insurance policies are thus an implicit party of
nearly all commercial interactions because parties can rely on insurance to
cover innumerable risks that would, if they had to be hedged in each and
every contract, add tremendous negotiation costs to every contract. In
addition, the existence of insurance reduces the need for and the cost of
litigation in the commercial context, which also reduces the costs parties
13

If the company is publicly held, then the true bearers of the risk, the
stockholders, have also spread out their own risk by owning a diversified portfolio.
See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT &
INSURANCE 171 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing reasons why companies purchase
insurance even though shareholder risks are already diversified).
14
Though the plans often have large deductibles that represent the share of the
risk the company feels comfortable bearing.
15
Victor Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of
Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541, 543-44 (2009) (discussing various benefits that
insurers provide to companies).
16
Göran Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of
Insurance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME II: CIVIL LAW
AND ECONOMICS 521, 526 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
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must account for in creating a transaction in the first place. By reducing
these costs, insurance plays an essential role in facilitating trade and
commerce.
Other explanations for carrying insurance include lowering the
expected transaction costs of bankruptcy, lowering the corporation's
expected tax liability, reducing regulatory constraints on firms, and
shielding them from class actions filed against them.17
Beyond these benefits, insurance companies also provide another
important function - that of loss prevention or minimization. Insurance
companies have the institutional expertise and knowledge to suggest and
implement cost-effective preventative measures.18 Consider, for example,
fire insurance on a commercial property worth $1 million. The chance of a
fire destroying the property in a given year is 1%, which means the
expected loss for that year is $10,000 and the insurance premium must be
at least slightly more than that amount. Now, assume that by installing a
sprinkler system, the risk of a fire destroying the property is cut in half,
meaning the premium to be paid is likely to be reduced to (slightly more
than) $5,000. If installing and maintaining the sprinkler system will cost
less than $5,000 per year, and its installation can be easily verified by the
insurer, the property owner has every incentive to invest in the sprinkler
system—a “loss control”—which reduces the risk of the loss in return for a
discounted premium.19 It is true that an uninsured person, generally, has an
even stronger incentive to prevent losses. The problem, however, is
knowing which steps to take, something that insurance companies are often
experts at. Furthermore, as will be explained below, in some contexts an
entity on the verge of bankruptcy, without insurance, may have only
minimal incentive to take care, as it has nothing to lose. However, the
17

See David Mayers & Clifford W, Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance, 55 J. BUS. 281 (1982) (conducting extensive work on why public
corporations purchase insurance); see also TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH,
ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 42 (2010) (documenting how Directors and Officers
liability insurance shields corporations from losses due to securities class actions
filed against them); Goldberg, supra note 14, at 543 (providing numerous reasons
why insurance is value enhancing despite arguably being inefficient for a risk
neutral company).
18
Goldberg, supra note 14, at 543-44.
19
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 11 (1986). How deductions incentivize loss prevention will be
explained below.
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possibility of a reduced premium restores the incentive of even that entity
to, for example, install the sprinkler system.
Insurance has some socially beneficial functions which go beyond
benefiting the direct parties to the insurance contract. One such function
served by compulsory insurance companies is gatekeeping, which is
accomplished in many of the most important sectors of modern economies.
Automobile insurance is required to drive a car; homeowners insurance is
often required to obtain a mortgage; and business owners insurance is often
required to take out a commercial loan. Insurers provide a way to screen
and filter individuals before they are permitted to undertake important, but
potentially socially harmful activities, thus serving effectively as quasiregulators. For instance, if a person has been in too many accidents for any
insurance company to offer him an automobile policy, the result is that he
cannot buy insurance and thus legally cannot drive a car. This keeps
society safer, at least as long as he does not drive without carrying
insurance. The gatekeeping function, however, may not be a social benefit
if the insurance industry acts inefficiently or considers factors—such as
race, gender, or nationality—that society views as inappropriate for
determining insurability.20
Another positive externality of a functioning insurance market is
that private insurance provides fast compensation to victims of disasters,
accidents, and torts, easing the burden on tax-funded social insurance
programs like Social Security disability benefits or FEMA’s Disaster Aid
Programs. For example, as of August 2006, only a year after the disaster,
insurers had already paid $17.6 billion for wind damage from Hurricane
Katrina.21 Without these payments, many more homeowners would likely
have been forced to turn to the government for assistance.
On the other hand, insurance affects social stratification in
significant, meaningful ways. The ability to obtain (and to afford
continuously) various types of insurance can be a serious and disconcerting
divide between the well-off and the lower classes, leading many states, and
recently the US Federal government, to provide national insurance,
especially health insurance, to lessen stratification.
Over all, insurance has many positive elements, and plays a
necessary role in nearly all commercial transactions. However, insurance
20

See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 517 (1983).
21
Joseph B. Treaster, Judge Rules for Insurers in Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2006 at C.
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can create negative externalities as well. For example, it is possible that
health insurance may encourage insureds to take less than optimal
precautions to avoid sickness, or doctors to perform unnecessary
procedures, or the medical device and drug industries to excessively
innovate, since insureds are sheltered from the true costs of these actions.
A policy makers committed to a well-functioning market should seek to
minimize these adverse consequences of insurance. These impediments to
efficient insurance contracts, and some potential solutions, are the core of
this article and are discussed in the following sections.
II.

INFORMATIONAL
IMPEDIMENTS
INSURANCE CONTRACTS

TO

EFFICIENT

According to the economic analysis of law, rational parties
operating in a perfectly competitive market (without transaction costs)
where everyone has complete information will voluntarily contract
efficiently to maximize their joint welfare. Absent externalities, these
contracts will also increase overall social welfare. That parties, especially
insureds, are not always rational has been widely documented will be
discussed in section 3 below,22. This section focuses on other impediments
to efficient insurance contracts—informational impediments and strategic
behavior. I discuss these impediments and offer possible contractual and
doctrinal solutions to them.
A.

INFORMATIONAL IMPEDIMENTS IN GENERAL

Information impediments result from the existence of imperfect
information with respect to the probability of the risk materializing and/or
its scope. Information impediments also arise from the existence of
information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured with respect to
these factors. It is the second reason for information impediments—those
stemming from asymmetric information—that is at the center of our
discussions. Why? Because when the information held by the insurer (and
the insured for that matter) is not perfect, but there is no problem of
information asymmetry, the risk the insurer is facing is small. For example,
an insurer who charges a premium equal to two percent of the total value of

22

See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 8; Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating
Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010).
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the property instead of three percent increased its risk by one percent of the
value of the property, an increase which usually is not destructive for him.23
More serious problems arise when information asymmetry exists between
the insurer and the insured. Such asymmetry can exist at the pre-contractual
stage; after the contract begins, but before the insured event occurs; or after
the occurrence. Four problems which arise from the information
asymmetry between the parties will be discussed in this section. When the
insured has more information at the pre-contractual stage, which is relevant
to the contracting itself, an adverse selection problem may occur. On the
other hand, when the insurer has more information relevant to the contract
itself, a reverse adverse selection problem may occur. After parties have
entered the contract, whether before or after the insured event occurred, an
informational gap about the insured’s behavior can lead to the problem of
moral hazard, while informational gaps about the behavior of the insurer
may lead to the problem of reverse moral hazard. At the end of each of
these discussions I will use the Two Islands Approach laid out in the
preface to demonstrate how one can go about analyzing potential solutions
to these problems.
Before we turn to the analysis of these four problems it is worth
mentioning that regulation of the insurance industry by the executive
branch also has an important role in dealing with these problems. For
example, the monitoring of insurance policies by the insurance
commissioners ensures both that consumers are burdened with efficient
disclosure duties, thus reducing the risk of adverse selection, and that the
policies match the consumer's reasonable expectations regarding the scope
of coverage, thus reducing the risk of reverse adverse selection. Further,
capital and liquidity requirements enforced by the commissioners ensure
that insurance companies meet their financial commitments to the insureds,
preventing reverse moral hazard. And so on and so forth. Of course
regulation is not a magic solution. Insurance commissioners often lack the
necessary resources to monitor effectively, are vulnerable to political
pressures, and some argue are often captured by market players or for
various other reasons do not maximize social welfare. In this paper I do not
focus on the functions of insurance commissioners, but rather on the
available solutions that courts and the parties to an insurance contract have

23

The picture may be different of course if the error is systematic and was
done for many uninsured, or if without the mistake the insurer would not have
agreed to insure the property at all, and there is no possibility of reinsurance.
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for dealing with the two pairs of problems resulting from asymmetric
information.
B.

ADVERSE SELECTION

Foremost, information that insurers and insureds possess will
inevitably end up being imperfect or asymmetric. Asymmetry of
information leads to the problem of adverse selection. A theoretical
concept first appearing in the late nineteenth century, adverse selection
describes the phenomenon of high-risk parties who, knowing their ‘type’,
seek more insurance coverage than low-risk parties. For example, a person
with a personal or family history of certain medical problems will be more
likely to purchase health insurance than a person who does not have such a
history. This result follows from insurers charging one premium rate to all
(or at least many) insureds. The insureds, though, have varying degrees of
risk and are personally better able to determine their own risk than the
insurers, who only know the average risk for a pool of observationally
similar, but in fact heterogeneous, insureds. This informational asymmetry
allows high risk parties to obtain insurance at a premium that is lower than
they would actually be otherwise willing to pay. For low-risk parties,
however, the premium charged to the entire pool is too expensive. Low-risk
parties might object to cross subsidizing the high-risk parties—with
insurers using the excess premiums of the low-risk parties to defray the
costs of offering cheaper insurance to high-risk parties—and might
therefore drop their coverage and leave the insurance pool. Consequently,
the average risk faced by the insurer increases, the premium must increase,
and this cycle of adverse selection repeats itself and theoretically might
lead to the risk pool unraveling completely—a classic death spiral.24
In general, the risk of the total market unraveling increases along
with the following factors: the heterogeneity of the insureds (whether both
high and low risk insureds exist), the certainty of the insureds’ knowledge
of their own risk level (otherwise, high risk insureds might not be
excessively attracted to the pool), and the competiveness of the market
(when there is a greater chance that another insurance company will
offer lower premium for low-risk insureds).
24

For a case study which explores a death spiral in the context of a healthinsurance plan see David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health
Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q. J.
ECON. 433 (1998).
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Of course, this is all known to the insurance companies which try to design
their contracts in a way that will address this problem. Unfortunately, this
is not a simple task because the asymmetric information brings with it
strategic behavior such as when high-risk insureds pretend to be low-risk
(for example by not reporting that they smoke). The following subsection
provides some possible solution.
1. Theoretical solutions to the adverse selection problem
There are several possible solutions on the theoretical level. The
first and most basic is requiring disclosure by the insureds. More accurate
information regarding the characteristics and behaviors of the insured
parties allows better assessment and pricing of the overall insurance pool.
This is why insurance companies ask insureds to fill out long forms
describing and bringing to light the potential risks the insureds bring to the
pool.
The information collected is used to differentiate premiums for
insureds in a way that reflects their varying levels of risk, a process known
as risk classification. By dividing insureds according to their risk
classifications in this way, an insurer may mitigate to some extent the
problem of adverse selection, because similar risks pay the same premium.
However, risk classification does not come free of disadvantages. By
decreasing the extent of cross subsidization between insureds, insurers
reduce the degree at which they spread risk among their risk-averse
insureds. This tradeoff between increasing ex-post coverage while
eliminating the ex-ante incentive for strategic behavior on the part of the
insured is fundamental to insurance and characterizes it more broadly. In
reducing the problem of adverse selection, risk classification allows the
insurer to reduce the average cost of insuring its pool while at same time, to
the extent high-risk insureds leave its pool to be admitted elsewhere where
the degree of cross subsidization is larger, it increases the average costs of
its rivals.
One may think there should be no limit to pursuing risk
classification if one wants to combat adverse selection. In practice, besides
the harm to the risk-spreading function of insurance, an attempt at too
detailed a classification will often cost more than the benefit derived from
it due to the costs involved in collecting, analyzing and utilizing the
data. Thus, in life insurance it may be of no use to distinguish between
female smokers and females non-smokers because the gap in life
expectancy is not substantial enough or because the proportion of women
who smoke is low and the extra cost of distinguishing between them is
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high. Hence, a certain amount of cross subsidization, and therefore of
adverse selection, will always remain.
In some cases the insurer can afford not to invest resources at the
contracting stage to ensure that the insured met its disclosure obligations,
despite being of vital significance, because after the occurrence it might be
able, perhaps more easily, to check whether the insured breached her duty
of disclosure. When the information is easily discoverable after the
occurrence and can serve as grounds for canceling the insurance contract or
paying reduced benefits—both are self-help measures the insurer can take
without a court—the insurer can make do with collecting information only
after the occurrence. A simple example involves the question of whether an
insured who died of lung cancer was a smoker. Instead of investigating the
condition of the lungs of all insured persons who stated they were not
smoking the insurer can only investigate those who died from lung cancer,
thus saving resources across the entire pool.
Classifying risk based on information collected from the insured,
either by way of filling out questionnaires or by medical examinations, as a
way to combat adverse selection, has many obvious limitations. The
insured has an incentive to hide negative information from insurers, either
because he is afraid the insurance company would refuse to insure him or
because he wants to pay a lower premium. Insurance law, as we will see
below, has developed various legal doctrines which punish insureds for
material false representations, but it seems that despite this insureds do not
always disclose private information, a fact that might lead to adverse
selection.
Is there a way insurance companies can get policyholders to
disclose voluntarily whether they are high risk? The answer, as first shown
by Rothschild and Stiglitz, is positive.25 By offering policies with diverse
deductibles insurance companies incentivize the insureds to sort themselves
into different risk pools based on a self-estimation of their own risk. Highrisk insureds will tend to purchase more insurance coverage and therefore
will choose a lower deductible for a higher premium, while low-risk
insureds will prefer higher deductibles for a lower premium. Rothchild and
Stiglitz famously showed that under some distribution of insureds’ risk
25

Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON 629
(1976). Their paper is the canonical insurance application of George A. Akerlof,
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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types what is called a ‘separating equilibrium’ may be reached where highrisk types are fully covered but low-risk types are only partially insured.26
In other words, self-selection by insureds may lead to an equilibrium where
high-risk and low-risk insureds choose different policies (in terms of scope
of coverage and the premium they pay for the scope of coverage they
choose) so that effectively they voluntarily self-classify themselves into
two separate pools without providing any further information about the
risks they bring to the pool.
On the other hand, if the proportion of high-risk insureds in the
pool is small and low-risk individuals are sufficiently risk averse, then the
economic justification for offering lower price and narrower coverage to
the low-risk insureds diminishes and the equilibrium that will be created is
a ‘pooling equilibrium,’ where both types of insureds are pooled together,
paying the same premium for the same scope of coverage.
Another way that insurance companies are encouraging self-selection is by
offering multiple-period contracts. For example, consider a commercial by
Allstate, a leading insurance company in the U.S, where it guarantees that
automobile insurance premium will not go up for those involved in a car
accident. Allstate markets this insurance by claiming it does not leave its
policyholders in the lurch. In practice, this scheme may serve as a
marketing device to create long-term relationships with the insureds
allowing Allstate to gather information on the risk level of its
policyholders. Moreover, the promise that the premium will not go up after
an accident is especially tempting to drivers with private information as
being at high risk of getting involved in multiple accidents. Those drivers
will self-select into this program, allowing Allstate to classify them into
their own special pool.27
A few problems arise, however, when insurers risk classify their
insureds. First, because classification is never perfect, certain insureds (the
less risky) essentially cross subsidize others (the more risky) when they pay
a premium higher than the risk they actually present. That creates not only
problems of efficiency as insurance pools might unravel, or some low risk
insureds will be driven out of the market, or get less coverage than they
desired—problems which were discussed above—but also of distributive
justice. Insurers—private or public—have the ability to redistribute
resources between the classes they have separated by overcharging,
26

Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 24, at 648.
Allstate - Accident Forgiveness, YOUTUBE (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.
youtube.com/ watch?v=J2nJYf1iRdM.
27
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intentionally or otherwise, the less risky and undercharging the more
risky.28 In health insurance, for example, the healthy subsidize the
chronically sick.
A related potentially troubling issue with risk classification
logically stems from the nature of classification which often raises sensitive
matters of discrimination. The reason is that the most obvious (and least
expensive) way to divide a large group of individuals, with the goal of
assigning them to different risk levels, is by observable characteristics like
age, sex, and race. Any parent of a male teenage driver feels the effect of
this practice when he or she pays a much higher car-insurance premium for
his or her son.
Is it discriminatory to force those people who have a lower risklevel, like women who drive on average less than men—although not
necessarily more carefully—to subsidize the relatively more risky by
having them pay the same premiums?29
On pure welfare grounds the analysis is (at least theoretically)
clear: in the implausible case where the correlation between risk and
gender, race, or age is perfect, that is, when insureds have no residual
private information about their own risk not captured by the classification,
then allowing such classification is welfare enhancing as it eliminates the
adverse selection that otherwise would exist. In all other cases, the social
welfare implications of allowing such classification is an empirical
question which requires comparing the ex-ante costs of strategic behavior
with the ex-post costs of reduced coverage. More specifically, one would
need to compare the loss caused by adverse selection in a pool without the
classification to the loss caused by classifying risk pools when the
correlation is less than one, thereby making insurance both over and under
expensive to some people.30
Obviously, whether a policy is discriminatory or distributively
unjust is not necessarily uniquely determined, although might well be
informed, by economic analysis. To what extent society is willing to
28

For an analysis of the tension between risk distribution and risk
classification see Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk
Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985).
29
See City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S 702
(1978) (banning gender based annuities provided by an employer under Title VII);
Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] Case C-236/09, para 47, Sept.
30, 2010 (Belg.) (European Union Court of Justice actually banned insurers from
even considering gender in determining insurance premiums).
30
Einav & Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 121.
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tolerate classifications such as race, gender, religion, or age varies greatly
with the groups affected, but the process remains in many ways
discriminatory nonetheless.31
An interesting, controversial matter on the forefront of the
insurance and adverse selection problem involves genetic testing and its
value in predicting disease. In one sense, the tremendous information
advantage presented by genetic knowledge could lead to better loss
prevention (for example people testing positive for HIV can be treated
before they actually develop AIDS) and to more efficient risk
classification.32 But the intensely private nature of that information, the
risks of errors, the fear that it would leak to third parties or be used against
relatives of the insureds, as well as the invasive means required sometimes
(at least to date) to obtain it cheaply, may speak against permitting insurers
to use genetic testing. Another argument against such testing is that it is
not “fair” to punish a person for things that were determined before his or
her birth. From a law and economics perspective an argument against the
usage of genetic testing for insurance purposes can be expressed in the
claim that using information obtained from genetic testing might lead to a
welfare loss stemming from the fact that realized risks might no longer be
insured, the so-called Hirshleifer Effect.33 Imagine a test which predicts
that a particular individual has a probability of 99% of developing cancer in
the next ve years. Once the information is revealed, insurance companies
might not want to insure those who tested positive. That is a social loss, as
most risk averse people would be willing to pay a premium before they
take the test to make certain that they were still insurable even if they tested
positively.
On the other hand, suppressing this information might deny the
individuals access to preventative medical care, or to at least planning more
optimally for their shorter expected life span. This creates a difficult
dilemma, and jurisdictions, including the United States, have weighed in
against the use of genetic testing by insurers for that very reason.34
31

See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 207-27 (2003).
32
Alexander Tabarrok, Genetic Testing: an Economic and Contractarian
Analysis, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 75 (1994).
33
Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
34
Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance
Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 211 (2005) (analyzing the economic
efficiency aspect of allowing the use of genetic test results for risk classification).
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A sensible compromise might be to allow insureds to know about their
genetic makeup but prevent insurers from using it in their underwriting
procedures. Unfortunately, the legal prohibition against using genetic
testing has the potential to lead to further exaggeration of the adverse
selection problem because of the asymmetry it creates. Given that some
individuals will undertake genetic testing for their personal knowledge or
will infer their genetic makeup from their family history, those who know
that they are high risk will view insurance as a worthwhile investment and
will over-insure. The opposite is true for those with knowledge of their
own clean genetic make-up.
This adverse selection effect of banning genetic testing was shown
in a recent study of individuals at risk for Huntington Disease, a terminal
genetic illness, and their propensity to purchase long-term care insurance—
insurance that covers the costs of nursing care later in life.35 The rates of
Huntington Disease are extremely low among the general population, but if
one parent has the disease you have a 50% chance of also having it and
there is no cure.36 Those with the genetic mutation are guaranteed to
require some sort of nursing care during their lives, making long-term care
insurance very valuable.37 Not surprisingly then, those individuals who are
at risk (have a parent with the disease) are two and half times more likely to
own long-term care insurance, and those who have tested positive (100%
chance of having the disease) are five times more likely to have the
coverage when compared with the general population and controlling for
various factors like age.38 While long-term care underwriters screen for
those who have been diagnosed with the disease (and would reject an
applicant who had previously tested positive), they do not ask whether a
parent has Huntington Disease.39 Insurers can also not force the potential
insured to undergo genetic testing to screen for Huntington or other
diseases. This illustrates the adverse selection issues that arise when one
party (the insureds) can use genetic testing to gain private information but
the other party (the insurer) cannot.40
35

Emily Oster et al., Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term
Care Insurance and Huntington Disease, UNIV. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. (June 8,
2010), http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/emily.oster/papers/geneticadverse.pdf.
36
Id. at 2.
37
Id. at 3.
38
Id. at 18.
39
Id. at 7.
40
In fact, the death spiral for the long-term-care insurance market may have
already begun. See Anne Tergesen & Leslie Scism, Long-Term-Care Premiums
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A totally different solution for adverse selection is group-based
insurance where insurance is offered to a group of people united by
characteristics other than the risk insured against. All members of the group
are automatically admitted without individual underwriting. Health
insurance offered through employers, as in the U.S., life insurance offered
through one’s bank, and automobile insurance offered through a trade
organization are such examples. Because the risk insured against is
randomly distributed in the group, the risk of the pool should not be
excessively high. The benefits to the insureds from groups insurance stem
from three sources. First, as was just mentioned the risk for adverse
selection is null and therefore premiums can be kept low. Second, the
administrative costs associated with group-based insurance are much lower
than the costs associated with individual underwriting, and, third, the group
often has market power that enables it to negotiate even lower prices. As a
result, the premium offered in group-based insurance is appealing even to
low-risk insureds. Those low-risk insureds prefer the group insurance
coverage even though they cross subsidize the high-risk insureds, further
eliminating the problem of adverse selection, because the premium is lower
than in a homogeneous risk pool but one where underwriting is done
individually.
Another possible solution for adverse selection is eliminating
coverage for preexisting conditions or a delayed coverage for these
conditions. If a patient has cancer and knows that he would have to wait
two years before he can get coverage in a new insurance company he
would not adversely select into that pool, if only because he might die
before the coverage would begin. But denying coverage for preexisting
conditions creates terrible ex-post problems as the sickest people in society
are left without care. Indeed, in the recent Healthcare reform (the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, known as the ACA) insurance
companies are prohibited from denying coverage for preexisting
conditions. In other countries, health insurance plans have always been
mandated to accept every applicant for health-care coverage regardless of
any preexisting conditions the insureds may have. The societal value of
this exclusion is discussed under the Two Islands Approach later in this
section.
Soar, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000
1424052748703298504575534513798604500.html (reporting that rate increases of
up to 40% were submitted to state regulators for approval to cover unexpected
increases in insurer costs).
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While it sounds noble, accepting every applicant who self-selects
into the pool may restore the adverse selection problem. Ordinarily at least,
it would. To prevent this from happening the prohibition of the preexisting
condition exclusion is usually accompanied, as it is in the ACA, with a
mandate requiring that everyone, including the young and healthy who
might not otherwise apply for insurance, purchase coverage.41
If everyone is required to purchase insurance, then more healthy people
will be in the pool to subsidize the sick people. While a greater number of
sick people in the pool may put upward pressure on premiums, the
increased number of healthy people, who might have been previously
priced out of the pool by adverse selection, will likely keep premiums close
to their original level, or lower. Furthermore, the cycle of adverse selection
where relatively healthy people are priced out by sick people, and then the
moderately sick people are priced out by the very sick people, and so on,
cannot happen because everyone is required by law to be included in the
pool. Essentially, mandatory insurance is tantamount to a one single groupbased insurance pool, which, as we saw above, is a way to combat adverse
selection.42
A less extreme solution is to provide a lump sum subsidy toward
the price of the policy, especially to the low risk individuals. This will lead
to fewer low risk individuals remaining without insurance.
In any case, uniform subsidies or mandatory insurance do not solve
the distributive justice and discrimination concerns raised before. Charging
every driver the same premium entails that good drivers subsidize bad
drivers, that drivers who drive less subsidize drivers who drive more, and
less directly, that the old subsidize the young and that women subsidize
men. More generally, there is an inherent question with insurance as to how
much the able and lucky should subsidize the unable and unlucky; with car
insurance it is the safe drivers against the unsafe, with health insurance it is
the healthy against the sick, and with liability insurance it is the nonnegligent-prone against the negligent-prone. These questions are a bit
easier to resolve when those subsidizing today will inevitably become those
41

Such mandate was recently held constitutional by the U.S Supreme Court in
Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
42
If the administrative costs of processing claims are too high, it might be
socially optimal to leave some low risk individuals outside of the pool, as the cost
of providing them coverage might outweigh the benefits to them. In such cases,
mandatory coverage might not be welfare enhancing. Einav & Finkelstein, supra
note 2, at 123.
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being subsidized tomorrow like when the young subsidize the old. In
contrast, these questions become starker in situations when the relatively
risky classification coincides with other social disadvantages, such as
poverty.43
2. Doctrinal solutions for the adverse selection problem
Insurance law has found ways to facilitate the practice of some of these
theoretical solutions in order to alleviate or prevent the effects of adverse
selection. Laws establishing a mandatory insurance framework—such as
in automobile insurance—are an obvious example. But other legal
doctrines, which pertain more closely to disclosure and risk classification,
are more intricate and arguably more significant in that they expose private
information about insured parties to investigation by insurers.
One such doctrine concerns the “warranties” proffered by the
insureds prior to the conclusion of the insurance contract. This practice
engages the warranty doctrine, and according to its terms in the U.S., the
insured party is permitted, prior to insurance contract formation, to make
any truthful statement about itself that would lower its perceived risk and,
consequently, its premium.44 If the insured party later makes a claim,
though, and the insurer can prove any of those statements, however
inconsequential, to have been false, the claim may be rejected. Because of
the high cost of a false statement, the warranty doctrine presents a fairly
effective means to encourage accurate disclosure. The associated frequent,
costly investigations into pre-contractual statements and the potential for a
penalty being imposed on the insured for simple pre-contractual
carelessness, however, are substantial detriments to the warranty doctrine.
A similar doctrine is that of misrepresentation. Here, an insured party also
makes pre-contractual representations to the insurer regarding the risk of
the insured. Under this doctrine, instead of being liable for any
43

Mandatory insurance may also increase the risk of moral hazard, to be
discussed further below. See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of
Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. &
ECON. 357 (2004). Same holds for state mandates requiring health insurance plans
to cover medical treatment. See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes
Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519 (2007) (finding that mandates
generate a moral hazard problem, with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the
adoption of these mandates).
44
Seth Chandler, Insurance Regulation, 3 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. &
ECON. 837, 845 (2000).
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misstatement, a future claim may only be denied if the insured knowingly
made a misrepresentation which is material to the insured’s risk. Thus
courts ask whether the insurer would have agreed to cover the risk at all, or
whether the premium the insured has paid for the policy covering the event
that actually occurred would have been materially higher if an accurate
representation had been made. Over time, the law in the U.S. has generally
shifted from the stricter liability associated with warranties to a negligencebased system of representations, whether through statutory action or
common law.45
Given a finding of breach of warranty or misrepresentation, the
penalty for the insured party is typically voiding or reducing the insurance
policy. If the penalty is reduction, the amount owed to the insured is
usually reduced to the amount that would have been available had no
misrepresentation occurred prior to contract formation. The rationale for
reduction is that, because it puts the insured in the same position as if her
representations were correct, there is no incentive for the insured to be
dishonest up front.
The problem, however, is that not all
misrepresentations will be caught, and if the only penalty is reduction,
insureds might gamble that they can get away with the misrepresentation.
Voiding the policy outright provides an affirmative penalty, creating a
stronger incentive for the insured to be honest at the outset.
In some scenarios, like when an insured has been paying premiums
for several years, certain statements and representations may not be
challenged under the doctrines of warranty or misrepresentation, because
after that much time has lapsed there is a high risk of erroneously
determining either the validity, or falsity, of pre-contractual statements.
This is the doctrine of incontestability.46 The purpose of incontestability is
to prevent an insurer from opportunistically issuing policies to insureds and
accepting years of premiums, all the while knowingly concealing a
technicality with the application that would allow the insurer to later deny
coverage should it so choose.47 Incontestability acts as de facto statute of
45

Particular attention has been recently paid to the requirement that a
materially higher premium would have been charged for insurance covering the
particular event that actually occurred. In other words while some require that the
misrepresentation contributed to the loss actually occurred, others require that it
contributed to the risk of loss. Id. at 846.
46
Id. at 846.
47
See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
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limitations insulating insured parties from “post-occurrence underwriting”,
a practice which is profitable for the insurer but places large risks of
forfeiture on a potentially innocent policy holder, who has presumably paid
years of premiums up to that point. Life insurance, health insurance, and
disability insurance policies often contain an incontestability clause or are
subject to an incontestability statute.48
Incontestability clauses, however, do not strip insurers of all
defenses. Fraud is a common exception where insurers are allowed to
challenge the validity of a policy, though what type of fraud avoids an
incontestability clause is not always clear. The California Supreme Court,
for example, has differentiated between the insured sending an imposter to
take his life insurance medical examination and a healthy person giving the
name of someone else as the insured, but taking the medical examination
herself: the former is subject to incontestability, while the latter is not. The
rationale given by the court for this discrepancy is that in the former case
there was a valid contract between the parties, even though it was procured
by fraud, and therefore the dispute was governed by the contract itself,
including its incontestability clause.49 In the latter case there was no
meeting of the minds between the insurer and the deceased person, as the
deceased person was obviously not a party to the contract. The policy
insured, if anyone, the person who completed the application and took the
medical examination.50
Another related doctrine is concealment, which punishes the
intentional nondisclosure of information by the insured either when asked
during the application process, or in the period that follows it.51 Given how
easy it is for insurers to ask relevant questions and to collect relevant
information, it is not clear that the doctrine of concealment should apply to
incomplete application forms. Rather, the doctrine of concealment seems
more relevant in the period after the insured filled out the applications but
before the insurance company issued the policy, as well as in the period
after the policy was issued and before the occurrence, because in these
1315 (2007) (documenting how Unum/Provident knowingly took on policies with
minor errors in them and then denied coverage on the basis of these technicalities).
48
See, e.g., Halstead Consultants, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 891 P.2d 926, 928
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S. v. Bell, 27 F.3d
1274 (7th Cir. 1994).
49
Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1997).
50
Id.
51
1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 3.08(d)
(2d ed. Supp. 2000).
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periods insureds are not usually asked about changes in their risks, and
therefore it makes sense to require them to initiate a disclosure of any new
changes in their risk profile. Indeed, courts have ruled that insureds may
remain silent unless specifically asked by the insurer or the insured knows
that the withheld information is material to the insurer’s decision to grant a
policy.
In that sense concealment is not as far-reaching as the
misrepresentation or warranty doctrines. As with misrepresentation,
however, the penalty for concealment is usually reduction of the scope of
coverage or voiding of the insurance policy all together.52
3. Returning to the Two Islands Approach
The value of the two island approach can be seen clearly in the
debate over coverage of preexisting conditions in health insurance,
discussed earlier in this section as a theoretical solution to the problem of
adverse selection.53 The Third Circuit addressed the preexisting medical
condition exclusion in Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Fortis Insurance Co.54
The question in that case was whether a child, treated for symptoms of
leukemia two days before the issuance of a policy but not diagnosed with
leukemia until after, was excluded from coverage by a preexisting
condition exclusion.55 Judge Alito found the policy language ambiguous as
to whether the exclusion required treatment or diagnosis, and found for the
insureds per contra proferentem.56 That decision merely limits the scope of
the preexisting condition exclusion in those situations where a condition
has not yet been diagnosed. The court’s decision can be explained by the
distaste anyone would have denying insurance to a child with leukemia.
But that is an ex-post approach which focuses on the parties at bar, whereas

52

Compare Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham, 95 U.S. 380 (1877),
with Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1928). In Stipcich the U.S.
Supreme Court voided a policy where the insured did not disclose changes in its
health that occurred between the date of application and the date of the issuance of
a policy, where as in Higginbotham it did not.
53
The exclusion has since been prohibited by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West Supp. 2012).
54
Lawson ex. rel. Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 167. Contra proferentem is a doctrine which dictates that an
ambiguous provision in a contract should be construed against the drafter. As will
be shown below, this doctrine combats reverse moral hazard.
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the correct approach, as we saw, is the ex-ante which focuses on the
function of insurance and the future implications a decision would carry.
All else being equal, an island with an exclusion for preexisting conditions
or illnesses will have far cheaper insurance premium than an island without
the exclusion. Indeed, an island without the exclusion could potentially
have the adverse selection cycle discussed above, pricing out all but the
sickest from the insurance market. Without the exclusion, there would be
little reason to buy insurance until you know you are sick. Premiums
would go up dramatically, causing fewer healthy people to buy insurance,
causing premiums to increase, and so on.
On an island with the exclusion, just as insureds know they cannot
purchase fire insurance after their houses burn down, they would know
they cannot purchase health insurance after they are diagnosed with a
disease. In a well-functioning market that knowledge should incentivize
everyone to purchase coverage in advance. Thus, healthy and sick people
are jointly members of the insurance pool, and once sick people are
diagnosed, their care costs are subsidized by the healthy people’s premium.
It is clear, therefore, as a general theoretical matter, the preexisting
condition exclusion is important, at least when insurance coverage is not
mandatory.57 However, to make a judgment about the Lawson case
specifically, the discussion must be sharpened.
In the Lawson opinion the issue was not the overall value of the
preexisting condition exclusion, but whether it should be applied when
symptoms have been treated without a diagnosis of the actual condition.58
Adding the court’s chosen “island” to the above analysis, the issue
becomes close. That “island” would only void the exclusion for people
treated without being diagnosed with a specific illness. This is a relatively
small group of claims, limited further by excluding instances where there is
an indication of bad faith or fraud. The adverse selection issue would be
57

If individuals are mandated to purchase insurance then they cannot wait
until after they discover they are sick to purchase insurance, and thus the problems
preexisting decision exclusion are designed to prevent never come to be.
58
In the Lawson case, there was some circumstantial evidence that the
condition, or at least a serious condition, was suspected by the daughter’s family
prior to the issuance of the insurance policy. Specifically, the grandmother was a
registered nurse, and the health insurance was applied for on the same day the
daughter was originally taken to the doctor. Lawson, 301 F.3d at 161. But the court
thought differently. To quote then Judge Alito, “[h]ere, there is no evidence that
the possibility that Elena's condition was actually leukemia ever entered the minds
of Elena's parents or Dr. Parikh.” Id. at 166.
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vastly smaller than if there was no preexisting condition exclusion at all.
There would still be some adverse selection, however, if the patients
themselves suspect they have a serious disease even before they are
officially diagnosed, leading to some increase in premiums.59 Additionally,
there will be higher administrative costs due the required case-by-case
analysis as to whether a condition has actually been diagnosed, or if
symptoms have merely been treated, and if there is any indication of bad
faith or fraud. The higher administrative costs will also lead to an increase
in premiums. The higher premiums associated with more coverage could
well be preferable to cheaper premium and no coverage, but to identify the
pool’s welfare maximizing “island”, further information is needed about
the frequency and costs of such circumstances. If such empirical
information exists, it should be presented to the courts. Otherwise, the court
needs to “guestimate” it itself.
Here we have seen that while the Two Islands Approach does not
provide a definitive answer, it does allow us to look at the situation
objectively. The court in Lawson probably got it right but only because of
the overall effect of its decision on insurance pools, rather than any
sympathy for a plaintiff with leukemia.
4. Adverse Selection—The Empirical Evidence
Although a formidable problem theoretically, there is only little
evidence that in certain insurance markets adverse selection exists and
almost no evidence to suggest that adverse selection is actually a major
problem for the insurance industry at large..60 Alma Cohen and Peter
Siegleman provide several explanations for the disconnect between theory
and practice. One is that it is hard to measure adverse selection
59

This would be further reduced by implementing some type of waiting
period, where new insureds do not receive full coverage until a certain period of
time has elapsed since they purchased coverage, unless they were previously
covered, as is currently the case with most United States health insurance policies.
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Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance
Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010) (surveying a wide-ranging literature and
concluding that whether adverse selection exists varies across insurance markets
and pools of insurance policies); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance
Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). For a study finding
adverse selection see Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, Selection Effects in the
United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market, 112 ECON. J. 28, 47 (2002)
(showing significant adverse selection in the United Kingdom annuity market).
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empirically. Many empirical papers attempt to estimate adverse selection
by comparing the insurance costs of those with ample insurance coverage
with the costs of those with less. But that, as Liran Einav and Amy
Finkelstein show, is problematic on various grounds, as any difference
could equally be attributed to moral hazard.61 There are also theoretical
explanations for why adverse selection is not detected. As was discussed
above, some forms of insurance, such as car insurance, are mandatory.
Mandatory insurance prevents adverse selection because low risk insureds
cannot opt out of the pool. Another explanation might be that insureds’
informational advantage vis-à-vis insurers is not really that large, and that
insureds fail to use whatever private information they do have, so at the end
of the day insurers’ superior predictive ability offsets whatever
informational advantage insureds might use. Adverse selection might also
not be prevalent because, as was explained above, insurance companies
have developed various underwriting practices (such as deductibles,
waiting periods, or group-based insurance), and because courts have
developed various doctrines, all of which encourage disclosure of private
information to combat the problem. Lastly, adverse selection might not be
detected because it is offset by another phenomenon called “propitious” or
“advantageous” selection. This stems from the fact that in the real world
there is heterogeneity in risk-aversion. Whereas the early models of adverse
selection, such as Rothschild and Sitglitz from 1976, conveniently assumed
people have the same preferences when it comes to risk, there is substantial
literature documenting heterogeneity of risk preferences between different
individuals and different insurance markets. Specifically, to the extent that
those who are more risk-averse (and therefore more likely to carry
61

For an excellent explanation of the methodological difficulties in measuring
adverse selection see Einav & Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 126-36. One way to
separate the two effects is to test the impact of an exogenous change in an
insurance contract on existing versus new insureds. If existing insureds change
their behavior, or if reported losses increase, that would be a sign of a moral hazard
effect. If, in contrast, the chance of accidents differs between new and old policy
holders, that would be a sign of an adverse selection effect. See Jaap H. Abbring et
al., Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to
Distinguish?, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N, PAPERS & PROC. 512 (2003) (using dynamic
insurance data to distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection); Patrick Bajari,
Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health
Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12445, 2006) (arguing that the two inefficiencies can be
separated through regression analysis).
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insurance policies) are also low risk individuals, that is, they are more
likely to pursue safe (non-risky) behavior, then a phenomenon known as
“propitious” or “advantageous” selection may emerge. These low-risk
individuals who propitiously select into the pool may well offset the cost of
the high-risk insured who adversely select into the pool.62 While in theory
insurance markets can face both adverse selection and propitious selection,
current empirical methods do not allow separating their effects.
It is worth mentioning that “propitious” or “advantageous”
selection, while not necessarily welfare enhancing, is usually beneficial to
the insurer.63 Accordingly, insurers seek to bring about propitious selection
by rigging the incentive structure of the policy to only entice low-risk
individuals. Offering a free health club membership as an incentive to
purchase life insurance selects for healthy individuals—who else would
62

See David Hemenway, Propitious Selection, 105 Q.J. Econ. 1063 (1990);
see also David de Meza & David C. Webb, Advantageous Selection in Insurance
Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 249 (2001).
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The usual underinsurance result in adverse selection models arises because
insurance companies anticipate self-selection of high-risks into their pool and
therefore set high premiums, making it unattractive for low-risks to join the pool,
even though the low-risk individuals would be more than willing to pay the
actuarially fair price for their coverage. In “propitious” or “advantageous”
selection, the presence of risk-averse yet cautious types causes insurers to lower
premiums and thus draws into the market less risk-averse people (who do not place
a high value on coverage), but which are high-costs types. These people value the
insurance at less than their expected costs and therefore on efficiency grounds
should not have been insured. Put differently, whereas adverse selection entails
that some people who should have been insured will not get insurance because they
were priced out, “propitious” or “advantageous” selection entails that some people
who should not have been insured (because the administrative costs of providing
them insurance are higher than their expected loss), will nonetheless get coverage.
See John Cawley & Tomas Philipson, An Empirical Examination of Information
Barriers to Trade in Insurance, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 827, 829-30 (1999) (finding
that the mortality rate of U.S. males purchasing life insurance is below that of the
uninsured); Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry. Multiple Dimensions of Private
Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 938 (2006) (providing evidence that more cautious individuals are more
likely to purchase long-term care insurance and also invest more in precautionary
behavior but are less likely to eventually use a nursing home); Hanming Fang,
Michael Keane & Dan Silverman, Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence
from the Medigap Insurance Market, 116 J. POL. ECON. 303 (2008) (documenting
advantageous selection in the market for Medigap coverage).
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want the membership? In a novel example of this “cream-skimming,” one
insurer was rumored to have offered applications for health insurance to the
elderly only on the third-floor of its office, which was only reachable by
stairs. The assumption was that if an elderly individual was able to traverse
the stairs, then she was likely a lower-risk individual.64 A more common
method is to market to the risk-averse under the assumption that they might
be those who will take more care than necessary. This may explain the
scary advertisement one sees on T.V. where one’s happy family life is
financially destroyed because he did not have life insurance, or where an
uninsured driver gets into a violent accident. Use of such high-pressure
sales tactics to induce people into buying life and other forms of insurance
is in a way an insurer-induced selection device: you don’t want to sell the
product to anyone who actually needs to buy it; only to those who really
want it but do not really need it.
C. REVERSE ADVERSE SELECTION
Adverse selection occurs not only among the insureds—insurers
themselves are also susceptible to its effects. “Insurer-side adverse
selection” results when there is a disparity in the quality of policies offered
by insurers and an information barrier that prevents insureds from
accurately separating those policies into high and low quality. The lower
quality policies will be offered at lower premiums, attracting more insureds
yet driving out of the market other insurers which offer higher quality
coverage (but which high quality the insureds cannot observe) at a more
expensive price, the so called “market for lemons”.65
Eventually, a race-to-the-bottom leads to either low quality of
coverage, costing much more than the benefits it actually provides, or nonpayment of claims by insurance companies who priced their premiums
below the necessary levels required to stay solvent. Both effects result in
negative public attitudes toward insurance as the externalities associated
with non-paying or under-paying insurers build up.
A famous example of the market of lemons in insurance policies is
the fire insurance industry in the late nineteenth century where insurance
companies offering property/casualty insurance policies sought to save
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money by ratcheting back coverage without informing consumers.66 In
response, New York promulgated a mandatory policy form for fire
insurance that was widely copied by other states. 67
A recent study looked at homeowners’ insurance policies in six
states and found some of the same problems in the modern insurance
market as in nineteenth century New York.68 One variation of the study
compared sixteen homeowners insurance policy types found in North
Dakota and Pennsylvania to the HO3 standard policy provided by the
ISO.69 Of the sixteen, five had substantially less generous coverage than
the HO3 policy, eight had slightly less coverage but were consistent with
HO3 terms, and three had more generous coverage. Generally speaking,
the negative deviations exceeded the positive deviations. Following his
analysis, Daniel Schwarcz expresses concern that some insurance carriers
may be exploiting consumer ignorance by ratcheting back coverage while
seeking to hide differences between their policies.70 He refers to this as the
“exploitation hypothesis,”71 and it is a perfect example of reverse adverse
selection.
Policy differences are not inherently bad though. In fact, offering
insureds different coverage levels for different prices is one of the ways to
get insureds to self-identify their risk level, as discussed in the previous
section on theoretical solutions to adverse selection. A problem arises,
however, when heterogeneity in coverage is combined with a lack of
transparency. The lack of information in many insurance markets occurs at
two stages. For example, homeowners cannot access policy forms prior to
purchasing the insurance. Second, even when insureds receive policy forms
66

See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, U.
CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1268-70 nn.9-11 (2011) (citing various studies of early
insurance policies and the standardization of fire insurance forms around the New
York form).
67
See George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire
Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 410, 410 (1937). As Goble explains,
“[b]efore the advent of the standard fire insurance policy there were in use in the
United States almost as many policy forms as there were companies.” Id.
68
See Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1277-1308.
69
ISO, Insurance Services Office, is a provider of legal and regulatory
services to insurers including homeowners’ insurance forms portfolio. See
generally id. at 1308-17, for a discussion on why the policies were chosen and how
they were analyzed.
70
Id. at 1315.
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Id.
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after payment the terms are “virtually indecipherable.”72 This lack of
information makes it impossible for consumers to select insurance based
upon coverage terms, and creates an environment where consumers can be
exploited by insurers offering an inferior product at a higher price.
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of reverse
adverse selection. The foremost solution to this problem is regulation. For
example, by limiting the prices at which policies may be offered and by
requiring insurers to maintain sufficient assets to pay out on claims, the
government prevents the race-to-the-bottom and non-payment problems
directly.
One of the major themes of regulatory reform to combat this
problem is transparency. Transparency could be achieved by making policy
forms and terms available online and requiring insurers to compare their
policies to a standard form baseline, like the HO3 form. Regulators could
also require simplified policy language that is comprehendible by the
average insured. These two reforms would prevent insurers from hiding
policy differences and allow consumers to make educated choices about
their coverage options.73
However, transparency alone may not be enough to combat this
serious problem. Other options include creating a standard form or at least
a default policy that consumers would have to opt out of.74 In this way it
would be impossible for insurers to secretly ratchet down coverage.
Mandatory floors provide similar protections, and, as the 19th century fire
insurance example teaches us, legislation mandating minimum standards is
already used in many states to ensure policies meet minimum quality
standards.75
1. Returning to the Two Islands Approach
One way courts can combat reverse adverse selection is to not
strictly enforce an “increased risk” exclusion against an unsuspecting
72

Id. at 1318.
Id.
74
As will be discussed in Section 3 (e) infra, the vast majority of insureds will
not make any changes to the standard form, so it is important that these protections
are adequate.
75
See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient
Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63-64 (1999) (arguing mandated policy provisions
are an efficient way to battle the reverse adverse selection problem).
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insured. As mentioned above, one place we see reverse adverse selection is
when insurance companies sell policies with specific coverage exclusions,
but because of various information impediments the insured is not aware of
the clause. An “increased risk” clause eliminates from coverage any
incident that was caused by an increased hazard within the control of the
insured.76 A fire caused by the insured smoking in bed is a perfect example
of an action that, under a strict reading of such an exclusion, would not be
covered under the insured’s policy. In deciding these cases, courts have
often held that such a loss is covered by insurance policies even though the
incident is specifically excluded.77 The question becomes whether we want
courts to enforce increased risk clauses under these circumstances, and in
our analysis we again set up two islands. Remember that each two-islands
exercise starts anew to allow us to focus on the ex-ante effects of the
proposed rule. Therefore the two islands we have created are identical in
every way except for the enforcement of increased risk clauses.
On the first island, the increased risk exclusion is fully enforced,
and so any actions by the insured that increase the risk of an incident will
lead to a finding of no coverage. Even common actions such as smoking in
bed would not be covered on this island.78 As a result, insureds have
stronger incentives to refrain from smoking in bed and policy premiums
should be lower because fewer events are covered. The costs of reduced
coverage, however, are that insureds will not be able to obtain insurance for
these accidents because such coverage would not be available.79
On the second island, the increased risk clause is not strictly
enforced by courts, so a fire caused by smoking in bed will still receive
coverage. Insureds’ incentives to refrain from smoking in bed are diluted
and more events will be covered, which means that policy premiums will
be higher. However, insureds now have less risk of remaining homeless
after losing their house to a fire accidently caused by them, thus avoiding a
cost that is potentially very high.
76

See Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1283-84 (discussing increased risk clauses
and quoting several examples).
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ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 376 (2d ed. 1996).
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Although smoking inside may be less prevalent now than it was in previous
generations, smoking is still the cause of around 15,000 residential fires each year,
many of which originate in the bedroom late at night. FEMA, Smoking Causes
Nearly 15,000 Residential Fires in United States (2005), available at
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/smoking-causes-nearly-15000-residential-firesunited-states.
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Looking at these two islands and adopting the perspective of the
entire pool of insureds, we can attempt to determine which they would
prefer: higher premiums for increased coverage yet diluted incentives to
take care, or lower premiums for less coverage and increased incentives to
take care.
One reason for preferring the second island is that people may
reasonably expect, even if they do not actually expect, that they will be
covered for their own clumsy actions. Both homeowners and liability
insurance capture this point. Specifically, people may want to be able to
smoke in bed and, on the small chance a fire begins, have these costs
covered by insurance. The insured already has other strong incentives to
not burn down his or her home without this exclusion – his own safety is at
stake – so not enforcing the exclusion is not expected to dilute their
incentives to take care.80 While people in the insurance pool who do not
smoke may oppose having to cross subsidize those who want to smoke in
bed, they could still benefit from this clause if they, for example, like to
burn scented candles in their bedroom, or otherwise engage in activities
that carry increased risk of loss.
Moreover, it may be the situation that on both islands the insured
actually expects that the event will be covered. If this is the case, then the
insurance companies may be able to charge the same amount of premiums
on both islands because insureds are not aware they should be demanding
lower premiums on the first island (without coverage). The risk of
insurance companies exploiting the ignorance of insureds by charging the
same premium regardless of the exclusion provides another reason for
courts to mandate coverage, even when it is specifically excluded by an
increased risks clause.
In this analysis we have seen an example where, unlike the child
with leukemia, a judge or jury might be unsympathetic to the plight of the
insured because it is well known that smoking in bed can cause fires.
However, by viewing the effects on the insurance pool as a whole, and
seeing that the risk of diluted incentives is not large and that the
corresponding benefit (lower premiums) may not be present, it seems clear
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See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution For Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1411, 1424 (1994).
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that in many circumstances the increased risks clause should not be strictly
enforced.81
D. MORAL HAZARD
Another systemic risk insurers face is known as “moral hazard.”
Moral hazard consists of the risk of three distinct kinds of behavior by
insureds, all of which are hidden from the insurer. The first is when
insureds take less than optimal care in protecting themselves against the
insured risk. The second behavior categorized as moral hazard is when
insureds make less of an effort to minimize their loss should the risk occur.
The third action, somewhat more controversially defined as moral hazard
because it can also be plain fraud, is the exaggeration of losses by insureds
to get higher reimbursements. The first behavior is considered ex-ante
moral hazard, while the second is considered ex-post moral hazard. The
third behavior, depending on its magnitude, is sometimes considered expost moral hazard, but sometimes is considered fraud. In all these cases the
insureds externalize costs onto the pool. Why? Because the insurer cannot
distinguish between insureds who do and those who do not behave in a
moral hazard way, the insurer charges the same premium to all insureds,
leading to cross subsidization. The risk for such “immoral” behavior by the
insureds was dubbed by insurance companies in the nineteenth century
“moral hazard”.82
Take, for example, a property owner with a piece of real estate
worth $1 million. She is concerned with fire damage, which at a 10%
likelihood each year will destroy the entire value of the property. Thus, her
expected cost from fire damage is $100,000 per year. The property owner
also knows that with a janitor properly maintaining the property, the
probability of a fire is reduced to 1% and therefore the expected cost falls
to $10,000. She can hire a janitor for $30,000 per year, bringing the total
expected cost of fire damage, plus a janitor, to $40,000. Therefore,
investing in care is efficient for an uninsured property owner—she has
invested $30,000 in care and has saved $90,000 in expected costs.
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Other actions that are intentionally dangerous, like making explosives in the
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The problem begins when the property owner purchases insurance.
Fire insurance could serve as a substitute or as a complementary solution to
the property owner’s concerns. If an insurer has no way of monitoring the
property or the janitor’s work, it will charge an annual premium of
$100,000 plus the insurer’s administrative costs and profit. The insured
who knows she is fully insured and cannot be monitored will have no
incentives to optimally invest in prevention. She has no incentive to hire a
janitor because it would not reduce her premium at all. This hazard of
“morally” inappropriate behavior by insureds—of not taking what would
ordinarily be cost-effective precautions—is “moral hazard.”
Moral hazard is often a problem also in the third-party liability
insurance context. Take, for example, automobile liability insurance.
Beginning in the 1970s, most American states adopted a requirement that
drivers be covered by automobile liability insurance.83 In theory at least,
drivers covered by liability insurance would take less care than those not
covered. Without insurance, a negligent driver causing an accident would
bear the cost of the harm the accident caused. With insurance, the driver
no longer bears that cost, thus her financial incentive to take care to avoid
an accident is diluted.84
A necessary but insufficient condition to the characterization of
moral hazard is that the suboptimal behavior of the insured is the result of
the insurance coverage. Thus, the insured’s behavior must be examined in
relation to her conduct in the state of the world where she was not covered.
An insured who never arms the alarm in her house (even in states of the
world where she was not insured) is a higher-risk insured and may pose a
problem of adverse selection to the pool, but does not pose a moral hazard
problem to the pool because her inefficient behavior is not as a result of the
insurance coverage. In contrast, if an insured does not activate the alarm
before she leaves the house—an inefficient behavior that is hidden from the
insurer—as a result of the insurance coverage she is acting in a moral
hazard way.
And why is such an action still an insufficient condition for the
characterization of moral hazard? Because not every behavior of the
insured—even if it is because he is covered— is necessarily suboptimal or
poses a disturbing moral hazard problem. For example, there is a concern
that health insurance brings about ex-post moral hazard because insured
83
84

below.

Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 42, at 358.
Whether or not this theoretical prediction holds in practice will be discussed
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people consume more health services as a result of being insured. But not
every over-consumption (relative to consumption in the absence of
insurance) is problematic since the very purpose of insurance coverage is to
ensure that when the insured person gets sick, she can afford expensive
medical treatments that otherwise could not be provided to her. Although
insureds may demand plastic surgery on the grounds that they have a
medical need, may replace their eye glasses too often, or may visit the
dental hygienist beyond what is reasonably necessary because they do not
bear the full economic costs of these treatments, it is hard to believe that
people will seek a heart transplant or brain surgery solely because they are
insured.85
How can one tell when the insured's decision to get medical care is
a legitimate and efficient, and when it is a moral hazard behavior which
creates a social loss?
Here is a mental exercise that may help resolve this issue, at least
theoretically. Suppose an insured needs a kidney transplant, which costs
$50,000, and he is insured under a policy which enables him to choose one
of two options. Option one: the insured undergoes the kidney transplant
and the insurer will indemnify him for its $50,000 costs. Option two: the
insurer would send him a check for $50,000 for his personal use. Now let’s
assume that Insured A tells the insurer that he is indifferent between the
two options while Insured B says he prefers the check. What can we learn
about A and B from their answers? An insured who really needed a kidney
transplant will be indifferent between the two possibilities, since in each
case he will undergo a transplant and remain financially neutral. This is our
Insured A, and we can deduce therefore that A's decision to undergo a
transplantation is efficient. The interesting point here is that A’s decision is
efficient even though it is quite possible that without the insurance money
A might have chosen to not undergo the transplant. In other words, even
though A's decision to undergo a kidney transplant is a result of the fact
that he has insurance, his behavior is not considered a disturbing moral
hazard. In fact, A’s choice fulfills the very purpose of insurance.
In contrast, an insured who would prefer the check, B in our
example, is signaling that undergoing a kidney transplant is not his
preferred use of the money and therefore that is probably not an efficient
option. Therefore, if the insurer offered Insured B only the option to be
85
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reimbursed for the costs for the surgery (option one above) and Insured B
chooses to undergo the kidney transplant, it is clear that Insured B’s
decision to undergo the transplant is not only as a result of having an
insurance coverage, but it is also inefficient. This situation reflects an
inefficient allocation of resources and thus a disturbing moral hazard.
Another way to look at this is to notice that providing insurance
coverage creates two effects. The first is an “income effect” that allows the
insured to consume medical care he could not otherwise afford. Under the
“income effect” the insured would have undergone these treatments under
either of our options above. Over-consumption of medical treatments in
such a case does not create a distortion in the efficient allocation of
resources and is therefore not problematic. The second effect is a
“substitution effect,” whereby the insured will consume medical treatments
he would not have consumed had he received cash in advance (just like
insured B above). Only the “substitution effect” is problematic from a
social welfare perspective because it does create a distortion in the efficient
allocation of resources. As we shall see, the distinction between overconsumption due to income effect and substitution effect is important for
empirical studies attempting to measure the social welfare costs of moral
hazard.
Over-consumption due to income effect is one example of how
what looks like moral hazard can actually increase social welfare. Another
example engages the “theory of the second best.”86 For example, where
medical services are provided in a non-competitive or monopolistic market
the quantity offered is too low relative to the efficient outcome (known as
the “first best”). In such a market, the excessive consumption of medical
services due to (ex-post) moral hazard may offset some of the social loss
due to smaller supply of medical services and bring on an increase in social
welfare because it corrects the market failure stemming from the
monopolistic market. In effect, the “excess” caused by moral hazard may
bring the level of consumption closer to a socially desirable level, the “first
best.” The same holds when as a result of budget constraints, lack of
information, or various cognitive biases, insureds do not consume enough
medical services, for example preventive medicine. With preventative
medicine, a certain level of consumption is required to prevent disease and
save on future costs, so again moral hazard may lead to an increase in
social welfare because it offsets a market failure. While these examples of
86
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the potential benefits of moral hazard are interesting from a theoretical
standpoint, it is clear that, with few exceptions, moral hazard remains a
problem that needs to be combated. The next sections discuss various
contractual and doctrinal solutions to the moral hazard problem.
1. Contractual Solutions for the Moral Hazard Problem
On a theoretical level, solving moral hazard requires
disincentivizing the deviations from the optimal level of care. Such a
solution can be approached from multiple angles. The first approach
involves the stick—punishing carelessness by denying coverage when the
insured was negligent in preventing the loss, in minimizing the loss, or in
exaggerating its scope. The second approach is the carrot—rewarding
carefulness. Third, we can more closely align the insured’s incentives with
the insurer’s, for example, by forcing the insured to bear some of the risk.
Let’s start with the carrot. Essentially, moral hazard is a
paradigmatic principal–agent problem where the agent (the insured)
exercises at least some control over the level of risk that the principal (the
insurer) incurs. One way to ameliorate this problem is to have the parties
“contract on care” by coming to a mutually beneficial agreement where the
insured agrees to take certain precautions in return for lower premiums.
This approach requires insurers to first determine what people should do to
lower the likelihood of an occurrence. With that information, the insurer
then requires the insureds to take those measures as a condition of an
insurance policy. Costly problems may arise for the insurer, however, in
both ascertaining that information and in monitoring insureds, whether on a
continuing basis or in retrospect.
In the example above if an insurer can monitor the property and
know that the janitor in fact is doing his job, the insurer can reward the
insured a “carrot” by lowering the premium to just over $10,000.87
Alternatively, if the insurer discovers after the occurrence that the insured
violated his obligation according to the policy to hire a janitor, the insurer
can deny coverage (the stick). These methods align the incentives of the
insured and the insurer and motivate the insured to do the socially optimal
thing by hiring the janitor.
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While the carrot and stick approach would seem to solve the moral
hazard problem, in many cases the insurer cannot effectively monitor the
insured’s care-taking behavior, nor can it cheaply investigate the reasons
for the loss. Like in the case of adverse selection, carefully designing the
policy contract may help. Deductibles and co-insurance clauses in the
policy force insureds to bear some specified amount or percentage of harm
(respectively), thereby forcing the insured to internalize some of the cost of
an occurrence and incentivizing careful behavior. Policy limits, or caps on
the total amount payable under the policy, similarly provide a strong
incentive to avoid risky behavior and to minimize total harm. The higher
the deductibles and co-insurance payments are, the lower the premiums are.
Similarly, the lower the policy limits are, the lower the premiums are.
While not a perfect solution—because it dilutes the ex-post coverage for
the insured—this is another way of at least partially aligning the ex-ante
interests of the insurer and the insured.
To better appreciate the way deductibles and co-insurance clauses
magically align parties’ incentives, let us return to our property owner and
her $1 million property. This time, she has an insurance policy which
contains a co-insurance clause of 35%, in this case $350,000, to be borne
by the insured in the event she files a claim for a total loss of her property,
leaving the insurer to bear a risk of $650,000. With no janitor and a 10%
probability of an accident, the owner’s premium is $65,000, her personal
expected uninsured cost of fire damage is $35,000, and therefore her total
expected costs are $100,000.88 But, if she hires a janitor and the probability
of an accident falls to 1%, her expected uninsured cost is now $3,500—one
percent of the deductible—plus the $30,000 for the janitor’s salary, totaling
$33,500. Add to this the $65,000 premium charged and the total is $98,500,
which is lower than without a janitor. Thus, with the deductible, an insured
has a monetary incentive to hire the janitor, and thus reduce risk, even if
doing that cannot be verified by the insurer. (Furthermore, that reduced risk
can result in a lower premium because the risk is now only 1%, meaning
premiums should really be only $6,500. With the lower premiums, overall
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The owner’s premium is $65,000, because it equals the damage the insurer
bears multiplied by the 10% chance of harm. Here, I am ignoring the
administrative fees and profits also charged by the insurer. Her personal expected
uninsured cost of fire damage is $35,000 because it equals the deductible
multiplied by 10%.
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expected costs for the insured are only $40,000.89) The result is that the
insured, acting self-interestedly, decided to hire a janitor, even though that
decision is not observable to the insurer, which is the socially efficient
outcome. This is the way a well-planned co-insurance clause can solve a
moral hazard problem in a way that is beneficial to all.
By and large, moral hazard is combated by deductibles in cases of
small losses, co-insurance in cases of medium losses, and caps (or policy
limits) in cases of large losses. Deductibles are fixed dollar amounts borne
by insureds, say $1,000 for car insurance. They provide incentives to keep
small claims out of the administratively expensive insurance system. This
is especially important because including small claims in the system would
mean a larger portion of premiums would go towards administrative costs.
Co-insurance clauses are fixed percentages of the loss borne by the insured,
say 35% of any claim as seen in the previous paragraph. They combat
strategic behavior for medium claims because the dollar amount insureds
have to bear increases with the claim. Lastly, caps, or policy limits, combat
strategic behavior for large claims by forcing any costs above the cap onto
the insured.
Unfortunately, deductibles and co-insurance are not perfect
solutions for all lines of insurance. In the health insurance market, for
example, the insured generally has to cover all expenses up to the
deductible, then pays a portion (10–20%) of his care up to the out-ofpocket maximum, and then has no costs associated with additional
insurance until he reaches his policy maximum. Therefore if the insured is
conscious not just of the price of each item of care he consumes (like an
MRI), but focuses on his expected expenditures for the entire year, then
varying the deductible or the co-pay might not change the behavior of the
insured as expected.90 A recent paper by researchers at MIT and Stanford
89

$30,000 cost of janitor plus $6,500 premium plus $3,500 expected loss borne
by insured. The insured will find it worthwhile to hire a janitor even when he
initially misleads the insurer to believe he has a janitor (when in fact he does not)
and in return is being charged only $6,500 as premium. Without a janitor his costs
will be $41,500 ($6,500 premium plus $35,000 expected losses), whereas with a
janitor his costs will be $40,000.
90
For example, assume a deductible of $3,000, co-insurance of 20%, an outof-pocket maximum of $5,000, and total expected medical costs of $20,000 for the
year. Our hypothetical insured’s co-insurance would be $3,400 (.20*17,000) and
so his total costs ($6,400) would exceed the out-of-pocket max. If the deductible is
lowered to $2,000 or raised to $4,000, his co-insurance costs still cause him to
exceed his out-of-pocket maximum for the year and so will not change his
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University found that insureds did in fact “look forward” to the future costs
of medicine.91 In other words, insureds take into account the actual price
and the future price when making medical care decisions.92 These results
must be considered when an insurer is trying to influence consumer
behavior through co-pay, deductibles, and co-insurance.
Another way the insurer can protect itself from moral hazard
without exerting control over the insured is by classifying insureds
according to their experience with the loss to be insured—called experience
rating.93 In other words, insurers threaten higher premiums for those
insureds with the highest losses, incentivizing the insureds to invest in
minimizing their losses (as well as reducing cross subsidization of high-risk
insureds by low-risk insureds). Some insurers offer policies that are
experience rated retrospectively, meaning that the premium is set after the
loss experience is known. Insureds with lower losses receive refunds for
part of their premiums, while a surcharge is levied on those with higher
losses.
An interesting question is when experience rating, as opposed to
deductibles or co-insurance, should be used to combat moral hazard.
Experience rating is more often used for third-party rather than for firstparty insurance, whereas deductibles and co-insurance clauses usually
apply to first-party but not to third-party insurance. The reason is two-fold:
First, deductibles better reduce the administrative costs associated with the
processing of small claims, which are more prevalent in the first-party
insurance context. Second, experience rating works better for repeat
players, which are more often found in the third-party liability insurance
context.94

consumption. If co-pays for each doctor’s visit count towards the out-of-pocket
total, then they too will not influence a forward looking insured with high expected
yearly costs.
91
Aviva Aron-Dine et al., Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: How Important
Is Forward Looking Behavior? 26-27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17802, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17802.
92
Id.
93
ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 15.
94
Patricia Danzon argued that liability insurance policies do not have
deductibles because of the problem of reverse moral hazard, which will be
discussed below. Specifically, the insured is exposed to moral hazard with respect
to the insurer’s legal defense efforts. Not having deductibles makes insurers bear
the full costs of coverage in case they do not defend vigorously, and thus dilutes
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However, in automobile insurance, which has a strong first party
component to it, experience rating is prevalent (in addition to deductibles),
whereas it does not exist in third-party medical malpractice coverage. The
reason for that is primarily because automobile accidents are frequent
enough and fault is often not hard to determine, whereas medical
malpractice claims are too infrequent to allow estimating risk components
for individual physicians and because it is widely believed that apparent
differences in number of lawsuits among physicians are the result of chance
or misinformation, not negligence. This stems from a belief that the legal
system is incompetent in accurately determining doctors’ fault.95
Lastly, as was mentioned above, sticks are also a possible means to
control moral hazard. One stick that can mitigate moral hazard is to limit
the types of occurrences for which the insurer will compensate the insured.
Such exclusions typically include high-risk behavior or, in the case of
liability insurance, intentional torts such as battery.96 In an obvious way,
exclusions pressure the insured party to avoid the proscribed behavior.
As was mentioned above, in addition to the ex-ante moral hazard,
there is also an ex-post moral hazard, i.e. moral hazard that happens after
the occurrence. One of the general concerns in this context is that in
indemnity policies, the insured will not take sufficient measures to
minimize the damage stemming from the realization of risk, or would file a
claim for excessive losses. Here, transferring part of the risk to the insured
(for example, by having deductibles) would not help because the covered
event had already happened and the deductible is a sunk cost (In fact, there
is a concern that the higher the deductible is, the greater the incentive the
insured has to exaggerate a claim in order to recover the deductible
amount).97
the reverse moral hazard problem. Patricia M. Danzon, Liability and Liability
Insurance for Medical Malpractice, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 309, 319-20 (1985).
95
However, this traditional explanation for insurers’ failure to utilize
experience ratings in medical malpractice insurance has been brought into doubt in
recent years. See D. M. Studdert et al., Special Article, Claims, Errors, and
Compensation Payment in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2024, 2031(2006) (saying that the malpractice liability system is relatively accurate
in sorting claims and that most insurance dollars are spent on valid claims).
96
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Insurance Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 346 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing
intentional acts in regard to insurance law).
97
Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent
Claims: Evidence From Automobile Insurance, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 290, 298
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Insurance companies deal with ex-post moral hazard in several
ways. First, they refuse to insure non-pecuniary losses because proving
their scope is hard and sometimes impossible.98 Second, insurance
companies audit claims that, due to different characteristics, are suspected
to involve ex-post moral hazard. In such claims, insurers will involve
private investigators, appraisers, and doctors to investigate the claim on
their behalf. But because these investigations are expensive, insurers find it
hard to commit to investigating all claims or even only those that are
suspected. Thus, in many cases a random investigation of claims actually
deters better than non-random investigations.99 Moreover, false or
exaggerated claims often lack external characteristics known to insurers to
be highly correlated with false or exaggerated claims. In such situations
post-occurrence investigations may be inefficient. Therefore, a better
strategy is for insurance companies to design the policies so that insureds
have fewer incentives to engage in ex-post moral hazard to begin with.
Indeed, one way to deal with such an ex-post moral hazard is by
designing insurance contracts so that the incentives of the insured to
exaggerate a claim are small. A simple way to do that is by substituting
indemnity policies for stated-value policies, which require the insurer to
pay the value stated in the contract regardless of the actual value of the
loss.100 In the jurisdictions that recognize stated-value policies, if the
insured property is completely destroyed the insurer cannot look beyond
the policy to determine the actual value of the property. Instead, the full
(2001) (finding that in automobile insurance, the larger the deductible is, the larger
the loss reported, especially in accidents with not witnesses).
98
There is a debate in the literature whether the lack of insurance for nonpecuniary losses stem from insureds’ lack of demand, or from lack of supply due to
market failures. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law,108 HARV. L. REV. 1785,
1789-99 (1995); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546-47, 1553 (1987); Ronen Avraham, Should PainAnd-Suffering Damages Be Abolished from Tort Law? More Experimental
Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 945-46 (2005).
99
Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, Optimal Auditing, Insurance and
Redistribution, 104 Q.J. ECON. 399, 413 (1989). Obviously, relying on third
parties’ investigations raises issues of collusion and fraud. See Ingela Algar &
Ching-to Alberta Ma, Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion, 50 J. ECON.
BEHAVIOR & ORG. 225, 226 (2003).
100
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of First Congregational Church of Austin v. Cream
City Mut. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Wis., 96 N.W.2d 690, 695 (Minn. 1959).
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value stated in the policy must be paid. The principle here is “caveat
venditor”—insurers have to make sure at the contracting stage that the asset
is properly valued. On the other hand, such contracts prevent a false
representation as to the magnitude of the loss. Stated-value contracts
provide certainty to both parties and reduce post-occurrence investigation
costs. Insurance of jewelry is a common example of stated-value policies.
As we have seen before, there is always a tradeoff between
providing coverage ex-post and not distorting incentives for proper
behavior. While stated-value policies reduce the incentives for ex-post
moral hazard they may under-indemnify a risk-averse insured, thereby
creating a welfare loss. Insurance companies can, therefore, offer a hybrid
between an indemnity contract (which fully compensates the insured but
creates incentives for ex-post moral hazard) and a stated-value contract
(where such incentives do not exist but the insured may find himself undercompensated). Such hybrid policies will be partially dependent on the size
of the damage and will therefore induce weaker incentives for ex-post
moral hazard. An example of this is a policy which under-compensates
types of losses where false representations are relatively prevalent, such as
back pain with no clinical markers, and generously compensates types of
losses where false representations are extremely difficult, such as losses of
limbs101
2. Doctrinal Solutions for the Problem of Moral Hazard
Moral hazard presents the greatest risk when the insured party has
no personal stake in the property or person covered by the insurance policy.
Thus, a simple method of countering that problem is to require the insured
to have an insurable interest in the covered item. An insurable interest
exists where the relationship between the beneficiary of the insurance
contract and the thing to be covered are such that it is reasonable to assume
the beneficiary has a significant benefit or advantage from the continued
existence of the insured item. Thus, in life insurance an insurable interest
exists where the relationship of the parties are such that there are
101

Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing
Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts, 106 J. POL. ECON. 355, 355
(1998). See also Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 429 (1996); Keith J. Crocker & Sharon
Tennyson, Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L.
ECON. 469, 470 (2002).
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reasonable grounds, either pecuniary or contractual or by blood or affinity,
to expect a significant benefit or advantage to the beneficiary from the
continuance of the life of the insured.
In the early days of insurance, an insurable interested was not
required. For example, in 1743 insurers offered 3:1 odds on the survival of
George II when he personally led his army in the Battle of Dettingen.102
Anyone could have purchased those contracts. Only in 1774 Britain
enacted the Life Assurance Act which required the beneficiary to have an
insurable interest. Since then more legislatures followed suit. However,
courts have also played a role in shaping this practice by refusing to
enforce insurance contracts that do not have an insurable interest. One
pointed example is “murder policies.” These are life insurance policies that
de facto incentivize the murder of the insured by the beneficiaries of such
policies. Courts typically void these policies and cut off the payment to the
beneficiary in order to undermine their criminal incentive.103 Moreover,
courts have even shown a willingness to recognize wrongful death suits
filed by insureds’ families against the issuers of such policies. In this way
courts have diluted the incentives of both murderous beneficiaries and
irresponsible insurers to engage in life insurance policies where the
beneficiaries have no insurable interest.104
Despite the obvious benefit of requiring an insurable interest, it is
important not to over-void policies for formalistically lacking this
requirement. Indeed courts have found insurable interests in various forms,
including a legal or equitable interest in the property; a factual expectancy;
a contractual right; and a legal liability. The most common insurable
102

Yoni Appelbaum, Have Insurance Companies Forgotten the Meaning of
Insurance?,
THE
ATLANTIC,
May
7th,
2012,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/have-insurance-companiesforgotten-the-meaning-of-insurance/256677/.
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See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and
Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 315 (2003).
104
Many states have statutorily imposed and defined insurable interest
requirements. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 359 (2007). For example in California,
Section 10110 of the Insurance Code, reads: “Insurable interest. Every person has
an insurable interest in the life and health of: (a) Himself. (b) Any person on whom
he depends wholly or in part for education or support. (c) Any person under a legal
obligation to him for the payment of money or respecting property or services, of
which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance. (d) Any person
upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends.” Cal. Ins. Code §
10110 (West 2005).
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interest is a legal or equitable interest in property. Thus, a person has an
insurable interest in the house she owns. The factual expectancy doctrine,
however, makes clear that legal title to property is not a requirement for an
insurable interest. Instead, an insured need only have a reasonably certain
expectation for a gain or other pecuniary interest in the subject property.
Thus, if there is a factual expectation that property will soon pass to a
putative insured, that insured has an insurable interest. A contractual right
to property can also create an insurable interest. This doctrine allows
secured creditors, such as mortgagees, to obtain insurance for property
securing a debt. Lastly, a legal liability gives rise to an insurable interest.
If a putative insured is legally liable in the event of the destruction of
certain property, but that insured does not have actual title to the property,
an insurable interest still exists up to the value of the liability.
The common thread through all types of insurable interest is a
direct and reasonably certain pecuniary interest in the object being insured.
A merely speculative interest is not sufficient.105 The exception to the
general rule that pecuniary interest is enough to establish an insurable
interest is life insurance, where a strong emotional interest between the
beneficiary and the insured is also an avenue to an insurable interest.106
Without the insurable interest requirement, insurance could be used to
create risky situations instead of removing risk, as it is intended to do.
Another feature of most, especially first-party, insurance contracts
that protects against moral hazard, and which is closely related to the
insurable interest requirement, is the indemnity principle—an insured may
only recover compensation up to the smaller of the amount covered and the
amount lost. This principle mitigates the incentive of the insured to acquire
too much coverage and then to cause the loss to her property when
insurance coverage is greater than the value of the property covered. But,
“value of the property” must be understood appropriately, as it typically
reflects replacement cost and not actual cash value. For example, most
goods have a lower cash value after they become used than when
105

See, e.g., Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 948 P.2d 1264, 1272-73
(Wash. 1997).
106
While often the beneficiary of a life insurance policy does have a pecuniary
interest in the life of the insured, specifically the beneficiary has an interest in the
continued stream of income from the insured, it is not a requirement. There is
nothing that would prevent the purchase of life insurance benefitting a loved one
when the beneficiary has no possible expectation of monetary gain from the
insured’s continued life.
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purchased new, but insurance will typically cover the cost of replacement
of a new warehouse, provided the moral hazard is not too great.
Whether the value to be paid is actual cash value or replacement
value is an issue that can be contracted on. Many homeowners’ insurance
policies provide for replacement value in the event of total destruction of
the property. The risk of moral hazard created when the actual cash value
is significantly lower than the replacement value can be mitigated by only
providing the replacement value if the recovery is actually used to replace
the property.107
Although the indemnity principle applies to most insurance
contracts, accident and health insurance are not fully included and life
insurance is usually not at all included in that category. The reason for this
is one of valuation; courts are reluctant to value a person’s life or limbs. In
the health and accident insurance contexts, courts do not want to engage in
the evaluation of the medical treatment insureds have received and
determine whether it is excessive or not. In the life insurance context, for
instance, if it cannot first be determined what the actual value of a person’s
life is, it is impossible to determine if the amount of the policy exceeds that
value. However, when the purpose of life insurance is strictly financial, say
insuring the life of a debtor to guarantee recovery of the debt, the
indemnity principle will dictate that the recovery will be limited to the
amount of the financial interest, here the amount of the debt.
Another solution stemming from the indemnity principle is to
prohibit over-insurance and under-insurance. As we saw, improper levels
of first-party insurance potentially increase moral hazard by creating
incentives for careless behavior that could result in windfall recoveries.
One may wonder why states have to regulate the prohibition over-insurance
and under-insurance. After all, the negative incentives created for insureds
by over-insurance would be handled by the principle of indemnity which
would prevent recovery which is too high. However, the administrative
costs and information-gathering problems associated with fully enforcing
the indemnity principle create a chance that over-insurance could lead to
windfall recoveries despite the protections the indemnity principle
provides. Stated-value policies, which were discussed above, may further
enhance the problem if the value is not correctly established.
Moreover, over-insurance does not emerge solely due to the
insured’s strategic behavior. Often insurers have incentives to sell too
107

See, e.g., Rhodes v. Farmers Ins. Co., 86 S.W.3d 401, 401-03 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2002).
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much coverage with the knowledge that the principle of indemnity will
prevent courts from forcing them to ever pay the full value of the policy.
This means that the insurance company can charge a premium that is
higher than their actual risk associated with an occurrence. As a result,
many states have solved the over-insurance problem by explicitly
prohibiting in their codes over-insuring, thus reducing both parties’
strategic behavior.
Under-insurance creates different, but potentially severe, negative
incentives. In fire and property coverage, for instance, small losses are far
more frequent than large losses. Yet, policy prices are determined linearly,
increasing at a set rate as the value of the policy increases. Thus, $50,000
of coverage costs half as much as $100,000 of coverage, even if the value
of the house is $100,000. The likelihood that any loss will only be partial
creates a strong incentive to only purchase the $50,000 of coverage, and
still be covered for the most likely losses. This incentive would distort the
insurance market, diluting the incentives to purchase coverage for large
losses, which is one of the fundamentals functions of insurance.
One can dilute the insureds’ incentive to under-insure by setting
the premiums based on the lower probability of a larger loss instead of a
purely linear pricing system. However, a more common approach to
address the problem of under-insurance is through coinsurance pegged to
the value of the property. If an insured covers only a small portion of her
property, her co-insurance will be higher. If, on the other hand, a policy is
valued at the actual value of the property, little or no co-insurance will be
required. For example, a homeowners policy may contain a clause that, in
the event of a loss, and if the coverage is less than 80% of the replacement
value, the insurer will pay only the proportion of the loss which the total
coverage bears to 80% of the replacement cost.108 Under such a clause, if a
house is worth $100,000, but coverage is only $60,000, then the insurer
will only pay 75% of any claim ($60,000 over $80,000 equals 75%). If, on
the other hand, the insured purchases coverage of at least 80% of the value
of the house, the insurer will pay 100% of any loss ($80,000 over $80,000
equals 100%). In this way, coinsurance provisions provide an incentive for
insureds to purchase coverage for most of the value of their property.109
108

See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 272 (5th
ed. 2010).
109
Id. Some companies no longer price their policies using the linear approach
described above but rather use a more complicated pricing method which allows
them to abandon coinsurance terms. As early as 1981 some scholars had suggested
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From the doctrine of indemnity follows the doctrine of
subrogation, which allows a first- party insurer to step in for the insured
and pursue his or her legal rights against tortfeasors after compensating for
a loss. For example, suppose a water pipe bursts near an insured’s house,
and that insured makes a proper claim to her homeowner’s insurance
carrier. If that carrier pays the claim, it then has a right of subrogation to
exercise the insured’s legal rights. If the water pipe bursting resulted from
a tort, the insurer has a legal right of action against the tortfeasor.110
Subrogation keeps premiums lower in that it permits the insurers to recover
part of their expenses from tortfeasors and by reducing insureds’ moral
hazard in that it avoids the potential problem of double-recovery which
would exist if subrogation were not part of the insurance contract. Thus,
subrogation is overall an efficient arrangement.
Extending the doctrine of subrogation, one could also argue that an
insured should be prohibited from settling a tort case regarding a loss for
which it carried insurance. Take for instance an insured who was tortiously
injured in a car accident, and who is also covered by health insurance. The
insurer, through its right of subrogation, is entitled to any recovery related
to the medical expenses. The insured, therefore, has a strong incentive to
structure any settlement in a way that none of the recovery is attributable to
medical costs. In that way, the insured will have her medical costs paid for
by the insurer, and keep the whole of the settlement. However, in doing so,
the insured externalizes costs to the entire insurance pool. For this reason,
it could be advantageous to allow first-party insurance companies to exert
some control over settlements, or their structure, in these situations.
Indeed, in practice there is often a three-way split among the plaintiff, her
attorney and the insurer.111
Similar negative incentives exist in the context of third-party
liability insurance. There, a tortfeasor covered by liability insurance may
wish to avoid the burdens of litigation because any liability attributed to her
would be paid by the insurer. To avoid litigation, the insured could
therefore settle up-front for the policy maximum, even if the actual harm
coinsurance was becoming obsolete. See Michael L. Smith & David L.
Bickelhaupt, Is Coinsurance Becoming Obsolete?, 48 J. RISK INS. 95, 95 (1981).
110
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
72, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Self-Insurers' Sec. Fund v. ESIS, Inc., 251
Cal. Rptr. 693 (1988)).
111
Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and The Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 304-08 (2001).
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was less than the settlement amount. This behavior too externalizes costs
to the pool and decreases the efficiency of the insurance market.
To prevent insureds from settling too often, or, more generally,
from not defending the claim against them very vigorously, general liability
policies impose on the insurer the duty to defend the claim. The idea is that
it would be advantageous to allow the insurer to act on the insured’s behalf,
presumably with better resources and stronger incentives than the insured.
But that creates a new problem as now the insurer is the agent of the
insured, acting on his behalf. These agency relationships create the problem
of “reverse moral hazard,” which will be discussed below.
As mentioned above, there is also the danger of ex-post moral
hazard where the insured exaggerates it losses in order to get monies he
does not deserve. We saw that insurance companies have a number
of contractual tools to deal with this problem.
One of them is the stated-value policy. These policies are common in lines
of insurance where the principle of indemnity does not necessarily apply
such as life insurance, health insurance and accident or disability insurance.
Once the indemnity principle does not apply, the justification for
subrogation falls as well.
Courts handle the problem of ex-post moral hazard in the same
manner they dealt with misrepresentations that occur before the issuance of
contract. When the insured does not cooperate with the insurer after the
occurrence so that the insurer can determine its liability, or when the
insured submits fraudulent claims, courts generally approve a reduction in
the insurance benefits and often allow insurers to not pay them at
all, even in cases where but for the insured’s post-occurrence behavior
(exaggerating his loss) the insured would have been entitled to reduced
benefits. One may even argue that such situations justify damages paid to
the insurer from the insured to further deter these misrepresentations.
3. Returning to the Two Islands Approach
As discussed above, one way to combat moral hazard is to use
deductibles and caps on losses to align the incentives of the insurer and the
insured. One common exclusion along these lines is the “loss of market”
exclusion for business interruption insurance coverage.
Business
interruption insurance provides coverage for lost profits due to the
interruption of business after a covered peril occurs, such as fire, flood, or
wind. Business interruption insurance is typically added, by endorsement,
to an insurance policy covering damage to an insured's property. The loss
of market exclusion excludes from that coverage any lost profits due to the
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business’s market disappearing. The loss of market could be due to
economic decline, competition, or shifts in demand that happened after the
occurrence. The loss of market exclusion has been a source of increasing
debate in recent years due to catastrophic events such as the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and Hurricane Katrina, which have
destroyed entire markets. The general question, as usual, is whether that
exclusion should be honored.
To analyze whether the exclusion is desirable, we once again create
two identical islands except that one island has the exclusion and one does
not. On the island that ignores the loss-of-market exclusion, business
owners can purchase insurance which essentially guarantees they make a
profit even when the demand for their product will never bounce back after
an occurrence. This might lead to a large moral hazard problem. After an
occurrence, if it is guaranteed that a company will be covered up to its
previous level of profitability, what incentive does that company have to
strive to restore its earlier business efforts? After a fire, for instance, an
owner of a restaurant with lost profits coverage would have no incentive to
work hard to get back some business when she is guaranteed to make at
least as much money as she was making before. That restaurant owner
could take that lazy attitude until customers return on their own.
On the island that enforces the loss-of-market exclusion, however,
there is no such moral hazard problem; the company must do everything it
can to earn business back after a disaster. While this is an advantage, the
disadvantage of the island is that there is less coverage. Due to an
occurrence, a business may not be able to survive until the market returns.
The reason for insurance in the first place is protecting the business in the
event of a covered peril, so it is likely a reasonable insured would be
willing to pay the higher premiums in exchange for the protection of her
business.
The question becomes one of incentives. Economic analysis
suggests that policies should not exclude loss of market (that is the policy
should provide coverage) when the risk of moral hazard is relatively small.
Consider for example Duane Reade, which dealt with business interruption
insurance in the context of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.112
The court decided that the destruction of the World Trade Center where
Duane Reade ran a store, and Duane Reade’s resulting lost profits, were
clearly a covered peril, and that the “loss of market” provision did not
112

See Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d
235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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encompass the destruction a market due to terrorist attack.113 In other
words, because the market loss was due to a covered peril—the destruction
of the business—the resulting lost profits were covered.
The court got it right, only for the wrong reasons. As the example
with the fire in the restaurant above suggests, we want to provide incentives
to business owners to work hard to restore customer traffic after an
occurrence. Therefore the court is wrong to provide coverage for loss-ofmarket only because it was originally initiated by a covered peril. However,
when it comes to catastrophic events, where there is nothing the business
owner can do to bring customers back to his store (think about ground zero
in the years post 9/11), there is no risk of distorting incentives. The interest
in providing coverage should therefore prevail, and the market exclusion
should not be honored.
However, it is unlikely a reasonable insured would want to pay for
coverage to keep a business around in perpetuity even though there is no
demand for the business. Thus, even in catastrophic events the coverage
could not be unlimited. The Duane Reade court took this approach to the
timing issue. It ruled lost profits were to be covered and the loss market
exclusion should not be honored—in other words, coverage should last—
only for the time it would reasonably take “to rebuild, repair, or replace”
the specific store at issue.114
4. Moral Hazard—The Empirical Evidence
As discussed above in the section on empirical evidence for
adverse selection, one problem with empirically measuring either moral
hazard or adverse selection is distinguishing one’s effects from the other.
For example, an unhealthy person would be more likely to buy health
insurance (adverse selection), while a person with insurance may be more
likely to adopt unhealthy habits, knowing that he has insurance in case he
became sick (moral hazard). In both cases the empiricist observes a
correlation between high-risk individuals and scope of coverage. In other
words, it is easy to observe a positive correlation between the demand for
coverage and the number or scope of insurance claims, but it is difficult to
determine whether this correlation is the result of adverse selection, moral
hazard, or some combination of the two. This inability to separate the two
problems poses policy consequences as well, since ameliorating either the
113
114

Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 239.
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potential welfare losses of moral hazard or adverse selection requires
separate policy tools. To curtail moral hazard, insurers would increase
deductibles to encourage healthful activities and discourage waste by
exposing consumers to the true cost of their medical care.115 To reduce the
potential problem of adverse selection, on the other hand, requires stricter
disclosure laws for potential insureds to allow insurers to better screen for
pre-existing conditions, or alternatively, a health-insurance mandate as
discussed above.
But not being able to distinguish between moral hazard and
adverse selection is not the only problem with the empirical literature.
Potentially a more worrisome problem is that the empirical literature fails
to distinguish between the moral hazard which stems from the “substitution
effect,” and that which stems from the “income effect.” As discussed
above, the former is welfare decreasing and the latter is welfare
increasing.116 Thus, that people consume more healthcare because they
have insurance is not worrisome from a policy making perspective as long
as the excess consumption is due to the income effect. Similarly, the fact
that people search for a job for a longer period of time because they have
unemployment insurance is not necessarily worrisome, as long as the
excess search period is only due to the impact of the insurance on their
liquidity constraints.117
For several decades health economists have been finding evidence
interpreted as ex-post moral hazard in health insurance. The most important
study is the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which randomized people
into different insurance plans, thus eliminating adverse selection effects
stemming from the insured’s ability to choose the type of coverage she
wishes. The Rand Experiment, as well as other studies, found that demand
for medical care is elastic with respect to its out-of-pocket costs. In other

115

However, “cost-sharing” is a blunt and not necessarily efficient way of
reducing over-consumption of health insurance. Empirical evidence shows that
when consumers have to bear a higher proportion of their health costs, they do cut
back on spending, but they do so on both frivolous and beneficial procedures. See
Mary Reed et. al., High-Deductible Health Insurance Plans: Efforts to Sharpen a
Blunt Instrument, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1145, 1145 (2009).
116
See supra p. 69.
117
Raj Chetty, Moral Hazard Versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment
Insurance, 116 J. POL. ECON. 173, 173-75 (2008) (separating moral hazard effect
and liquidity constraints effect in unemployment insurance).
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words, people carrying health insurance are responsive to the personal cost
of healthcare and therefore ex-post moral hazard exists.118
The Rand Experiment approach (as well as other studies) presents
several empirical challenges to analyzing people’s utilization of medical
care as a function of their scope of insurance coverage. First, the scope of
the plan coverage might be endogenous. Generous health insurance plans
might boost utilization of medical services, or, areas where people need or
demand more medical services will be areas where people demand more
generous health insurance coverage, without these studies being able to
isolate which one is operating in practice. Second, as was just discussed,
not every variation in consumption that follows a variation in insurance
coverage can be tied to ex-post moral hazard. It is conceivable that when
insurance coverage expands, the consumption of medical services,
especially by budget-constrained people, will increase since the price will
become affordable. This is the income effect discussed above. It is only the
increase in demand due to the substitution effect which is worrying, but
such type of increase in demand is much harder to empirically identify.
So far I have dealt with ex-post moral hazard. An equally
interesting question is the extent to which one would expect to see ex-ante
moral hazard. It is worth mentioning that even a small effect is important
because even if the chances the individual’s moral hazard behavior has an
impact on her probability of being involved, say, in a fatal accident is
small, it may still cause a large social problem at the aggregate. Thus, for a
population of 100 million people, a one percentage-point increase in the
probability of a fatal accident creates a million more deaths.
In general, the empirical literature fails to establish ex-ante moral
hazard in health care.119 In the context of automobile insurance, one would
think that an insured driver is not going to drive more recklessly than he
otherwise would, as there are plenty of uncompensated losses associated
with an accident (including uncompensated bodily injuries) besides the cost
of repairs. Yet, using an instrumental-variables approach, Cohen and
Dehejla find evidence that automobile insurance does have moral hazard
118

The Rand study found an overall medical-care price elasticity of about 0.2, which means that as the personal costs increases by say, 10%, the demand for
medical care decreases by 2%. See Peter Zweifel & Willard G. Manning, Moral
Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 410, 454. (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., Elsevier Science B.V.
2000).
119
Id. at 446.
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costs, leading to an increase in traffic fatalities.120 Because they cannot
distinguish between the income effect (careful drivers drive more miles
which might be optimal despite the increase in fatalities) and the
substitution effect (careful drivers no longer take care, which is always not
optimal) caused by automobile insurance, Cohen and Dehejla cannot
identify the net welfare effect of automobile insurance.121
E. REVERSE MORAL HAZARD
Just like there is reverse adverse selection, there is arguably also
reverse moral hazard. It is not insured parties alone that behave
strategically once the insurance contract is in place—insurers are similarly
the perpetrators of opportunistic behavior, finding it easy and advantageous
to mistreat their insureds once they are locked in a contract.122 This is
especially true because barriers to litigation can prevent insureds from
challenging insurer abuse.
While insurers and policyholders have similar interests at the exante contractual stage, a fundamental conflict of interests arises in the postoccurrence stage. At the contractual stage they will agree to a policy that
minimizes total loss-related costs, including defense costs, because that will
be efficient and will keep the premiums low. But ex-post (after insurance
is purchased and claims arise) the insurance company might have different
incentives than the insured about whether the loss should be covered and—

120

Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and
Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357 (2004).
See also Sarit Weisburd, Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 27
(Hebrew Univ., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il/
~saritw/moralhazard_sep12.pdf.
121
Similarly, Bernard Fortin and Paul Lanoie have documented an increase in
work injuries correlated to the implementation of North American workers’
compensation programs, which provide employees with fast access to damages for
work related injuries. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, Incentive Effects of Workers
Compensation: A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 421, 421 . (Georges
Dionne ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000).
122
As far as I know, the idea of reverse moral hazard was first mentioned by
Patricia Danzon. See Danzon, supra note 93. See also Eric D. Beal, Posner and
Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 97 (2000); William Choi & Lan Liang,
Reverse Moral Hazard of Liability Insurers: Evidence from Medical Malpractice
Claims, 39 APPLIED ECON. 2331, 2331-32 (2007). .
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in liability insurance contract—how defense of the claim should be
exercised.
Take for example, the insurer’s decision whether to cover a claim.
After the occurrence, insurers have the dual role of both deciding whether a
certain claim is covered under the policy, and paying the damages
associated with that claim if it is determined to be covered. As one would
expect, insurers often have the economic incentive to decide coverage
exists in as few situations as possible, knowing that they are often
effectively insulated (or “insured”) from being sued due to insureds’ lack of
sophistication, knowledge, and resources. This is a reverse moral hazard.
(While one could imagine a system where insurers are not the judge and
financier of a claim, and instead these decisions are made by separate
entities, that is not the world we live in.)
As with ordinary moral hazard, there are multiple ways to counter
reverse moral hazard on a theoretical level. First, full and detailed
disclosure of the coverage decisions insurers make could be required,
whether to potential customers (thus harnessing market forces to eliminate
unethical insurers) or complaining insureds (thus exposing the unethical
practices). Second, such disclosure could be used to punish opportunistic
behavior by insurers. Insurance regulators, for instance, could analyze the
disclosures and impose fines on, or revoke the licenses of, the worst
behaving insurance companies. Third, individual insureds could have a
legal claim for damages resulting from bad faith denial by insurers. Fourth,
independent and simplified alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
could make it easier to challenge insurers’ decisions.123
Doctrinally, there are several principles of contract law which serve
to mitigate the effects of reverse moral hazard. One is the interpretive
principle of contra proferentem—that ambiguities in any contract will be
construed against its drafter. For insurance contracts, the drafter of course
is the insurer. Thus, the doctrine of contra proferentem prevents insurers
from taking advantage of gray areas of policy coverage and instead
incentivizes clear, unambiguous policy writing. However, whether or not
that incentive outweighs the incentive to maintain ambiguous, boilerplate
policy terms, is a very complicated question.124
123

See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case
Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83
TUL. L. REV. 735, 810-11 (2009).
124
Bad boilerplate is often perversely incentivized by the very rulings that
would seem to cut against it in that a term that has an established, known cost may
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Ambiguities come in multiple forms. A policy can be ambiguous
because it is vague in and of itself.125 A policy can also be considered
ambiguous if it does not address a certain situation. An example of this is
litigation arising out of the attack on the World Trade Center where it was
unclear, based on the language of a policy, whether each plane strike was
an “occurrence,” or the entire event was an “occurrence.”126 Lastly, a
policy can be ambiguous if two or more of its provisions conflict. For
example, a Second Circuit case found a policy ambiguous when one of its
provisions seemed to extend airplane insurance to trips between the United
States and the Caribbean, and another provisions indicated the policy only
applied to flights over the continental United States.127 To generalize, a
policy is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to two meanings.”128
Even if the policy writing is clear, it can still be opportunistic when an
insurer includes unambiguous, but still self-advantageous, provisions. This
is an issue because insureds may be unaware of the provision and its impact
on the insurance coverage, and may think they are covered for an
occurrence when under the stated policy terms they are not. To counteract
that problem, courts have applied what have been called “allied” doctrines
with contra proferentem, including waiver, estoppel, and the “insured’s
reasonable expectations” doctrine.129
be more valuable than one whose cost or benefit is unknown. For more on the
complex relationship of policy drafters and the courts, see Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentum: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (2006).
125
See, Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34
(Minn. 1979).
126
See World Trade Center Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d
154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003). The policy limited recovery to $3.5 billion per
occurrence. Id. If each plane strike was an occurrence, the insured could collect a
total of $7 billion, whereas if the entire event was an occurrence, the insured could
only collect $3.5 billion. Id.
127
Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving
a trip from New York to Puerto Rico, with stops in Miami and Haiti to refuel,
where the airplane crashed before it reached Puerto Rico). The court found,
because the policy was ambiguous, the policy covered the incident. Id. at 842.
128
Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95
MICH. L. REV. 531, 537 (1996).
129
See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). The term “insured’s reasonable
expectations” was coined by Professor Robert Keeton in 1970 when he recognized
that courts provide coverage even when the exclusion is not ambiguous.

90

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.1

Though recognized in only a minority of jurisdictions, the
reasonable expectations doctrine allows courts to enforce an insurance
contract despite an unambiguous exclusion contained therein if the
exclusion goes against the reasonable expectations of the insured. Some
jurisdictions distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated
insureds, recognizing that sophisticated parties may contract for such
exclusions in exchange for lower premiums.130 Waiver and estoppel are
heavily fact-dependent doctrines, with courts relying on the particulars of
the policy and the relationship between the insured and insurer to determine
whether coverage should be granted despite a policy term indicating
otherwise.131 The societal value of the reasonable expectations doctrine is
examined in more detail, via an application of the Two Islands Functional
Approach, in the next subsection.
As mentioned previously, a special type of reverse moral hazard
exists in liability insurance policies around the decisions regarding the
defense of a claim. Problems of reverse moral hazards arise because the
insurer acts as an agent of the insured, but might maximize its own interests
rather than the insured’s interests. For example, because insurers often care
only about their financial exposure in a specific case, they may prefer to
settle a lawsuit instead of litigating. But the insureds, whose reputation and
livelihood depend on the outcome, might prefer to defend against such suit
in court to clear their name. Another example is when an insured’s
potential liability to its victims is higher than the policy limit, but any
potential settlement would be at or close to the policy limit. The insurer has
incentives to pursue the litigation because the payout would be the same,
while the insured might be happy to settle for the amount of the policy
limit, because this will ensure he or she bears no personal liability.132
Parties combat reverse moral hazard through the design of the
insurance policy. As was mentioned above, many liability insurance
contracts include provisions requiring the insurer to defend a suit unless the
insured consents in writing to a settlement. Over time, courts have also
found ways to deal with reverse moral hazard in the context of defense
decisions. For example, courts have often penalized insurance companies
130

See Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85, 85-86 (2003).
131
See ABRAHAM, supra note 107, at 70-71.
132
See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 266 (1995) (discussing these
problems and many other conflicts of interest arising in such situations).
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who subordinate the insureds’ interests to their own.133 That helps solve
the first problem mentioned above, where insurers settle and consequently
harm the insureds. With respect to the second problem, where insurers
refuse to settle and harm the insureds, several states’ supreme courts have
affirmed judgments against insurance companies for bad faith refusal to
settle where they gambled with their insureds’ money. In Crisci, for
example, an insurer refused to settle a claim by a tenant against the
landlord (the insured).134 The insured’s policy limit was $10,000; the
lowest settlement demand by the plaintiff-tenant was also $10,000. As a
test for whether an insurer has liability above a policy limit after it refused
to settle, the court relied on whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted a settlement offer. In that case, the court believed
such an insurer would have settled and therefore awarded the insured
damages in the amount she had to pay to her tenant.135 This rule prevents
insurers from gambling with insured’s money.136
Interestingly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, insurers’ power to
strategically refuse to settle which seems to harm the insured when viewed
from an ex-post perspective, may in fact benefit the insured when viewed
from the ex-ante perspective. Such strategic behavior by the insurer
functions as a commitment device that the insurer would reject victims’
excessive settlement offers.137 Thus, insurers may extract better settlements
from the insureds’ victims, which will lead to lower premiums to the class
of insureds. Still, if settlement negotiations fail, the insured might discover
she has to pay judgment way beyond the policy limit, a risk she might not
want to bear.
In more extreme scenarios, it is even possible to get punitive
damages if the insurer denied coverage while violating the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Insurers who attempt to take advantage of an
insured in an improper manner may be required nonetheless to pay out on
133

Kent Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 75 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1990).
See, e.g., Crisci v. The Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 175
(Cal. 1967).
135
Id. at 177.
136
See also Alan O. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability
Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 137374 (1994) (using an economic analysis of bad faith claims for refusal to settle to
suggest courts should not interfere with contracts between insureds and insurers).
137
Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent:
Settlement Conflicts between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 502, 502-22 (1992).
134

92

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.1

an insurance policy where a repudiation of the insurance contract or a
denial of coverage is made in bad faith.138 State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Campbell showed punitive damages against insurance
companies for bad faith denial of coverage are available, even if there are
due process limits to the size of the punitive damages award.139 In State
Farm, the liability insurer refused to settle a car accident case even though
“a consensus was reached early on by the investigators and witnesses that
Mr. Campbell’s [the insured’s] unsafe pass had indeed caused the crash.”140
Rejecting the at-policy-limit settlement offer, State Farm told Campbell he
need not worry as he would not be held liable for the accident. The jury
returned a verdict three times the limit of Campbell’s policy, and, at first,
State Farm refused to cover the excess, or the cost of appealing the
judgment. At one point State Farm even told the Campbells they would
have to sell their house. After the Campbells lost the appeal State Farm did
pay it in full, but that was too little too late as in a separate lawsuit against
State Farm the court awarded punitive damages for its treatment of
Campbell.141 While this case sends a clear message to insurers to not deny
coverage in bad faith, it has been argued that claims against insurers for
bad faith denials of coverage cause more harm than good due to courts’
limited abilities to accurately identify opportunistic behavior by insurers.142
In sum, insurers in third-party liability policies usually assume the duty to
defend the insured. This gives insurers control over the case and thus works
to prevent insureds from failing to defend a claim vigorously or settling
with the insurers’ funds too easily.143 At the same time, requiring an insurer
to receive the insured’s consent on any settlement agreement and imposing
liability for a bad-faith refusal to settle by the insurance company lowers
the agency costs associated with the fact that insurers act on behalf of the
insureds.
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Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09 (Cal. 1974); Chandler,
supra note 44, at 850-52.
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Id. at 413-14.
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See Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 443 (1996).
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In contrast, Directors and Officers insurance policies state that it is the
insured’s responsibility to defend a claim when one occurs. Yet, these policies still
prohibit the insured from settling without the insurer’s consent.
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1. Returning to the Two Islands Approach
An excellent candidate for the Two Islands analysis for this section
is the reasonable expectations doctrine. Take for instance a Minnesota
Supreme Court decision from 1985. In Atwater Creamery, the issue was
whether an insurance policy covered a break-in where there was no visible
evidence of forcible entry.144 The policy quite clearly excluded coverage
where there is no physical evidence of forcible entry. Yet, the court decided
that despite the language of the policy, where it is clear that a burglary
happened by unrelated parties, there should be coverage. In ignoring the
language of the policy the court relied on the reasonable expectations
doctrine, with a focus on the ex-post bargaining power of the parties, not
the future effects of its decision.145
Under the two islands functional approach, the question in that
case should have been, all else being equal, whether an island that allows
the physical-evidence exclusion is better than an island that does not allow
the exclusion. To answer that one needs to inquire about the function of
the exclusion. The exclusion is designed to screen out coverage for
burglaries by someone associated with the insured—inside jobs. The island
that allows the exclusion places the costs of burglaries without physical
evidence on insureds, yielding two effects on insureds: insureds are
motivated to monitor their property against an inside job, and they will be
more likely to take precautions to prevent clean “out-side” burglaries by
locking their property or using alarm systems. In other words, the exclusion
reduces moral hazard associated with insurance burglary policies by
incentivizing the insured to take optimal care. One could expect there will
be fewer burglaries as a result of the exclusion, and premiums will be
lower, both social benefits.
On the other island, where the exclusion is not enforced, insureds
will have less incentive to secure valuables, and may even be incentivized
to defraud insurers by burglarizing their own property. Either way
premiums and social loss would be higher.
144

Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 274
(Minn. 1985).
145
See id. at 277-79. The Iowa Supreme Court in C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Atwater, also relies
on fairness to the insured to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine to ignore a
similar definition of burglary. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 274
N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975).
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It seems therefore that as a general matter excluding burglaries
where there is no sign of forcible entry is desirable because “inside jobs”
are hard to detect by the insurer and relatively easier to prevent by the
insured. The exclusion therefore maximizes social welfare for the entire
pool of insureds. Between providing more coverage (for clean outside jobs)
and not distorting the incentives to take care against inside jobs, the latter
seems a better option.146
But, in the Atwater Creamery case there was no suggestion that
anyone associated with the insureds was involved in the burglary.
Furthermore, it was clear that proper precautions were taken to secure the
property.147 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided to provide coverage in
this case. Was that a good decision? In this situation, the island the
Minnesota Supreme Court chose would still fight the moral hazard problem
because by conditioning its decision on the finding that no insider was
involved the court did not dilute the incentives insureds have to not
participate in self-burglaries and to take adequate precaution. At the same
time, in those situations where the insured acted in a socially beneficial
way, that is, when she took optimal precautions, providing coverage (by
ignoring the language of the contract) would distribute the risk of clean
“outside jobs” across the entire pool of insureds. Most likely a welfare
gain.
While the court’s opinion in Atwater Creamery might well
maximize the pool’s welfare, one needs to remember that the down-side of
the decision is that it opens the door for costly, case by case analyses of
every similar situation. For this reason, and because it provides coverage in
cases such as clean outside jobs, the island the Minnesota court chose
would have higher premiums than an island with the full exclusion
enforced. Insureds, however, might prefer higher premium in exchange for
the additional coverage.
The result in this case is not unambiguous, and to determine the
best island empirical data comparing the increased risk of extending
146

Daniel Schwarcz comes to the opposite conclusion about these clauses,
arguing that the potential moral hazard benefits of the exclusions are low because
there is little that can be done to prevent against internal thefts, and if insurers do
have evidence of fraud then they can deny the claim on that basis. See Schwarcz,
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Id.
147
Atwater Creamery, 366 N.W.2d at 274.

2012

ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW

95

coverage to clean inside jobs (which should be excluded) against the net
benefit of covering clean outside jobs (which should be covered) is needed.
Selectively ignoring the exclusion would certainly combat moral hazard
more than always ignoring the exclusion, and would likely be less effective
at combating moral hazard than always honoring the exclusion, but where
in that spectrum the Minnesota court’s decision would fall is unclear.
Furthermore, the administrative cost of selectively ignoring the exclusion is
also hard to determine, although it is certainly more costly to selectively
ignore the exclusion than always honoring it or always ignoring it: a
bright-line rule will almost always be cheaper to enforce than a case-bycase analysis. Thus, the Minnesota court’s decision can be justified if clean
outside jobs is such a prevalent phenomenon that covering them provides
more benefit than covering only dirty, or forced-entry, outside jobs creates
costs in forgone coverage, and if the administrative costs associated with
proving an incident were not an inside job are not too large.148
As this example has demonstrated, the two islands analysis will
not always provide the answer, but it does give us a good, basic framework
for answering the question.
F. SUMMARY
This section discussed the major impediments to the efficient
insurance contract—hidden characteristics and strategic behavior. These
problems manifest themselves in adverse (and reverse adverse) selection
and moral (and reverse moral) hazard. According to the economic analysis
of law, one of the main roles of insurance law is to protect the parties from
strategically exploiting hidden information. Indeed, the contractual and
doctrinal solutions discussed in this section do just that. These solutions,
however, do not come without a price tag. For both adverse selection and
moral hazard the challenge is to strike a balance between diluting both
parties’ strategic behavior while providing maximum coverage, and the two
islands approach can often help courts and other decision makers strike that
balance.

148

One may still wonder why insurers did not find a simple way to design
language that supplements the forced entry requirement. Their failure to do so
suggests that insuring clean outside jobs is hard to do without also creating a big
loophole into which many inside jobs will fit.
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The previous section discussed informational problems and the
strategic behavior they create as impediments to an efficient insurance
contract. However, there are many other systemic factors that impede the
creation of efficient insurance contracts including transaction costs,
externalities, correlated risks, non-competitive pricing and insures’
irrational behavior. In this section I briefly discuss them. At the end of the
discussion of these five additional impediments I will use the two islands
approach to analyze a solution to one of them- the problem of correlated
risks.
A. TRANSACTION COSTS
One systemic impediment to insurance contracts is transaction costs,
part of the larger administrative costs category.149 Such costs arise in the
arranging and executing of a transaction, and in extreme cases may exceed
the value that the transaction itself would create. Thus, the transaction,
which would otherwise be efficient, is not pursued by the parties.150
In the insurance world, one common solution to the transaction cost
problem has been the standard form. Standard forms have long been
thought to present several advantages for the parties to an insurance
contract: (1) creation of economies of scale in drafting which may lower
premiums; (2) greater likelihood of terms with predictable meanings; (3)
facilitation of price competition; and (4) facilitation of the collection and
aggregation of claim and loss data for use in rate-setting. This subsection
evaluates the current usage of standard forms as a way of combating
transaction costs.
Addressing the first potential advantage, the economies of scale for
insurance contracts were once especially valuable because insurance
contracts must be filed and approved by state regulators. This gave
insurers a strong incentive to collectively draft their contracts and submit a
single contract for approval, rather than having each one approved
149

Administrative costs include any extra cost incurred in the business of
insurance. They include transaction costs, but also the costs necessary for any
insurance company to run, the costs to market policies to consumers, the costs in
adjudicating disputes, etc.
150
ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 14.

2012

ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW

97

individually.151 Recently though, new changes have reduced these
regulatory burdens. As of today, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia utilize an electronic platform called the System for Electronic
Rate and Form Filing (SERFF), which provides for easier approval of
policy forms.152 Indeed, a study of homeowners insurance policies, finds
anecdotal evidence suggesting that the vast majority of insurance policies
submitted to state regulators are approved.153 If new contract forms are
easily approved, then regulatory transaction costs may now be almost
nonexistent, and the benefit from economies of scale from collective policy
drafting lessened.
Moving on to the second advantage, insurers may rationally prefer
the predictability of complicated terms which courts have already
interpreted over the clarity of untested terms.154 The stability of standard
forms is further increased due to path dependency where insurers fear that
deviation from the traditional language of the contract might be perceived
as an attempt to mislead insureds. Yet, the actual benefit of predictability of
meaning is difficult to ascertain, as courts have often diverged on the
meaning of even common terms such as “sudden.”155 Thus, this benefit of
the standard form may also be overstated.
Third, many scholars have argued that standardized forms allow
for competition because consumers can more easily compare coverage and
pricing details.156 On the other hand, when the standard forms are drafted
collectively and every insurer uses the same form, the forms eliminate
competition over the substance of the coverage provided and discourage
innovation in the formulation of terms. Indeed, in the early 1900s a
standard insurance form and pricing schedule were proposed specifically to
prevent “ruinous competition” between insurers.157 More recently, an
entity called the Insurance Services Organization (ISO) has produced
151

Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1272.
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standard forms and aggregated data in the property and casualty lines.
Until the late 1980s, the ISO also published advisory rates with its standard
forms, a practice which dampened competition between insurers.158 While
these rates could not be mandatory due to antitrust laws, they did provide a
potential vehicle for price-fixing or collusion within the insurance industry.
This history suggests that standard forms may actually reduce competition
rather than facilitating it, although the jury is still out on this benefit.
Indeed, the life and health insurance business have survived and thrived
without the existence of an ISO-like entity.
The last benefit of the standard form to be analyzed is that it allows
the aggregation of loss data, which can only be done when companies
utilize the same coverage. While this was once important for insurance
companies, most modern insurers are very large, and are able to collect
enormous amounts of information that is specific to their company—
specific information that is more relevant to their risk calculations than
what would be collected from all insureds under a standard form.159
Technological advances have also helped in this area, reducing its
importance.
To sum up, the standard form may still reduce transaction costs,
but its actual benefit to insurers and insureds could be overstated. In
practice, however, the insurance industry may actually be moving away
from the standard form. This is evidenced by recent finding that there is
now “substantial heterogeneity” in homeowner’s insurance policies.
Rather than solving problems related to transaction costs and competition,
however, this change may just create a whole new set of problems as
consumers lack the ability to comparison shop between policies. 160
B. EXTERNALITIES
Another impediment to efficient insurance contracts is the
externality problem.
Externalities, or more particularly negative
externalities, are costs of an action or transaction that are projected onto
158
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160
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non-parties or society as a whole, rather than being borne by the parties to
the transaction. One of the principle justifications of the American tort
system is to force wrongdoers to pay for the harm they cause. In other
words the tort system forces tortfeasors to internalize their externalities.
Liability insurance helps insulate tortfeasors from paying for their actions,
thus it makes negative actions cheaper, and externalizes some of the costs
onto society—or at least onto the tortfeasors’ insurers.161 On this view,
liability insurance is a welfare reducing institution.
Interestingly, liability insurance also prevents externalities. Some
individuals and companies are judgment proof, meaning they do not have
enough assets to pay for harm they may cause. Because a judgment proof
entity will not have to compensate victims in the event of a loss, it has a
lower incentive to take care than a non-judgment-proof entity. In contrast,
insured entities are not judgment-proof, thus they may have more incentive
to take care than non-insured entities, as long as the insurance company can
provide them incentives to take care.162 Requiring an otherwise judgmentproof driver to carry insurance leaves him or her to bear the cost of
dangerous driving (via higher premiums) rather than leaving the victim or
society (via the tax and transfer system) to pay.
If liability insurance both externalize costs and prevents cost
externalization at the same time, is it a welfare decreasing or welfare
increasing institution? The insurance industry has developed ways to deal
with negative externalities, mainly through experience rating, and refusing
to insure certain high-risk entities or activities. Knowing that their premium
might go up if they are in a car accident, drivers take more care thus at least
partially internalizing the social costs of driving with insurance coverage.
But not all is so rosy with liability insurance. Historically, liability insurers
tried to limit their exposure by writing in the insurance contract clauses—
called diminution clauses—which allowed them to reduce their own
liability on account of the insolvency of the insured (the wrongdoer), in
essence restoring the judgment-proof problem.163 The diminution clauses
161
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imposed costs on the victims of the insured, who were not fully
compensated for the harm they suffer. These clauses exacerbated the moral
hazard problem because these potential tortfeasors paid lower premiums
that reflected that not all their victims were compensated. As with other
problems discussed in this paper, insurance law has developed internal
doctrines to remedy many of these more nuanced types of externalities,
including this one. Nowadays, anti-diminution laws, also called bankruptcy
provisions, prohibit the inclusion of diminution clauses into the policy.164
Another insurance law doctrine developed to combat externalities
arises in the context of subrogation. As we saw above, it is a general
principle of subrogation, and a common clause in first-party insurance
contracts, that if the insured releases a wrongdoer of liability when,
otherwise, the first-party insurer would have had a claim against that
wrongdoer through its right of subrogation, then the insured forfeits his
claim under the policy.165 This protects the insurer’s ability to exercise its
subrogation rights.
The general principle prevents insureds from
externalizing the cost of harm caused to them onto their first-party insurers.
If the rule was not so, insureds could exchange a release of liability for
something of benefit from the wrongdoer, and still require the insurer to
pay for the harm. However, courts have made an interesting exception for
releases of liability of the wrongdoer prior to the wrongful action.166 Such
release often comes up in construction contracts where the contractor is
released from any liability arising during its performance of the contract.
In exchange for the liability release, the hiring company (the insured)
receives a discount. The hiring company then has to rely on its first-party
coverage.
Despite the potential externalities, courts allowing prior liability
releases can be justified in several ways. First, when insureds are
unsophisticated, exculpatory clauses are often contained in fine print on
standard form contracts that people do not read—such as the common
loss and ask to be reimbursed. In the case of judgment-proof policyholders,
insurers benefited automatically from policyholders’ inability to pay.
164
The interplay of mandatory minimum liability coverage with prohibitions
on diminution of coverage in bankruptcy works an interesting effect, in that it
weakens the protection bankruptcy laws provide for insureds by requiring them to
spend prospectively on insurance—a payment that cannot be discharged, since it is
in advance—for the benefit of victims whose claims are dischargeable.
165
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limitation of liability in parking garages tickets. Even if a driver sees the
limited liability notice, it is probably not reasonable to ask drivers to notify
their first-party insurers every time they enter a parking garage that they
have just agreed to release the parking garage from liability and therefore
that the first-party automobile insurer is exposed to higher risk. Second,
when insureds are sophisticated, the practice of releasing putative
wrongdoers from liability can be justified if first-party insurers can better
monitor or risk-classify their insureds than liability insurers of construction
contractors can monitor or risk-classify their insureds or insureds’ clients.
This can happen if first party property insurers know well the value and
risks associated with the property they insure whereas the contractor’s third
party liability insurers may have less information about those whom their
insureds may damage in the course of their activities. In any case, it should
be remembered that first party insurers can easily deal with this externality
by explicitly requiring insureds not to release putative wrongdoers from
liability, even prior to the act, in the policy.
Insurance law also proscribes, in many instances, liability coverage
for fines incurred from intentional misconduct and for punitive damages.
That sort of coverage, if permitted, would remove the deterrent effect of
fines by reducing or eliminating the cost to the actor himself; in other
words, by allowing him to externalize that cost.167 For this reason, some
countries do not allow indemnity for criminal sanctions. Courts should also
be cautious in interpreting too broadly insurance policy clauses providing
coverage for civil fines (such as in Directors and Officers policies) and
carefully consider any externalities that such policies may create. The more
broadly courts construe that fine coverage, the freer insureds are to violate
whatever law imposes the fine and force their costs onto society. Such
coverage allows insureds to participate in whatever activity the fine
provision is intended to curb without bearing the cost of the fine.168

167
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C. CORRELATED RISKS
Correlated risks are those risks that, if they come to fruition, will
affect a large portion of the insurance pool. Hurricanes, floods, and acts of
war are examples of these types of risks.169 They pose a problem for
insurers for two reasons: they affect a large portion of the insurance pool—
meaning the insurer will have to have access to a lot of cash to honor
claims; and the timing of when the risk will occur is unpredictable. Thus,
in a year when a correlated risk occurs, an insurer’s loss ratio will be
extremely high—meaning the insurer must pay out far more than it takes
in. Covering correlated risks therefore would require insurance companies
to keep large amounts of capital liquid, something the institutional
infrastructure of the capital markets makes very unappealing.170 Without
liquid capital to pay claims, however, an insurance company would become
insolvent when correlated risks come to fruition.
Correlated risks are not so much an impediment to efficiency but a
category of risks that are generally hard to insure. As discussed above, the
insurance market works because risk-averse insureds transfer their risks to
the insurer who spreads those risks among all the insured parties. In this
way the insurer fills a large pool by charging small premiums to cover the
losses of the unfortunate few whose risks come to fruition. The law of large
numbers allows an insurer to charge a certain premium which reflects only
a small fraction of the actual loss an individual would suffer if the risk
materializes. The ratio of the losses paid out over the premiums
collected—plus any interest made on capital held—is called the loss ratio.
171
In order to be sustainable, the loss ratio must be under one—or 100%,
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depending on the scale used—meaning the premiums collected in a given
year are greater than the losses paid out.172
How can one deal with correlated risks? Sometimes the state takes
it upon itself to provide insurance for such risks. Flood insurance created
through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is one example.
Sometimes the state provides reinsurance for such risks. The Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 is an example of that. Other times, insurers
have to find their own solutions. As is well known, insurers extend their
protection through diversification of risk. Diversification of the risks to
which the insurer (through the insured parties) is exposed occurs in two
ways: diversification with regard to a particular risk and across different
types of risks.173 For particular risks, the principle is essentially the same
as the law of large numbers. More individuals protecting against the same
risk reduces the uncertainty faced by any one of them, provided the risks
are not perfectly correlated with each other. For different types of risks, the
overall chance of loss is reduced by hedging exposure related to the risk of
a particular event, such as a tornado, against exposure to other events, such
as a fire.
Because insurance is often sold through retail, many policyholders
are localized in the same geographic regions—making the hurricane risk
correlated between a large bulk of the insureds. That is why
diversification—both in covering different types of risk and covering larger
geographical areas—is so important to protect against correlated risks.
Another way to protect against correlated risks is purchasing reinsurance in
local or foreign markets, and when the private market cannot supply it,
from the government.174 Lastly, insurers often exclude those types of risks
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from their policies—war, pollution and flood exclusions in homeowners’
policies are such examples. Those who want flood or pollution insurance
must get it separately. At the end of this section I apply the two-island
approach to the problem of correlated risks.
D. NON-COMPETITIVE PRICING
Another obstacle to efficiency to be discussed is non-competitive
pricing. Pricing problems arise when there are significant impediments to
competition between insurers, whether on account of capital requirements,
unfair competition, or regulatory standards.175 As in any market, such
conditions result in inefficiently high prices and lead to a less-than-ideal
amount of insurance being purchased. It must be noted, though, that legal
interference to correct these pricing problems may create more costs than
benefits, for example, where premiums are artificially kept down, which
may cause insurers to respond by reducing the quality of their contracts.
The problem of competitive pricing is linked to problems discussed
above. Collectively drafted standard form contracts and path-dependency
present parallel problems, in that they limit insurers’ flexibility to offer
differing, competitive terms to insureds, thus harming overall competition.
Offering contracts which deviate from norms might be interpreted as an
attempt to mislead consumers. Similarly, it has been argued that both
plaintiff and defense lawyers have incentives to keep insurance contracts
complicated in order to maintain their role as informed intermediaries
between insurers and insureds. Sometimes, the result could be inefficiently
restrictive or onerous terms, especially in compulsory insurance regimes
where insurers have greater capacity to dictate terms.
Limited competition has long been considered a social negative,
and is regulated by federal antitrust law. Insurance, though, was
considered a matter of state law under the U.S. Constitution, and the
insurance market was therefore traditionally exempt from antitrust law. In
1945, reacting to a U.S. Supreme Court case which subjected insurance
companies to federal antitrust laws,176 Congress enacts the McCarranGovernment Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS
REV. 337, 338 (2006).
175
ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 13.
176
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944),
superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006),
as recognized in U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993).
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Ferguson Act, which provided that federal antitrust law would apply to the
insurance market in each state beginning in 1948 unless the state had
passed its own legislation. Within several years, every state passed its own
legislation which preempts the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Today, insurance
markets are still largely exempt from federal antitrust laws.
E. RATIONAL (OR IRRATIONAL) BEHAVIOR BY THE INSURED
The final obstacle to be discussed is irrational behavior. Much of
the behavior by insureds discussed in this Primer has been assumed to be
rational. However, as in many other areas, consumers do not always make
the economically efficient decision when it comes to insurance. The field
of behavioral economics, which explores and explains how people act in
the real world, provides some useful insights into how best to take
advantage of a variety of irrational biases held by the majority of insureds.
Some of the major decision-making anomalies that affect insurance
companies include: loss aversion, status quo bias, choice overload, value
of zero, availability bias, and hyperbolic discounting—and the list goes
on.177 The field of behavioral economics is too large to be covered in a
paper of this length, but the following discussion provides a taste of how
behavioral economics might be helpful in complimenting the theories of
insurance law discussed in other sections.
The first bias amongst insured is loss aversion, or the idea that
people feel more pain from a loss than they do pleasure from a gain.178 In
other words, the joy and pain in losing twenty dollars and gaining twenty
dollars would not cancel each other out (despite the equal but opposite
economic outcomes). For insurance purposes, this translates to a
preference for steady premiums rather than rates that vary up and down
over time. Loss aversion also explains one of the most irrational decisions
a consumer can make: purchasing an extended warranty. Under this
theory, the insured categorizes the extended warranty as a cost rather than a
loss. Therefore the cost of the warranty is weighed less than the expected
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loss from product failure, and that product-loss calculation is exaggerated
because of loss aversion. 179
Status quo bias has also proved to be very powerful in predicting
behavior, and basically resonates with the idea of inertia from physics.
This translates into people being more likely to accept form contracts
(which represent the status quo) rather than making individual choices.180
Much of this may have its roots in loss aversion, or that people are worried
about making a choice that ends up being risky. When faced with a variety
of options, discussed below as choice overload, many insureds opt to keep
the status quo. A natural quasi-experiment that demonstrates the power of
the status quo bias took place couple of decades ago.181 Changes in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey automobile insurance laws introduced the
option of giving up some of one’s right to sue, with a corresponding
reduction in insurance rates. In New Jersey, the default was to have a
reduced right to sue, and a driver had to opt in to the full right to sue by
paying more. In Pennsylvania, the default was retaining the full right to
sue, and one could receive a discount for opting out. Since the option is the
same and only the default is different, one would expect that insureds
would act based on whether the reduction in premiums was worth the lost
right to sue, leading to similar results in both states. Instead, only twenty
percent of drivers in New Jersey opted into the full right to sue, and
seventy-five percent of Pennsylvania drivers retained this right.182 In other
words, about three-fourths of all drivers did nothing.
A related anomaly is choice overload which predicts that when
given too much information potential insureds may become overwhelmed
and do nothing, even if their actions would be beneficial. Insurers must be
aware of the danger of increasingly complex terms as it may serve to
confuse buyers and cause them to not make the best choices for their
situation.183 Health care is a great example of the numerous decisions that
must be made by an insured. Even if the employer has made many of the
179
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choices for their employees, an employee still must choose a plan (PPO,
HMO, etc.), pick a deductible and finally decide when and how much
medical care to consume.184 These decisions can be very difficult, and
behavioral studies have shown that human beings are not good at predicting
high-consequence, low-probability risks (even though they must do this to
choose their efficient level of insurance).185
A phenomenon that extends well past the insurance world is
people’s bias towards the value of zero. Individuals are very attracted to
free promotions, to the point of acting irrationally. For example, when
Amazon.com rolled out its free shipping promotion for all orders above a
certain dollar value the Amazon.com operation in every country except for
France saw an increase in sales. In France, Amazon.com was charging the
equivalent of $.20 instead of nothing for shipping on large orders, and this
tiny amount was enough to prevent the increases in order size seen in other
countries.186 The value of zero applies equally to insurance too, as
consumers will appreciate additional services at “no additional cost.”187 Of
course the costs of the policy just include these services, but the customer
feels like they are getting something for free.
An additional decision making anomaly relevant to insurance is the
availability bias. This theory details how people generally assess the
chances of an event occurring based upon specific examples in their lives,
and can also be thought of as a rule of thumb bias.188 As was mentioned
earlier in the paper, the expected yearly cost of an incident is the
probability of the event multiplied by its cost. This means that if people
think the probability is higher, they will be more likely to purchase
insurance. A great example of the availability bias comes from 1990 when
a business consultant and self-proclaimed climatologist predicted there to
be a .5% chance that an earthquake would occur in eastern Missouri during
an upcoming two day span.189 This prediction received significant press
184
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coverage but was refuted by other earthquake experts. Still, State Farm
reported that more than 650,000 policyholders added earthquake insurance
to their homeowners policy, mostly in the two months prior to the predicted
date.190 The earthquake never happened, but people were still made more
aware of the chances of an earthquake and therefore wrongly calculated the
earthquake probability to be higher than it actually was. More broadly
speaking, it has been shown that “[p]eople tend to conclude, for example,
that the probability of an event (such as a car accident) is greater if they
have recently witnessed an occurrence of that event than if they have
not.”191
The last bias to be discussed here is hyperbolic discounting. This
occurs when individuals use a large discount factor to compare current
benefits to future benefits.192 If you have heard of the time value of
money193 then this concept should sound familiar. However, most people
will use the wrong discount factor when deciding between present
consumption and future benefit. This leads to underinvestment in future
health care and a lack of preventative medicine. In theory a rational
insured would make the correct choice about their health care plan and
undergo economically efficient preventative care, but behavioral
economics predicts, as indeed was empirically confirmed, that this does
not happen in the real world.
This section has discussed the irrationality of insureds, and it adds
a few additional layers of complexity to the analysis of efficient insurance
contracts. Most importantly, the irrational behavior by insureds must be
taken into account when making ex-ante predictions, and many times it can
be worked into the models we use to predict behavior. The other important
takeaway is that our theoretical solutions to market inefficiencies are not
perfect. The full effects of behavioral economics is beyond the scope of
any introduction to law and economics, but know that applications of the
theoretical and contractual solutions to the impediments to efficient
190
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insurance contracts are able to account for both the rational and irrational
behavior of insureds.
1. Returning to the Two Islands Approach
For brevity’s sake I will not apply the two islands approach to
every one of the impediment discussed in this section. Instead I will apply
it only to the problem of correlated risks. The two island approach shows
the utility of exclusions associated with correlated risks. Consider the
flood exclusion in homeowner’s policies. On one island, floods are
excluded, and on another they are covered. If a flood hits each island, the
majority of houses on that island are going to be damaged. On the island
that does not cover floods, premiums will be lower than the island where
floods are covered. Without more, it is a close call—higher premiums with
coverage or lower premiums without coverage. The answer depends on the
probability of flood, people’s risk aversion, the size of the losses, and other
factors. However, the analysis must consider that floods are a correlated
risk. This fact likely makes the island without coverage more desirable.
On the other island, because the flood will hit all of the insureds, the
insurer might not have enough cash to pay all of the premiums, leading to
insolvency, or will have to charge exceedingly high premiums to cover
such an island-wide event. An insolvent insurer is clearly not good for
insureds, and therefore flood exclusions, and other catastrophic correlated
risk exclusions, are socially useful. Of course, insureds can always
purchase flood insurance separately from companies—or public agencies—
which specialize in such risks, but that is a different issue from whether a
general homeowner’s policy should have such coverage.
Two cases demonstrate how courts do, and how they should, use
the economic factors discussed above to interpret flood exclusions in
homeowners policies. Kane v. Royal Insurance Company of America
involved a standard flood exclusion clause and a dam failure in Colorado.
The court found that because the water damage occurred from a natural
body of water invading normally dry land, it was unambiguously a flood
under the policy. 194 In Ferndale Development Co. v. Great American
Insurance Co., on the other hand, a burst water pipe was found not to be a
flood under similar terms in an insurance policy.195
194
195
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In each of these cases the respective courts based their decisions on
interpretations of the meaning of “flood.” Is there really a difference
between a flood caused by a failing dam and a flood caused by a ruptured
valve on a city water line? Under the functional approach the relevant
question is the purpose of the flood exclusion which, as discussed above, it
is to prevent insurers from being exposed to correlated risks. A dam failure
will likely lead to the inundation of a large area, possibly an entire town.
This is the same type of correlated risk that the flood exclusion is meant to
avoid. On the other hand, a burst pipe is likely to only affect a small
number of houses around the pipe. This type of occurrence is not likely to
lead to correlated losses, thus it should not be interpreted as being under the
umbrella of the flood exclusion.
In today’s world of large, national insurance companies, though,
correlated risks actually threatening insurers’ solvency are less likely.
Most insurers cover insureds across a state, or the entire country. It is
unlikely any one flood will affect a large percentage of a given insurer’s
insureds. Thus, in our ongoing example, the islands are quite large, and the
risk of a flood leading to insolvency is small. If there is no threat to a large
portion of the insurance pool, there is actually no correlated risk problem.
The question becomes again whether higher premiums for coverage are
better than lower premiums for no coverage. This is another example of a
situation where more empirical information as to what a rational insured
would do behind the veil of ignorance is necessary. That is the proper
question behind any insurance dispute. Unfortunately, the needed empirical
evidence to answer this question (such as the frequency and distribution of
floods, their costs, etc.) is often missing, so courts will have to decide based
on other framework. But as long as the question is focused in the right
direction, more and more often the right answer is within reach.
F. SUMMARY
As has been shown, there are many additional impediments to the
efficiency of the insurance market in addition to moral hazard and adverse
selection. Transaction costs, externalities, correlated risks, non-competitive
pricing, and irrational behavior all serve as partial barriers to the
maximization of social welfare. While various strategies can be employed
to battle each of these impediments, none of the strategies are completely
effective and they often create additional problems that must be dealt with.
Standard forms are an ideal example. While they are useful in lowering
transaction costs, they certainly do not eliminate them. Furthermore, the
forms may sometimes lower competition and even make it easier for
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insurers to collude when fixing their pricing. Consumers’ irrational
behavior vis-à-vis standard forms is another reason for concern. When
courts or legislatures examine a particular legal problem in insurance law,
all of the impediments must be kept in mind and the effects on these
inefficiencies of any new rule or reform must be considered. Over time,
through judicial decision-making, doctrine should be refined so as to
consider the function of the exclusion before a court. On the one hand,
insurers should not be able to use their greater bargaining power—
including greater resources and expertise—to unfairly take advantage of
insureds. On the other hand, exclusions generally serve a useful purpose,
and if courts do not consider that purpose when ruling whether to uphold or
void an exclusion, they risk creating a less efficient insurance market and
hurting the entire pool of insureds.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The modern insurance market arose from a desire to manage and
distribute risks. It is, by definition, a system where customers pay now to
receive financial protection later, if they need it. Like many other
consumers, purchasers of insurance need protection. Unlike other sales
situations, however, there is an inherent need to protect the sellers—
insurers—as well. Insurers should be seen as a nexus of insureds. The
reason that both parties need protection arises primarily from informational
impediments. These main impediments are: adverse selection, reverse
adverse selection, moral hazard and reverse moral hazard. In addition,
many other impediments to efficiency arise in the insurance context,
including: administrative costs, negative externalities, correlated risks, noncompetitive pricing and irrational behavioral. Other impediments, such as
conflicts of interest, were not discussed in this paper. Most insurance policy
clauses, and almost all of the appropriate ones, are designed to address one
or more of these impediments.
Any lawyer or judge dealing with the insurance field should keep
the impediments in mind.
Judges in particular should consider the
function an exclusion clause plays in the policy before they decide whether
to honor it. In most circumstances insurers have unquestionably more
bargaining power, putting them in a better position than insureds to protect
themselves. For this reason insurers’ actions should be closely policed.
That being said, just because a certain exclusion seems to treat an insured
harshly in a given case does not mean it should be voided. The question is
not so much whether the plaintiff who suffered a loss should recover based
on the language of policy, because deciding questions of coverage based
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solely on the language of the policy is never simple. Rather, the question
should be whether a rational plaintiff behind a veil of ignorance would
have been willing to pay for the disputed coverage without knowing
whether he would ever need it, given that such coverage might distort
parties’—and the entire insurance pool’s—incentives. This is exactly the
pool of insureds’ perspective, and this is the efficient insurance contract
paradigm employed here.
The two islands functional approach facilitates a users’ ability to
determine which side of a dispute maximizes social utility. It relies on the
ex-ante perspective to refocus a decision from the (often heart wrenching)
effects on a specific insured to the overall impact on the pool of insureds
and, if externalities exist, on society. This refocusing is made easier in the
insurance context once the view of insurers is appropriately shifted from a
faceless company to a pool of similar people who all pay money to the
insurance company in exchange for its possible protection later. The two
island approach allows the analyst to balance the advantages of extended
coverage against the possible incentive distortions such extension carries
while considering all of the possible effects of either side of a ruling. The
result of this inquiry is often that more information is necessary. While this
is not ideal, at least it focuses the decision-maker in the proper direction.
In other words, the right question is always the first step towards the right
answer. The two island approach offers a way to find the right question
and not infrequently even answer it.

STRANGER-INITIATED ANNUITY
TRANSACTIONS AND THE CASE FOR
INSURABLE INTEREST
KENDALL J. BURR
THOMAS F.A. HETHERINGTON
DAVID T. MCDOWELL
***
This article addresses the issue of whether insurable interest
requirements similar to those which have already been enacted in many
states to prohibit the practice of Stranger-Originated Life Insurance
policies (STOLIs) should also be made applicable to Stranger-Originated
Annuity Transactions, or ‘STATs.’ The article makes the case that they
should by highlighting the inherent similarities that exist between STATs
and STOLIs while also analyzing the flawed reasoning behind the lone case
to hold that insurable interest requirements are not applicable to STATs.
The authors then discuss various state insurance statutes and advance the
argument that many of them may already prohibit STAT contracts from
being entered into. In other words, the statutory framework for
criminalizing STAT schemes may already be in place, in which case, the
issue becomes the charge of the courts whose job it will be to interpret
these statutes.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Variable annuities have traditionally been viewed as long-term
investment vehicles that offer a number of desirable benefits, including a
guaranteed future income stream, favorable tax treatment, and standard or
enhanced death benefits paid to a beneficiary in the event of untimely
death. Savvy investors, however, claim to have discovered a “loophole” in
these products, exploiting them to invest aggressively in the securities
markets with the assurance that any short-term losses will be borne by the
insurance company. To implement their strategy, they recruit terminally ill
individuals to serve as the measuring lives for annuities with built-in death
benefits, which provide a full and prompt refund of the investors’
premiums if their high-risk investments go awry. This predation on sick
individuals—who often claim not to have understood that their poor health
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was being exploited as a hedge against market losses by a total stranger—
raises a significant legal question: should these “Stranger-Originated
Annuity Transactions,” or “STATs,”1 be rescinded as unlawful wagers on
human lives, violating the well-established “insurable interest” requirement
applied in life insurance cases? Examining the pertinent laws applicable to
annuities and life insurance, persuasive arguments can be made that
insurable interest laws apply to annuity products, and that stranger
investors may not use the products to profit from the deaths of other human
beings.
II.

THE PRODUCT: VARIABLE ANNUITIES

A variable annuity is a product, primarily sold by life insurance
companies, that incorporates certain features of an investment account and
life insurance. Fundamentally, an annuity is a contract pursuant to which a
purchaser agrees to make one or more premium payments to the issuer up
front, during an “accumulation phase,” and the issuer agrees to make a
series of payments thereafter, either to the purchaser or to a designated
beneficiary, during a “payout phase.” Thus, an annuity is essentially a loan
from the purchaser that the insurer pays back over time. An annuity may
be “fixed,” meaning the insurance company promises to pay a minimum
rate of interest or a set dollar amount for each periodic payment, or
“variable,” allowing the premiums to be invested in mutual funds or other
options in the bond and equity markets.2 Variable annuity products offer a
range of benefits that make them appealing to individuals interested in both
preparing for retirement and safeguarding against untimely death. Variable
annuities typically offer three major categories of benefits: guaranteed
income distribution, favorable tax treatment, and death benefits.3
First, variable annuities provide a guaranteed distribution of
periodic income. An annuity may be structured so as to make payments for
a period certain, but is more commonly structured as a “life annuity,” made
payable for the duration of the lifetime of a designated “annuitant.” The
1

Also sometimes referred to as “Stranger-Originated Annuities” (“STOAs”)
or “Stranger Originated Life Annuities” (“STOLAs” or “STOAs”).
2
Variable annuities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, whereas fixed annuities are not considered securities and are
therefore not regulated by the SEC. Annuities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov
/answers/annuity.htm (modified Apr. 6, 2011).
3
See Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/varannty.htm#vch (modified Apr. 18, 2011).
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income distribution schedule and amounts are typically fixed at the time of
annuitization, the point at which the contract owner agrees to freeze all or
some of the funds invested in the accumulation phase and use them to
commence distributions in a payout phase.
Thus, a fundamental
characteristic of a life annuity is its ability to provide a guaranteed source
of income lasting as long as the uncertain lifetime of the annuitant. This
offers a form of “longevity insurance,” protecting the designated
beneficiary against the possibility that the annuitant will outlive the assets
available from the accumulated value of the investment at the point of
annuitization. Given this framework, a purchaser of a variable annuity will
often name the same person as both annuitant and beneficiary, or will
designate one person as the annuitant and his or her spouse, child, or other
family member as the beneficiary.
The second attractive feature of a variable annuity is its favorable
tax treatment. Under the Internal Revenue Code, variable annuities owned
by individuals may be invested during the accumulation phase in a taxdeferred manner,4 much like a Roth 401(k). As a variable annuity is
funded during the accumulation phase with after-tax dollars, any internal
accumulation remains tax free. Once annuitized, any amounts withdrawn
from the annuity during the payout phase over and above the amounts
contributed are taxable. These market profits are taxed at ordinary income
tax rates rather than capital gains rates. As such, the utility of the variable
annuity is maximized if used as a long-term investment vehicle.
Third, a variable annuity typically includes a “Guaranteed
Minimum Death Benefit” (“GMDB”) to be provided to the beneficiary
upon the annuitant’s death. Usually, the life insurer offers a standard death
benefit provision already built in to the base contract, generally
guaranteeing the beneficiary an amount no less than the greater of (1) the
total face value of the account, or (2) the total of all premiums paid, minus
any adjusted withdrawals from the account. Enhanced or “stepped-up”
GMDB options are often available à la carte for additional fees, either as
part of the annuity contract or as a contract rider. A stepped-up GMDB
option may, for example, allow the customer to “lock in” the account’s face
value as of a specified date, if the account’s investments have been
performing well. The issuer may also offer a “high water mark” or
“anniversary ratchet” option, which looks at the account face value on each
contract anniversary date and guarantees a minimum GMDB based on the
highest account value as of any of those dates. Or the company might offer
a “roll-up” option, guaranteeing a minimum rate of return on the invested
4

See generally I.R.C. § 72 (2012).
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funds. Various combinations of these enhanced options may also be
available.
While other elective features may also be available for additional
fees,5 these three main advantages—guaranteed income distribution, taxdeferred investment, and death benefits—are frequently the defining
features of a variable annuity product. Because these products incorporate
death benefits, as well as lifetime benefits whose duration is tied to the date
of the annuitant’s death, it is often treated as an insurance contract, or as a
hybrid product combining features of an investment product and life
insurance. Whether a variable annuity is actually legally defined as life
insurance varies from state to state, as discussed in further detail below.
III.

THE BACKDROP: STOLI

Before examining how the death benefit component of variable
annuities has been recently exploited to pursue risk-free investment
opportunities by third-party investors, it is first necessary to examine recent
developments in the life insurance industry.
Over the past decade, investors and agents have developed a gray
market in life insurance known as Stranger Originated Life Insurance
(“STOLI”).6 STOLI refers to any transaction or arrangement by which an
investor seeks to purchase a life insurance policy on the life of an
individual, typically an elderly insured, even though the investor does not
have an insurable interest in the insured’s life. The investor typically pays
the premiums and structures the transaction so that the investor obtains
ownership of the policy, the beneficial interest of a trust holding the policy,
or otherwise secures control of the policy through a variety of clandestine
transactions, enabling it to re-sell the policy or its controlling interest on the
life settlement market. STOLI promoters use various methods to acquire
interests in life insurance policies. The investor might agree to buy the
5

Insurers may, for example, offer various guaranteed lifetime benefits for an
additional charge, such as a guaranteed minimum income benefit (“GMIB”),
promising a minimum income stream during the payout phase, or a guaranteed
minimum accumulation benefit (“GMAB”), which, after a set period of time
(usually 10 or 20 years), resets the account’s value to a guaranteed accumulation
amount. Insurers also sometimes offer “bonus credit” features, such as a promise
to add a bonus contribution to the accumulated value based on a specified
percentage of purchase payments, typically ranging from 1% to 5%.
6
Also referred to as Investor-Owned or Stranger-Owned Life Insurance
(“SOLI” or “IOLI”).
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policy outright from the insured on a pre-determined date, or purchase a
beneficial interest in a trust holding the policy.7 Or the policy might be
funded by premium financing for a period of two years (the typical
statutory contestability period of a life insurance policy), after which the
insured is given the option of either paying off the loan, which typically has
large administrative fees and a high interest rate, or surrendering the policy
to the investor in full satisfaction of the loan.8
STOLI practices pose significant problems for the life insurance
industry. STOLI often promotes fraud, incentivizing investors and agents
to encourage exaggeration of the insured’s net worth and income in order
to qualify for larger death benefits,9 and sometimes takes place even
without the knowledge or complicity of the insured.10
The most significant problem posed by STOLI, however, is its
noncompliance with the well-established requirement that a life insurance
policy’s initial owner, beneficiary, or both must possess an insurable
interest in the life of the insured. This requirement is based on public
policy and is designed to prevent wagering on human lives, which creates
perverse economic incentives to hasten the insured’s death.11 As discussed
in further detail below, nearly all states impose insurable interest
7

See Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (describing STOLI scheme whereby policy was owned by an irrevocable
trust and the insured, who had initially named himself as trust beneficiary, sold his
beneficial interest to a funding third-party investor shortly after policy issuance).
8

See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (D.N.J.
2009) (describing a “typical STOLI transaction” as involving an up-front cash
payment in exchange for a promise of a future sale of the policy, use of a trust to
hold the policy, and funding of premiums through non-recourse premium
financing).
9
See, e.g., Settlement Funding, LLC v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 06
CV 5743(HB), 2010 WL 3825735, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (STOLI policy
on life of elderly insured was based on application claiming that she had a net
worth in excess of $12 million, even though she lived in an apartment and had
assets of less than $100,000).
10
E.g., id. (evidence showed that insured’s signature was forged on trust
agreement, insured was not in the same state as where the agreement was
purportedly signed, and notary had never met the insured or notarized the trust
agreement).
11
See, Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881) (insurable interest
required as a matter of public policy to avoid the issuance of life insurance “by
which the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the
assured”).
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requirements in a life insurance transaction. Due to the proliferation of
STOLI practices in the last decade, many states have also recently enacted
additional statutes specifically targeting STOLI transactions and clarifying
that they violate the insurable interest requirement. For example, the
California Insurance Code, as amended in 2009, defines entering into a
STOLI arrangement as a “fraudulent life settlement act,”12 and defines
“STOLI” to include any arrangement designed to “initiate the issuance of a
life insurance policy in this state for the benefit of a third-party investor
who, at the time of policy origination, has no insurable interest, under the
laws of this state, in the life of the insured.”13 A majority of states have
already enacted legislation specifically targeting STOLI practices just in
the past few years,14 with additional legislation in other states likely to
follow.
12

CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(g)(1)(B) (West 2012).
Id. § 10113.1(w) (adding, “Trusts that are created to give the appearance of
insurable interest and that are used to initiate policies for investors violate
insurable interest laws and the prohibition against wagering on life.”); see also id.
§ 10110.1(e) (same).
14
At least twenty-seven states thus far have enacted statutes specifically
defining and prohibiting STOLI practices, nearly all since 2008, including Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-443.02 (West
2002 & Supp. 2011-2012) (prohibiting STOLI); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-81-802(24)
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011-2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice);
CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(g)(1)(B), (w) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (describing
STOLI as fraudulent life settlement act); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-465 (defining
STOLI), -465j (2011) (entry into any practice or plan that involves STOLI
constitutes fraud); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-59-2(24) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011)
(defining STOLI as unlawful practice); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431E-2 (defining
STOLI), -24 (2005 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting entering into any practice or plan
that involves STOLI); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-1951(15) (defining STOLI),
1962(1) (2010) (prohibiting any act that constitutes or promotes STOLI); 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 159/5 (defining STOLI), 159/50 (prohibiting entering into
STOLI), and 159/72 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011-2012) (crime of life settlement
fraud includes entering into any arrangement which involves STOLI); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-8-19.8-7.8 (defining STOLI), 27-8-19.8-20.1 (LexisNexis 2008)
(prohibiting the issuance, solicitation, or promotion of STOLI); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 508E.2(12) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011-2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful
practice); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5002(f)(5) (K.S.A 2011 Supp.) (same); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.15-020(15) (West 2006) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 6802-A(12-A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
13
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Thus, the past few years have witnessed a flurry of legislation and
an industry-wide spotlight on the STOLI issue. Legislators and life
insurers, focusing their efforts solely on life insurance policies owned by
strangers, apparently did not foresee that despite these tightened
restrictions, some opportunistic investors would move on to exploit
variable annuities in an analogous but unanticipated manner.
IV.

STATs

The life insurance industry is now facing a new challenge from
brokers and investors orchestrating the purchase of variable annuities
offered by life insurance companies, referred to as “Stranger-Originated
Annuity Transactions,” or “STATs.” STATs are the subject of a wellpublicized lawsuit currently pending in federal court in the District of

60A.0782(12) (defining “STOLI practices”), 60A.0784 (making it “unlawful” to
“engage in STOLI practices or otherwise wager on life”), 60A.0786(1) (creating
presumption of STOLI practices where, inter alia, the premiums are financed by
means other the assets of the insured or someone “closely related to the insured by
blood or law”), and 60A.0789 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011-2012) (insurer may bring
declaratory judgment action to declare STOLI policies void); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. 408-D:2(XVI) (defining STOLI), D:12(I) (LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting the
solicitation, promotion, or knowing participation in any STOLI activities); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 7815 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2012) (defining STOLI as prohibited
practice); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.4-01(23) (2010) (same); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3916.01(W) (defining STOLI), and 3916.171 (any contract, arrangement
or transaction entered into in furtherance of STOLI act is “void and
unenforceable”), 3916.172 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011-2012) (promoting STOLI
constitutes fraud); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4055.2(13) (West, Westlaw through
2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 744.318(18)
(defining STOLI), 744.369 (2011) (prohibiting entering into any practice or plan
involving STOLI); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-2(26) (West, Westlaw through
2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-50-102(12)
(2011) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-36-102(18) (defining STOLI), 31A-36113(2)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting the entering into any practice
involving stranger-originated life insurance); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3835(18)
(defining STOLI), 3844(a)(2) (2009) (prohibiting any activities resulting in or
intending to result in the issuance of STOLI); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.102.006 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13C-2(18) (LexisNexis 2011) (same); WISC. STAT. ANN.
632.69(w) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011-2012) (same).
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Rhode Island,15 in which two life insurance companies, Transamerica Life
Insurance Company and Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of
Ohio, claim to have been defrauded by STAT arrangements masterminded
by Rhode Island attorney Joseph Caramadre and carried out with the
collaboration of investors and brokerage firms.16
Caramadre, a real-estate specialist, believed he had discovered a
“loophole” in the variable annuity product that allowed their use to
facilitate aggressive short-term investments.17 By locating individuals with
extremely poor health and a short life expectancy who would be willing to
act as “annuitants” for variable annuities with GDMBs, Caramadre realized
that one could engage in high-risk, short-term investments with the
expectation that any potential losses would be borne by the insurance
company upon the individual’s death.
To implement their strategy, STAT originators like Caramadre first
seek out potential annuitants with terminal illnesses, recruiting such
individuals through a number of unsavory methods that have drawn
national attention. Caramadre, for example, published advertisements in
the Rhode Island Catholic, an official diocese publication, stating
“Terminal Illness? $2,000 in CASH, Immediately Available.”18 The ads
further promised that the funds were offered by a “compassionate
organization” hoping to provide “financial assistance” to those near death.19
STAT originators also target church patrons and workers and patients in
nursing homes, hospices, and hospitals, circulating flyers or through direct
solicitation20 and generally offering between $2,000 and $5,000 for their
participation.21

15

See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp.
2d 270 (D.R.I. 2010) on reconsideration in part sub nom. W. Reserve Life
Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012).
16
See generally W. Reserve’s Amended Complaint, W. Reserve Life
Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D.R.I. 2010) (No.
09-564S).
17
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13, 20; see also Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Investors
Recruit Terminally Ill to Outwit Insurers on Annuities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704479704575061392800740492
.html.
18
Maremont & Scism, supra note 17.
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 17; Jim Connolly, Senior
Recounts Brush with STOA as Commissioners Determine Tools to Fight It, THE
INS.
BELLWETHER
BLOG
(May
21,
2010,
12:57
AM),
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Once a terminally ill individual is identified, the STAT originator
arranges for a licensed agent of an annuities brokerage firm to provide and
sign an application for a variable annuity, designating an investor as the
owner and beneficiary and having the terminally ill individual serve as the
annuitant. The annuitization date is usually far enough in the future that a
terminally ill annuitant will likely never receive an annuity payment.
STAT sponsors opt on the application for either a standard or stepped-up
GMDB, guaranteeing that the beneficiaries will receive a death benefit
totaling at least the amount of premiums paid, and in some cases also
purchasing additional enhanced benefits.22 The GMDB acts as a safety net,
allowing the investor to make aggressive investments within the variable
annuity with the expectation that, if they do not perform well, the insurance
company will pay out at least the total of all premiums paid upon the
annuitant’s death.
V.

THE NATIONAL RESPONSE

STATs have been widely criticized since coming to national
attention over the past two years, with particular focus on the disturbing
manner in which terminally ill annuitants are recruited. Often, the
individuals or their families claim to have been misled about the nature of
the arrangement, believing that the solicitors were simply offering
charity.23 As one such individual later testified to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), “What if I die now? He’s going to
collect. I don’t want to see him get that kind of money. Not for bodies.
I’m not going to sell my body.”24 Another individual testified to a federal
grand jury that Caramadre and his associates never mentioned annuities at
http://www.theinsurancebellwether.com/2010/05/senior-recounts-brush-with-stoaas.html.
21
Linda Koco, Testimony Rips into Stranger-Originated Annuities in Different
Ways, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (June 14, 2010),
http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2010/06/14/feature-testimony-rips-intostrangeroriginated-ann.
22
See Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 19, 28, 45, 62.
23
See Koco, supra note 21 (noting testimony from Rhode Island’s
Superintendent of Insurance that the annuitants “are unclear on their participation
in the annuity contract” and believe that they are receiving a charitable gift); see
also Olsen Testifies to NAIC: Annuity Transactions Raise Regulatory Questions,
ACTUARIAL UPDATE, July, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.actuary.org/
files/publications/Actuarial_Update_July_2010.pdf.
24
Connolly, supra note 20.
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all, and never told him that someone would profit from his wife’s death,
saying, “They preyed on the sick and the weak at a vulnerable time.”25 The
plaintiffs in the Rhode Island cases have even alleged that some of the
annuitants’ signatures may have been forged.26
However unsavory and exploitative STAT tactics may appear,
questions still remain regarding their legality. The similarities between
STATs and STOLI practices are obvious, particularly their exploitation of
elderly or ill individuals for the profit of investors with no genuine interest
in the continued life of those individuals. But despite the flurry of recent
statutory enactments relating to STOLI, legislatures have yet to expressly
tackle STATs. The NAIC held hearings in May 2010 at which numerous
groups, including the Life Insurance Settlement Association (“LISA”), the
National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors (“NAIFA”), and
the American Council of Life Insurers (“ACLI”), testified in condemnation
of STATs and described them as sharing many of the same troubling
characteristics of STOLI practices, but not all groups were yet prepared to
announce their support of implementing new regulation or legislation to
directly address STATs.27 Several state insurance departments have issued
bulletins regarding the potential harms of STATs, but they have not openly
condemned them as illegal per se, instead opting to merely warn life
insurers and recommend the implementation of safeguards.28
Courts have yet to resolve open questions regarding the legality of
STATs. The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating
Caramadre and his associates for possible violations of the securities
25

Katie Mulvaney, Philanthropist Accused of Profiting from Terminally Ill,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (Mar. 7, 2010).
26
See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 24.
27
See Gary A. Sanders, Vice President of Securities and State Government
Relations, National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, Statements
before NAIC Life Insurance and Annuities Committee Public Hearing on Stranger
Originated/Owned
Annuities
(May
20,
2010),
available
at: http://www.naifa.org/advocacy/documents/naifatestimonyfornaichearing.pdf;
Doug Head on behalf of LISA and the ACLI at the May 20, 2010 NAIC hearing,
available at http://www.naic.org/committees_a.htm.
28
See, e.g., Companies Encouraged to Have Safeguards in Place to Limit
Potential Exposure to Stranger Originated Annuity Transactions, OH. DEPT. OF
INS. (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Consumer/Documents/Stranger
%20Originated%20Annuity%20Transactions.pdf; Bulletin No. 2010-02, LA. DEPT.
OF INS. (July 6, 2010), http://www.ldi.state.la.us/docs/CommissionersOffice
/legal/Bulletins/Bul2010-02_cur_StrangerOriginatedAn.pdf (bulletins issued by
the Departments of Insurance of the states of Ohio and Louisiana).
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laws,29 but that investigation is still ongoing. Caramadre and his colleague
were also indicted by a grand jury on charges including conspiracy, mail
fraud, wire fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and money
laundering.30 Outside of Rhode Island, several other lawsuits have been
filed involving disputes regarding the validity and enforceability of
stranger-initiated annuities, and whether insurance companies must remain
bound to those contracts.31 However, only one court, the District of Rhode
Island in dealing with Caramadre’s scheme, has thus far rendered a
substantive decision directly addressing the validity of STATs, Western
Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC (hereinafter
“Conreal”).32 Moreover, that court’s conclusion, that the contracts were
not voidable for lack of insurable interest nor contestable on fraud grounds,
is based on a tenuous interpretation of Rhode Island statutes and, as
discussed further below, raises more questions than it answers. Regardless,
in at least forty-nine states, the question as to whether STATs should be
viewed as analogous to STOLI policies, and potentially subject to
rescission under existing insurable interest laws, remains a matter of first
impression.

29

See generally Indictment, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Caramadre et al., No. 1:10-mc-00052-S (DLM) (D.R.I. 2010).
30
See Katie Mulvaney, Two Men Plead Not Guilty to Defrauding Elderly,
Dying, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 1, 2011, at 5.
31
For example, in MetLife Investors USA Insurance Co. v. Zeidman, 734 F.
Supp. 2d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), a STAT was issued and the terminally ill annuitant,
Sherry Pratt, died twelve days later. MetLife later investigated and then rescinded
the annuity, and the contract owner, the Zeidman Trust, did not contest rescission;
it sought only the return of the $975,000 purchase price for the annuity. Id. at 308.
MetLife thereafter interpleaded those funds with the court, citing competing claims
to the funds by the Zeidman Trust and the estate of Ms. Pratt. Id. The court issued
an opinion addressing various claims asserted by Ms. Pratt’s estate against the
Zeidman Trust and MetLife, ultimately holding that the estate had failed to
adequately allege its claims. The only claim by the estate against MetLife was an
alleged violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, claiming that MetLife had
used Ms. Pratt’s identity for an annuity without her consent, but the court
dismissed the claim because the statute required a “public” use of one’s identity to
be actionable. Id. at 311-12. The court then granted MetLife’s petition for
discharge. Id. at 316. The decision did not involve any discussion regarding the
validity or enforceability of the annuity itself, however, given the Zeidman Trust’s
concession to rescission.
32
See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp.
2d 270 (D.R.I. 2010).
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COMPARING AND CONTRASTING STATs AND STOLI

STATs and STOLI arrangements share several key elements. For
both types of transactions, a third-party investor is the real party in interest
acquiring the product, despite having no familial relationship or other
interest in the life of the individual insured or annuitant. Both also involve
the exploitation of a product offered by life insurance companies, and both
involve products that guarantee a death benefit. But obvious distinctions
between life insurance policies and variable annuities are worth
consideration before addressing whether STATs should be subject to
insurable interest requirements.
First, life insurance policies and variable annuities trigger different
financial obligations on the part of the issuing insurer during the named
individual’s lifetime and after his or her death, and thus implicate different
interests for the insurer with respect to that individual’s longevity. In the
case of life insurance, the insurer hopes to benefit by continuing to receive
premium payments for the duration of the insured’s life. As such,
insurance companies have a clear interest in obtaining more thorough
information from applicants seeking life insurance that will enable them to
more accurately assess the mortality risk of persons and determine proper
risk classes for each policy, so as to maximize average expected profits.
By contrast, issuers of variable life annuities only continue to
receive premium payments during the accumulation phase, but not after the
contracts are annuitized. Moreover, before STAT exploitation, the only
perceived profitable use of variable annuities was for long-term
investments. Customers who purchase annuities were therefore viewed as
self-selecting, being highly unlikely to commit large proportions of their
funds to a long-term investment if their health was poor.33 Thus, for a
typical non-STAT annuity with a GMDB, the initial mortality rate is
roughly 1%.34 Based on this risk assessment, most insurers did not see a
need to engage in extensive underwriting, and structured their variable
annuity applications and contracts accordingly, unaware that the mortality
risk for a STAT, by definition, would approach 100%.35 Thus, insurance
33

See ACLI, supra note 27, at 4.
Nancy Bennett, Senior Life Fellow, American Academy of Actuaries,
Actuarial Considerations of Stranger Initiated Annuity Transactions 5 (July 9,
2010), available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/life/AAA%20Comments%20
to%20NCOIL%20on%20Stranger%20Originated%20Annuities%20final%207-92010.pdf.
35
Id.
34
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companies have historically had comparatively few financial incentives to
examine a prospective annuitant’s health or life expectancy, and thus do
not engage in the same degree of underwriting they ordinarily require of
prospective insureds.
These different underwriting requirements may make it more
difficult for an insurer to prove fraud in a STAT case than in a STOLI case.
STOLI disputes are likely to involve more clear evidence of fraud and
misrepresentation, given that an applicant must answer direct questions on
the policy applications regarding their medical condition and finances.
Annuity applications often do not ask such questions. Of course, the
evidence in a particular STAT case may still show express
misrepresentations, or a failure to disclose the annuitant’s failing health or
the fact that the beneficiary and the annuitant are total strangers, despite a
duty to do so. The Rhode Island plaintiffs, for example, allege that
Caramadre set up a relatively low initial premium on the application,
invested conservatively, to avoid arousing the suspicions of the insurer, and
then, after issuance, dramatically increased the premium payments and
transferred the funds into riskier investment options.36 Caramadre and his
associates, however, respond that the insurer does not request medical
information or inquire about the relationship between the annuitant and the
beneficiary, and argue that the application, contract, or prospectus are silent
on such issues.37
Another key difference between life insurance policies and variable
annuities relates to the duration of the contract’s contestability period. Life
insurance policies typically have clauses providing that they are contestable
on grounds of material misrepresentation for a period of two years, and
most states have enacted statutes requiring insurers to promise no more
than two years of contestability in life insurance contracts.38 But although
state statutes sometime allow insurers to provide for up to two years of
contestability for annuity contracts,39 some insurers still opt for a shorter
contestability period and choose to make their annuity contracts

36

See Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 21.
See generally Answer and Counterclaim, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v.
Caramadre, No. 09-471 S (D.R.I. Apr. 8, 2011).
38
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5 (West 2006); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT
5/224(c) (West 2000); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(a)(3) (McKinney 2008); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.455 (West 2011); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1101.006(a) (West 2009).
39
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-15-18 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.466 (West 2011).
37
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incontestable from the date of contract issuance.40 Again, such business
decisions reflect the perceived self-selective nature of annuity applicants,
and demonstrate how insurers simply did not foresee how variable annuity
products might be exploited by stranger investors.
The Conreal opinion shows that such business decisions may come
back to haunt the insurer. There, the court determined that the fact that the
insurers drafted their annuity contracts as incontestable from the “policy
date” foreclosed any argument by the insurers that the policies should be
rescinded due to fraud.41 Notably, the court still allowed the insurers to
pursue fraud claims seeking damages from Caramadre and his associated
sponsors, agents, and brokers, noting that “unlike Harry Potter’s
‘Invisibility Cloak,’ which could conceal not only Harry, but anyone who
wore it,” the incontestability clauses could not be invoked by third parties
to the contract.42 But as to the owners of the annuities, and the validity of
the contracts themselves, the court dismissed all fraud claims as
incontestable.43
Still, despite these varied distinctions, a key functional similarity
between a life insurance policy and a variable annuity with a GMDB
remains: both products provide a death benefit, and if purchased by a
stranger investor, can therefore be exploited to provide a significant
monetary payout upon the death of an individual in which the purchaser
has no insurable interest.

40

For example, the Rhode Island STATs cases all appear to have involved
contracts providing that they were incontestable from the “policy date.” See W.
Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 279-80
(D.R.I. 2010).
41
Id. at 279-80.
42
Id. at 281.
43
Id. at 280. Insurable interest claims, however, would in most states survive
the contract’s contestability period. Most state laws provide, at least in the
insurance context, that insurable interest is an issue that goes to contract formation,
rendering the contract void ab initio, and thus may be raised at any time regardless
of any contestability clause therein. See 1 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D
§ 240:82 (2009) (“The majority of jurisdictions follow the view that an
incontestable clause does not prohibit insurers from resisting payment on the
ground that the policy was issued to one having no insurable interest—such a
defense may be raised despite the fact that the period of contestability has
expired.”).
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LEGAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN “INSURANCE” AND
“ANNUITIES”

Before addressing whether insurable interest rules should apply to
annuity products, it must be noted that courts have long recognized various
legal similarities and distinctions between life insurance policies and
variable annuities in various contexts. Courts have treated the two types of
products differently for such varied purposes as to compel issuers of
variable annuities to comply with securities laws,44 to allow national banks
to sell annuities,45 or to address their tax treatment.46 But as the Seventh
Circuit noted after examining numerous cases and treatises addressing the
similarities and differences between insurance and annuity products, “The
most we can conclude from these long lists of cases and treatises is that
annuities are not exactly insurance policies, but that the two have multiple
similarities. Thus courts and treatise writers have stated that the two
products are different in some situations, and the same in others.”47 The
court then concluded that “none of the cases or treatises authoritatively
answers the question that we must decide.”48 While the issue before that
court is not pertinent here,49 it demonstrates that given the numerous
44

See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
(discussing the differences between life insurance and variable annuities and
concluding that the latter had to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933).
Interestingly, a key reason for the Supreme Court’s conclusion was its
understanding that a variable annuity “places all of the investment risk on the
annuitant, not on the company. . . . The companies that issue these annuities take
the risk of failure. But they guarantee nothing to the annuitant except an interest in
a portfolio of common stocks or other equities -- an interest that has a ceiling but
no floor.” Id. at 71-72. STATs, however, do not follow these conventions; the
investor is guaranteed a floor in the form of a GMDB, and the insurer is misled
into unwittingly assuming all of the risks in the investment portfolio.
45
See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 263-64 (1995) (noting various similarities and distinctions between annuities
and insurance, and deferring to the Comptroller of the Currency’s decision to treat
them as distinct products for purposes of the National Bank Act, noting that his
conclusion was “at least reasonable”).
46
See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941) (focusing on the
differences between insurance risks and investment risks in examining estate tax
dispute).
47
Am. Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834, 840 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996).
48
Id.
49
See id. (examining the specific question as to whether annuities should be
considered to be “insurance” for purposes of the McCarran Ferguson Act).
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similarities and differences between the two types of products, any analysis
of whether they should be treated similarly or differently depends entirely
upon the nature of the legal issue being considered. Here, the salient
question is whether insurable interest requirements should apply to both
products.
VIII.

PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FOR REQUIRING INSURABLE
INTEREST FOR VARIABLE ANNUITIES

A review of the historical development of the insurable interest
requirement suggests that it should apply equally to variable annuities with
GMDBs for the same reasons it applies to life insurance policies. The
requirement was first imposed in eighteenth-century Great Britain in an
effort to combat the so-called “dead pools” or “death pools” popular at the
time, in which aristocratic gamblers wagered on when royals and other
celebrities would die first.50 Prior to 1750, the common law had only
condemned wagers on human life when accompanied by a criminal act,
such as murder to collect on a policy.51 In the third quarter of the
eighteenth century, however, gambling on human life began to be seen as
an independent moral hazard, a concern plausibly related to growing
unease over slavery and the concept of trafficking in the commerce of
human lives.52 Thus, Parliament enacted the Life Assurance Act in 1774,
holding that any insurance policy made to benefit a person who had “no
interest” in the life of the person insured would be deemed “null and
void.”53
This insurable interest requirement was reinforced in the common
law of the United States as a matter of public policy. For example, the
United States Supreme Court recognized this public policy requirement in
1881 in Warnock v. Davis, explaining that without such an interest, “the
contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly
interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency
to create a desire for the event.”54 The Supreme Court reiterated the same
concerns in Grigsby v. Russell, a 1911 opinion rendered by Justice Oliver
50

See Timothy Alborn, A License to Bet: Life Insurance and the Gambling Act
in the British Courts, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 1 (2007).
51
Id. at 2.
52
Id. (citing GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND 1695-1775, 62-63 (Manchester University Press 1999).
53
Life Assurance Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 48, § 1 (1774).
54
Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
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Wendell Holmes: “A contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured
has no interest is a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister counter
interest in having the life come to an end.”55 The “very meaning” of
insurable interest, Justice Holmes explained, “is an interest in having the
life continue.”56 Recent court decisions addressing STOLI disputes have
reiterated these principles in holding that modern statutes imposing
insurable interest requirements are based on these fundamental public
policy concerns.57
Thus, although the insurable interest requirement has since been
incorporated into the insurance codes of nearly every state,58 the
55

Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1911) (adding, “although that
counter interest always exists . . . the chance that in some cases it may prove a
sufficient motive for crime is greatly enhanced if the whole world of the
unscrupulous are free to bet on what life they choose.”).
56
Id. Warnock and Grigsby also address a key issue more applicable to
STOLI policies than to STATs -- the alienation of the contract to one with no
insurable interest. While Warnock invalidated an assignment of ninety percent of a
policy’s proceeds executed contemporaneously with the application for the policy,
see Warnock, 104 U.S. at 781, Grigsby clarified that a lack of insurable interest on
the part of a prospective assignee does not bar the sale of an in-force life insurance
policy, see Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156-57. Grigsby clarified that this freedom to
alienate only applies to policies that are issued with a valid insurable interest in the
first instance and there is no pre-existing agreement to assign, noting an important
distinction: “And cases in which a person having an interest lends himself to one
without any, as a cloak to what is, in its inception, a wager, have no similarity to
those where an honest contract is sold in good faith.” Id. at 156. While
assignment or some other method of alienation is frequently a key component of a
STOLI transaction, however, STATs often involve no alienation at all. The
application typically just names the third-party investor as owner and beneficiary,
and the annuitant signs the application as the annuitant only. See, e.g., W. Reserve
Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274 (D.R.I.
2010).
57
See, e.g., Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652-55
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (analyzing rationales given in Warnock and Grigsby, as well as a
December 19, 2005 opinion by the Office of General Counsel on behalf of the New
York State Insurance Department noting that STOLI activities seeking to procure a
policy “solely as a speculative investment for the ultimate benefit of a disinterested
third party . . . is contrary to the long established public policy against ‘gaming’
through life insurance purchases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lincoln
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888-89 (D.N.J. 2009); Lincoln
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Schwarz, No. 09-03361, 2010 WL 3283550, at *7 (D.N.J.
Aug. 18, 2010).
58
See discussion infra Part X.
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requirement is not a creature of statute. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Warnock, the prohibition of the wagering on human lives is founded in
public policy “independently of any statute on the subject.”59 This
distinction is reflected in recent statutory amendments addressing STOLI
cases, which are typically worded so as to reflect that insurable interest
statutes recognize and apply pre-existing insurable interest requirements,
which are based on public policy and common law.
California’s new 2009 legislation, for example, added a subsection
providing that certain STOLI arrangements, through the use of trusts or
special purpose entities, “violate the insurable interest laws and the
prohibition against wagering on life,”60 plainly recognizing and referring to
pre-existing legal standards. Another provision in the same section, which
existed both before and after the 2009 amendment, adds, “[t]his section
shall not be interpreted to define all instances in which an insurable interest
exists.”61 In other words, the California legislature recognized that the
contours of the insurable interest laws were incapable of being precisely
defined by statute. To expect otherwise of state legislators is unreasonable,
particularly in a modern world where investors continue to invent new and
unanticipated ways to exploit human lives for profit. Thus, by specifically
prohibiting certain STOLI practices in 2009, the California legislature was
not trying to fix a pre-existing statutory loophole or create a new rule of
law, but to confirm that a new, previously unforeseen type of transaction
was of a nature that violated existing laws.
When examining the scope of state laws on insurable interest,
courts should therefore be mindful not only of pertinent statutes and case
law, but also of the fundamental public policy interests underlying those
statutes and judicial opinions. Such interests are implicated no differently
by STATs than by STOLI policies, both of which are structured to provide
a death benefit to a third-party investor who stands to gain financially from
the death of a human being. Indeed, STAT investors are essentially using
variable annuities as life insurance policies; the product is being used in
such a manner as to use it almost entirely for its life insurance feature, in
conjunction with a short-term market play. STAT investors who purchase
annuity products for that purpose should be viewed as subjecting
59

Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779; see also Schwarz, 2010 WL 3283550, at *7
(citing Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779) (holding that the original public policy interest
in precluding insurance absent an insurable interest “is the law in New York”).
60
CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(d) (West 2010).
61
CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(i) (West 2010) (amending CAL. INS. CODE
§10110.1(g) (2004)).
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themselves to a contract that public policy dictates to be of the type that
must have insurable interest to be valid and enforceable.
The twin public policy rationales historically given for the
insurable interest requirement—prohibiting the morbid practice of
gambling on human lives and eliminating a perverse incentive to commit
murder (sometimes called the “moral hazard” rationale)—have in some
circles been attacked as no longer being compelling concerns in a modern
However, as demonstrated by the eagerness of modern
world.62
legislatures to enact laws prohibiting STOLI practices,63 modern societies
do apparently continue to believe that wagers on human lives by
disinterested investors still pose a legitimate threat to the public interest.
Indeed, at least one recent case suggests that the moral hazard concern,
while it may appear to be implausible in modern times, may not be a simple
paranoia of the past. In September 2008, 74-year-old Germaine Tomlinson
was mysteriously found having drowned in her bathtub in Indiana, fully
clothed and wearing high heels. The last person to see her alive was her
son-in-law, the beneficiary of a $15 million insurance policy on her life,
who had been with Ms. Tomlinson at a bar the night of her death, drove her
home, and escorted her into the house. Police first concluded that the death
was accidental, but reopened their investigation after learning that Ms.
Tomlinson died the day before her son-in-law’s deadline to either repay a
$1.3 million loan he had taken out to finance the policy premiums or risk
surrendering the policy to the lender.64 Police were unable to find clear
evidence of foul play, but courts allowed civil suits to proceed.65 Even if
such incidents are unlikely or rare today, the mere threat thereof is not too
far-fetched, which helps explain why the moral hazard concern played a
part in supporting the recent wave of anti-STOLI legislation nationwide.

62

See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1123
(2000) (arguing that the gambling rationale has only been paid “lip service” in
court decisions like Grigsby, and that courts instead relied more heavily on the
moral hazard concern implicated by an incentive to hasten another’s death); Jacob
Loshin, Insurance Law's Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest
Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 483-90 (2007) (arguing that even the moral
hazard rationale is too imprecise to justify an insurable interest requirement).
63
See supra note 14.
64
See Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Inquiry Into Death in Indiana
Reopened, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2010, at A7.
65
See K. McLaughlin, Drama Builds in Hilbert Suit, 31 INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J.,
November 6, 2010, at A3.
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STAT cases create similar moral hazard risks; indeed, at least one
STAT plaintiff has alleged that the annuitant had voiced fears that STAT
originators sought to kill her.66 Although it may arguably be difficult to
imagine a white-collar STAT investor carrying out or orchestrating a
calculated killing for profit, the moral hazard public policy rationale has
never targeted a specific demographic of suspected would-be murderers.
Indeed, such temptations could theoretically be exacerbated in STAT cases,
given the volatility of the stock market. One might imagine, for example, a
sudden downturn decimating the investor’s high-risk portfolio, and an
urgent need for cash flow that a GMDB payout might provide. Although
STAT annuitants are selected with the expectation that they will pass away
soon, the uncertainty as to the timing of that passing may prove frustrating
for an investor with substantial sums invested in a fluctuating market. A
STAT investor might even have fewer qualms about orchestrating the
carrying out of such a deed given the individual’s terminal illness. The
objective of the public policy is simply to eliminate such incentives that
could conceivably result in disastrous consequences.
Another public policy concern that supports an insurable interest
requirement for STATs is their negative impact on the market itself. The
other parties to a STAT investor’s high-risk speculation do not know that
the investor is not actually undertaking such risks, given its concealed
knowledge of the GMDB safety net. Such conduct may expose the
investor to liability to such third parties, and, as in Caramadre’s case, may
also invite investigation by the S.E.C. But it can also be seen as
sufficiently damaging to the market to justify another public policy
rationale for preventing STATs. The securities laws themselves, and
related doctrines such as the fraud-on-the-market theory, are based on
similar public policy concerns that the integrity of the securities markets
requires a “philosophy of full disclosure.”67 The imposition of an insurable
interest requirement for STATs would be an effective way to reduce such
risks.
STATs also negatively impact the market by disrupting the
economics in the annuity industry. Annuity providers are faced with a
66

See, e.g., Complaint in Eouity [sic] and Law at 44-45, Pratt v. Flowers., No.
2010-L-002155, 2010 WL 687509 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 2010) (alleging that annuitant had
stated her fear that “these people are trying to kill me.”).
67
Tad E. Thompson, Messin' with Texas: How the Fifth Circuit's Decision in
Oscar Private Equity Misinterprets the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1086, 1093 (2008) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230,
(1988)) (discussing public policy interests underlying Rule 10b-5 and the fraud-onthe-market theory).
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problematic choice – either they must invest in additional underwriting, or,
if they choose not to do so, they must increase the prices charged to the
public to account for the market losses that STAT investors will pass on to
the company. Either way, the annuity providers would have to pass on
these additional costs to the customers who buy their annuity products, and
may have already done so.68
With the exception of the last two market-based justifications for
barring STATs, the other public policy interests noted above are wellestablished and provide the basis for current statutes codifying insurable
interest requirements. As examined below, these public policy concerns
are not in conflict with such statutes. These concerns, however, were
inexplicably ignored by the Rhode Island District Court in Conreal.
IX.

THE FLAWED ANALYSIS IN CONREAL

Conreal is the sole judicial opinion thus far rendered addressing
the applicability of the insurable interest requirement to stranger-originated
variable annuities. The justification for that conclusion, however, is flawed
in several respects.
First, the court assumed that the insurable interest requirement only
applied to products fitting statutory definitions of “insurance.”69 The court
presupposed that the sole basis for the requirement was statutory, citing a
provision in the state insurance code prohibiting the procurement of an
“insurance contract” without an insurable interest.70 Thus, the court’s entire
discussion is framed exclusively within the limited confines of an analysis
of whether annuities can be considered “insurance products” or as “hybrid
products” under statutory definitions.71 But the court did not seriously
consider the possibility that other non-statutory bases for an insurable
interest requirement existed based on common law and public policy.72
68

A similar argument has been made regarding STOLI transactions, which
caused a reduction in lapse rates due to the fact that investors do not typically
allow policies to lapse. This forces insurers to increase premium rates for their
products, further harming ordinary consumers.
69
W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276
(D.R.I. 2010).
70
Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(a) (2010)).
71
Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d. at 276-79.
72
The court even quoted language from an older Rhode Island case that
arguably supported a common-law argument for applying the doctrine outside the
context of insurance, holding that “a purely speculative contract on the life of
another is . . . objectionable on the grounds of public policy.” Id. at 276 (quoting
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The court did briefly examine state cases in seeking to differentiate
annuities from life insurance, quoting an 1877 Rhode Island Supreme Court
decision noting that other transactions resulting in “speculation upon the
chances of human life,” such as “when a man takes a transfer of an
annuity,” have not been held void.73 But a “transfer of an annuity” is an
entirely different type of transaction from a STAT. An annuity purchaser
buys the right to receive annuity payments lasting as long as the duration of
the annuitant’s life, and thus has every hope that the annuitant stays alive.
STAT originators, by contrast, set up the transaction from its inception so
as to benefit the investor when the annuitant dies. Not until recently, and
certainly not in 1877, could the Rhode Island Supreme Court have
anticipated that annuities could be exploited in a manner giving a stranger a
contractual right to benefit from another’s death.
In fact, the Conreal court went out of its way to deliberately skirt
the question regarding the pertinence of the moral hazard rationale. The
court did briefly acknowledge the possibility that STATs may create a
“temptation to shorten life,”74 but did not go on to consider whether such a
danger was of public concern. Instead, the court focused its discussion
solely on a critique of the plaintiff insurers for their failure to ensure that
their application procedures screened for insurable interest.75 Thus, by
censuring the insurers for the fact that they did not foresee how variable
annuity products might be exploited by investors recruiting terminally ill
annuitants,76 the court sidestepped the more important question of whether
there existed a valid public interest in eliminating an incentive to shorten
life.
Further, the Conreal opinion is based on a tenuous interpretation of
the pertinent state statutes. It noted that the Rhode Island Insurance Code

Cronin v. Vt. Life Ins. Co., 40 A. 497, 497 (R.I. 1898)). This language, unlike the
statute cited above, is not constrained to life insurance contracts.
73
Id. at 278 (citing Clark v. Allen, 11 R.I. 439, 444 (1877)).
74
Id. at 279 (quoting Cronin, 40 A. at 497).
75
Id.
76
Id. Interestingly, the court also appears to recognize that these novel
schemes were unanticipated, describing Caramadre as having “discovered” a
loophole in the product itself, and describing his strategy as based on his “insight”
regarding how the product could be exploited. Id. at 273-74. The court later
describes the STAT originators as having “figured out how to game a flaw in the
product.” Id. at 278. The court almost appears to be praising Caramadre for his
ingenuity, but condemning the insurers for failing to come to the same realization
first.
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had separately defined the terms “life insurance” and “annuities,”77 but
failed to examine why that distinction mattered in the STAT context. As
noted above, although treatises and cases alike conclude that the products
are similar in numerous respects, various reasons exist for distinguishing
between the two products in certain contexts, such as for purposes of
taxation or securities registration. Thus, while many states define “life
insurance” as including annuities, others, like Rhode Island, have defined
them differently.78 The key question, then, is not whether annuities are
insurance products, but whether certain rules historically applied to
insurance policies should also apply to annuity contracts that have only
recently begun to be used in a similar manner. There is no evidence that
the Rhode Island General Assembly defined the terms “life insurance” and
“annuity” for the purpose of excluding annuities from insurable interest
requirements.
The Conreal court, however, asserts that the General Assembly
“reinforced the statutory distinction” between the two when it failed to
mention annuities in the Life Settlements Act (“LSA”), which addressed
STOLI practices.79 But as noted above,80 Rhode Island is but one of many
states to recently enact STOLI legislation. Like many other states, the
General Assembly based the LSA on a model act recommended by the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators.81 The model act and the
LSA were both drafted well before STATs came to national attention in the
past two years. Thus, it is likely that the omission of any reference to
STATs in the LSA was not a conscious exclusion, but a reflection of the
fact that the legislature was simply unaware that variable annuities could
similarly be exploited by stranger investors.
Moreover, the language of the LSA itself again indicates that
insurable interest legislation is designed to codify pre-existing insurable
interest requirements. Like the California anti-STOLI legislation cited
above, Rhode Island’s LSA provides that STOLI arrangements through the
use of trusts “violate insurable interest laws and the prohibition against
77

Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 276-77 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-0.1
(2010)).
78
See discussion infra Part X.
79
Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-2
(West 2010)).
80
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-2(26) (West 2010).
81
Trevor Thomas,
Rhode
Island
Enacts
Settlements
Law,
LIFEHEALTHPRO.COM
(Nov.
11,
2009),
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/News/2009/11/Pages/Rhode-IslandEnacts-Settlements-Law.aspx.
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wagering on life.”82 Thus, the statute sought to clarify that STOLI
arrangements violate existing laws, not to announce that all other hithertounknown schemes to wager on human life were fair game.
Further, even if it were true that the court was constrained by the
statutory language to restrict insurable interest requirements to “insurance”
or “hybrid” products, the court still erred in concluding that they were not
hybrid products, contending that GMDBs merely “sweeten the deal.”83
While that might be the case for non-STAT annuities, where the purchaser
expects the annuitant to live long enough to justify pursuing a traditional
investment strategy, the GMDB is a fundamental component of a STAT
transaction. By placing a wager on whether aggressive investments will
turn a profit before a stranger dies, and putting the entire risk of loss on the
insurance company, STAT promoters have certainly made the life
insurance component of the scam more than a mere “ancillary perk.”84
X.

A SURVERY OF STATE LAWS RELATING TO ANNUITIES
AND INSURABLE INTEREST

Conreal is the sole judicial opinion thus far rendered that examines
whether insurable interest requirements might apply to variable annuities.
But even if later Rhode Island courts or statutes do not overrule or
contradict its holding, Conreal does not necessarily spell disaster for
insurers or annuitants wishing to declare STATs void under the laws of
other states. An examination of other statutory schemes and related
caselaw reveals that the framework underlying Conreal’s conclusion is not
at all typical, and that in each state, sufficient statutory or common-law
authority may already exist to support contrary conclusions.
Two considerations are important in this analysis. First, how states
define the terms “life insurance” and “annuities” may or may not indicate
whether the legislature intended that the latter should be treated as
insurance products. Thirteen states, encompassing California,85 Colorado,86
82

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-72-2(26) (2010).
Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
84
Id. at 278-79.
85
CAL. INS. CODE § 101 (West 2005) (“Life insurance includes insurance upon
the lives of persons or appertaining thereto, and the granting, purchasing, or
disposing of annuities.”).
86
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1-102(12) (West 2011) (“‘Insurance’ means a
contract whereby one, for consideration, undertakes to indemnify another or to pay
a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk
contingencies, and includes annuities.”).
83
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Florida,87 Illinois,88 Michigan,89 Mississippi,90 Nebraska,91 New Mexico,92
North Dakota,93 South Carolina,94 Tennessee,95 Texas,96 and West
Virginia,97 have statutes or case law that expressly define annuities as
87

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.602(1) (West 2011) (“The transaction of life
insurance includes also the granting of annuity contracts, including, but not limited
to, fixed or variable annuity contracts”).
88
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/4 (West 2000) (defining “classes of
insurance” — “Life. Insurance on the lives of persons and every insurance
appertaining thereto or connected therewith and granting, purchasing or disposing
of annuities.”).
89
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.602(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (“‘Life’
insurance is insurance upon the lives and health of persons and every insurance
pertaining thereto, and to grant, purchase, or dispose of annuities.”).
90
Hamilton v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 So. 2d 278, 280 (Miss. 1944)
(annuities not technically life insurance policies but are subject to provisions of
insurance code regulating life insurance); State ex rel. Gully v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
of N.Y., 196 So. 796, 799 (Miss. 1940), overruled in part on other grounds, United
Gas Corp. v. Leggett, 198 So. 763 (1940).
91
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2010) (requiring benefits of any “policy of
insurance” to be payable to person with insurable interest in person’s life, and
expressly providing that the term “policy of insurance” includes annuity contracts).
92
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-7-2 (2000) (“‘Life’ insurance is insurance of
human lives and every insurance appertaining thereto, and the granting, purchasing
or disposing of annuities. . . ”).
93
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-26-11 (2010) (variable annuities categorized along
with variable life insurance contracts as “insurance coverage”); id § 26.1-05-02
(same); id. § 26.1-34.2-02 (definitions section relating to annuities includes
definitions referring to “insurance, including annuities” and “insurance products,
including annuities”).
94
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-1-20(19) (2002) (“The term ‘insurance’ includes
annuities.”).
95
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-2-201(4) (2008 & Supp. 2011) (“For the purposes
of this title, the transacting of life insurance includes the granting of annuities, both
with and without a life or mortality contingency or element . . . .” ); see also H & R
Block E. Tax Serv., Inc. v. State Dep’t of Commerce & Ins., Div. of Ins., 267
S.W.3d 848, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that statutory definitions of
“contract of insurance” and “insurable interest” were circular and ambiguous, and
that the broad definition could cover various types of contracts).
96
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1102.001(1)(A) (West 2009) (definition of
“insurance policy” includes annuity contracts).
97
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-10(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (“Life insurance. -Life insurance is insurance on human lives including endowment benefits,
additional benefits in the event of death or dismemberment by accident or
accidental means, additional benefits for disability and annuities.”).
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insurance products. Further, their rules relating to insurable interest do not
seek to carve out annuities or other specific types of insurance products.98
Nebraska even expressly includes annuity contracts in its insurable interest
statute.99 Other states are not quite so explicit as Nebraska—which is not
surprising, given the very recent advent of STATs—but the fact that these
thirteen states define annuities as insurance suggests that courts confronted
with STAT disputes in those states would have little choice but to
distinguish Conreal.
But the second consideration in examining state statutes is far more
important: regardless of whether a state legislature or court has chosen to
define the products separately, the language of the state’s insurable interest
laws may already be broad enough to cover annuities. Many states do not
expressly define annuities as insurance, and sometimes even define them as
separate products, but their insurance codes still make clear that insurable
interest requirements apply to annuities. For example, New Jersey’s
insurable interest statute, like Nebraska’s, explicitly applies to annuities100
even though the code elsewhere defines them as separate from insurance
products.101 In other states, it is clear from the structure of the code that the
insurable interest requirement applies to annuities. For example, Arizona’s
insurance code provides, “Except as exemption or other provision is made,
all provisions in this title applicable to life insurance shall be deemed
applicable also to annuities.”102 That title includes an insurable interest
statute that does not make any “exemption or other provision” excluding

98

See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (West 2005) (insurable interest
requirement does not carve out annuities); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.404 (West 2011)
(same); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.2207 (LexisNexis 2008) (same); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-18-4, 59A-18-5 (2000) (setting forth insurable interest
requirements), and § 59A-18-1 (chapter applies as to all insurance policies and
annuity contracts); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1103.052 (West 2009) (subchapter
relating to insurable interest for life insurance policies “shall be liberally construed
to implement the purposes of this subchapter”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-2
(LexisNexis 2011) (insurable interest statute with no carve-out for annuities).
99
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2010).
100
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-1.1 (West 2006) (setting forth insurable interest
requirement and providing that it applies to life insurance, health insurance, and
annuities).
101
Id. § 17B:17-5 (defining “annuity” and noting that a contract that includes
life insurance death benefits is still deemed to be an annuity “if such extra benefits
constitute a subsidiary or incidental part of the entire contract”).
102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-254 (2002).
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annuities from the requirement.103 This type of statutory framework is
especially common. Eighteen states, comprising Alabama,104 Alaska,105
Arizona,106 Arkansas,107 Delaware,108 Georgia,109 Idaho,110 Indiana,111
Kentucky,112 Louisiana,113 Maine,114 Maryland,115 Nevada,116 New

103

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104 (2010); see also id. § 20-1101
(clarifying scope of article that includes insurable interest requirement and
excluding certain products, but not annuities).
104
ALA. CODE § 27-14-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (“[T]his chapter applies as to all
insurance contracts and annuity contracts”); § 27-14-3 (very next section, stating
insurable interest requirement without any carve-out for annuities). Alabama thus
makes its insurable interest requirement applicable to annuities even though it
defines them as separate products elsewhere in the code. See § 27-5-3 (defining
“annuity” as a separate type of contract from a life insurance policy as defined in
§ 27-5-2, and noting that a contract that includes certain life insurance death
benefits is still deemed to be an annuity “if such extra benefits constitute a
subsidiary or incidental part of the entire contract”).
105
ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(d) (2010) (defining insurable interest
requirement as referring to “life, annuity, or health insurance”).
106
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1101 (2010) (clarifying scope of article that
includes insurable interest requirement and excluding certain products, but not
annuities).
107
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (2004) (defining insurable interest
requirement); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-102 (Supp. 2011) (clarifying scope of
chapter and excluding certain products, but not annuities).
108
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2701 (1999) (explaining “this chapter applies to
all insurance contracts and annuity contracts”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2704
(1999) (describing insurable interest requirement with no carve-out for annuities).
109
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3 (West Supp. 2011) (defining insurable interest
requirement); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-2 (West 2003) (clarifying scope of chapter
and excluding certain products, but not annuities).
110
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1804 (2010) (defining insurable interest
requirement); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1801 (2010) (chapter of code applies “as to
all insurance contracts and annuity contracts”).
111
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-15.6-31 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (insurable
interest law applies to annuities in context of requiring producer to have an
insurable interest in life of annuitant in order to have an interest therein); see also
In re Estate of Powers, 849 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
112
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040 (West 2012) (defining insurable
interest requirement); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-010 (West 2012) (subtitle in
code applies to annuities as well as life insurance). Like Alabama, Kentucky has
this framework despite explicitly defining annuities as separate products from life
insurance. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.5-030 (West 2012).
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Jersey,117 Oklahoma,118 South Dakota,119 Utah,120 and Wyoming,121 have
similarly enacted statutes that either expressly state, or whose structure and
113

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:914 (2009) (stating provisions of insurance code
apply to variable annuity contracts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:901 (2009)
(defining insurable interest requirement); see also bulletin issued by the state
insurance department taking the position that STATs would violate insurable
interest laws, see supra note 28.
114
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404 (2000) (defining insurable interest
requirement); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2401 (2000) (chapter of code
“applies as to all insurance contracts and annuity contracts”). Maine has this
framework despite some arguable inconsistencies in its code relating to whether
annuities are deemed insurance products. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 3 (2000) (defining “insurance” broadly to include annuities), with ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 703 (2000) (defining “annuity” as a separate type of
contract from a life insurance policy per § 702).
115
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-201 (LexisNexis 2011) (defining insurable
interest requirement); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-102 (LexisNexis 2011) (article
applies to insurance and annuity contracts). This framework applies even though
annuities are not defined in the code as life insurance products. MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 1-101(d)(3) (LexisNexis 2011) (definition of “annuity” provides that it
“does not include life insurance); see also Matthews v. Matthews, 647 A.2d 812,
817 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (annuity contracts are not technically life insurance).
116
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.040 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (defining
insurable interest requirement); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.010 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011) (scope of chapter of code “applies to all insurance contracts and
annuity contracts”). The statutes so provide despite having defined annuities as
separate from insurance. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.020 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011).
117
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-1.1 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:175 (West 2006).
118
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3604 (West 2001) (defining insurable interest
requirement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3601 (West 2001) (clarifying scope of
chapter and excluding certain products, but not annuities); see also Baird v.
Wainwright, 260 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Okla. 1953) (holding where annuity certificate
provided a monthly annuity for insured during his lifetime, and at his death if
aggregate of annuities was less than the premium paid the difference was payable
to the beneficiary named in the policy, the contract was a combination life and
annuity policy authorized to be executed by an insurance company).
119
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4 (2004) (defining insurable interest
requirement); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-1 (2004) (“Chapters 58-10 to 58-12,
inclusive, apply as to all insurance contracts and annuity contracts.”).
120
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining insurable
interest requirement); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-101 (Supp. 2012) (defining
scope of chapter and not carving out annuities); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
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placement in the code imply, that annuities are subject to the same
insurable interest requirements as life insurance policies.
Altogether, this review indicates that thirty-one of the fifty states
either expressly define annuities as insurance products or otherwise
indicate that insurable interest requirements apply to annuities. In each of
these states, strong arguments could be made that insurable interest
requirements already apply to STATs under existing law.
Such arguments might also be made as to some variable annuities
in Hawaii and Washington, which have developed an interesting approach
to the definitional question that is of direct relevance to STATs. Both
states have enacted statutes providing that whether life insurance rules
apply to annuities depends on the nature of the death benefit. If the GMDB
is “not in excess of the greater of the sum of the premiums or stipulated
payments paid under the contract or the value of the contract at time of
death,” the provision “shall not be deemed to be life insurance and
therefore not subject to the provisions of this code governing life insurance
carriers.”122 But “[a] provision for any other benefit on death during the
deferred period shall be subject to such insurance provisions.”123
Presumably, that would include being subject to insurable interest laws.124
Thus, in these states, a STAT that is limited to a standard GMDB allowing
it to pursue risk-free investment, with a safety net promising only a
premium refund, would arguably not be subject to insurable interest
requirements, whereas a STAT with an enhanced or “stepped-up” death
benefit, such as the “lock in,” “anniversary ratchet,” or “roll-up” options

1-301 (Supp. 2012) (including various definitions of terms that include annuities,
including “business of life insurance” and “insurance business”); but see In re
Estate of Clark, 354 P.2d 112, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1960) (analyzing statutory
definitions of life insurance and annuities in context of tax dispute, and holding,
“We find nothing in these sections to justify the claim that an annuity contract such
as herein involved should be classified as life insurance either for the purpose of
estate tax or otherwise.”).
121
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102 (2011) (setting forth insurable interest
requirement); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-101 (2011) (“This chapter applies to all
insurance contracts and annuity contracts.”).
122
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10D-118(b)(2) (2005); see also WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.18A.030 (West 2010).
123
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10D-118(b)(2) (2005) (emphasis added); see also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18A.030 (West 2010).
124
E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.030 (West 2010) (imposing insurable
interest statute as applying to life insurance).
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described above, would more clearly run afoul of insurable interest
requirements.
Insurers seeking to rescind STATs in the remaining seventeen
states will have to deal with a variety of statutes and cases—or, in some
states, an absence thereof—that may make it more difficult to establish that
insurable interest is required for variable annuities. Eight of these states—
consisting of Connecticut,125 Minnesota,126 Missouri,127 Montana,128 New
York,129 North Carolina,130 Vermont,131 and of course, Rhode Island—
present a statutory framework similar to that considered in Conreal. In
those states, statutes define annuities as separate products from life
insurance, but do not explicitly speak to the issue of whether insurable
interest laws apply to those separately defined annuities. But again, that
fact does not necessarily suggest that the legislatures in those seventeen
states meant to exclude STATs. Rather, it suggests only that those
125

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-1 (West 2012) (“This definition of
‘annuities’ does not apply to payments made under a policy of life insurance.”).
126
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.021 (West 2005) (sale of life insurance and
annuity as a single product, e.g. with a rider or otherwise, expressly prohibited in
Minnesota).
127
MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.671 (West Supp. 2012) (where annuity contracts
also provide death benefits by rider, the annuity and life insurance portions of the
benefits shall be calculated separately as though it were a separate contract); see
also Carroll v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 9 F. Supp. 223, 224 (W.D.
Mo. 1934) (emphasizing distinct characteristics between annuities and life
insurance contracts).
128
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-208 (2011) (defining life insurance without
referencing annuities); see also Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1144
(Mont. 2000) (analyzing code in detail and noting that legislature could have, but
did not, define annuities as life insurance or provide that they should be similarly
treated).
129
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113(a)(1-2) (McKinney 2006) (defining annuities and
life insurance policies as separate types of contracts); see also N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3205 (McKinney 2006) (insurable interest requirement only refers to life
insurance contracts).
130
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-7-15 (2001) (defining life insurance and annuities as
separate products); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-58-70 to -86 (2001) (relating to
insurable interest without speaking to which types of contracts require such an
interest).
131
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3717 (2009) (stating an annuity with death benefits
of the kind provided by life insurance “shall nevertheless be deemed to be an
annuity if such extra benefits constitute a subsidiary or incidental part of the entire
contract.”).
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legislatures have not yet been confronted with the possibility that strangers
lacking insurable interests in the lives of terminally ill annuitants might
exploit variable annuities.132
Four other states—Massachusetts,133
134
135
Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin136—have insurable interest statutes
whose phrasing or placement in the code suggests that the legislature did
not intend them to apply to annuities. And finally, as to the last five
Kansas,138
New
Hampshire,139
Ohio,140
and
states—Iowa,137
132

As argued above, if these states later enact legislation making insurable
interest a requirement for annuities, such enactments would arguably not reflect a
“change” to state law, but a recognition that STATs violate existing common-law
and public policy grounds prohibiting the procurement of contracts by total
strangers who stand to gain from another’s death. See supra p. 136.
133
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 123 (West 2011) (requiring assent of
insured not applicable to “contracts based upon the continuance of life, such as
annuity or pure endowment contract . . . .”).
134
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 743.024 (West 2011) (setting forth insurable
interest requirement for personal insurance but then stating, “[t]his section does not
apply to annuity policies.”). This statute does so despite the fact that the Oregon
code defines insurance to include annuities. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 731.102 (West
2011) (“‘Insurance’ so defined includes annuities.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
731.170 (West 2011) (“For convenience, reference to ‘life insurance’ in the
Insurance Code includes life insurance as defined in subsection (1) of this section
and annuities as defined in ORS 731.154, except if the inclusion of annuities
obviously is inapplicable or if the context requires, or the Insurance Code provides,
otherwise.”).
135
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301 (2007) (setting forth insurable interest
requirement); id. § 38.2-300 (2007) (chapter does not apply to annuities). This
carve-out for annuities is made despite the fact that other statutes define annuities
as insurance. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-602 (2007) (“‘Life insurance’ includes
annuities.”); id. § 38.2-501 (2007) (“‘Insurance policy’ or ‘insurance contract’
includes annuities . . . .”).
136
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.01 (West 2004) (chapters addressing life insurance,
which include provisions relating to insurable interest, “do not apply to annuities”).
137
See, e.g., Hult v. Home Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 240 N.W. 218, 227 (Iowa
1932) (“[A] life insurance contract must be based upon an insurable interest, in the
absence of which it becomes a wager contract.”). Hult involved claims by an
executor seeking to rescind annuity contracts that the deceased had purchased on
her own life. Although the court declined to apply the insurable interest rule to
rescind the contracts at bar, its rationale for doing so arguably suggests that it
would have reached a different result in a STAT case:
If a person takes out a life insurance policy on the life of one
in whom he has no insurable interest, there are three parties
involved: First, the party who procures the insurance; second, the
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Pennsylvania141—the statutory framework and case law does not provide a
concrete answer.
While this review does not exhaustively examine every potentially
pertinent statute or case in each state, it at least suggests that Conreal
should not necessarily be viewed as a dangerous precedent or as an
invitation to STAT promoters to target other markets. Because Rhode
Island’s statutory scheme is unlike those of most other states, Conreal is
easily distinguishable.142
XI.

OTHER POTENTIAL ISSUES IN STAT DISPUTES

Even if a STAT dispute does not result in judicial rescission of the
annuity contract on insurable interest grounds, other potential arguments
insurance company; third, the party insured. Not so in this case.
Here there are but the two parties, the one to whom the contract
runs and the insurance company, which makes the contract.
There is here no disinterested third party, whether viewed as an
annuity contract or an insurance contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
138
Kansas has a statute prohibiting a “life insurance contract” without
insurable interest, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-450 (West 2000), but the insurance code
does not purport to define that term or to distinguish it from annuity contracts.
139
New Hampshire law requires insurable interest for a “policy of life or
endowment insurance,” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 408:2 (LexisNexis 2009), but the
insurance code does not define that term or to distinguish it from annuity contracts.
But see Frederick v. Frederick, 687 A.2d 711, 714 (N.H. 1996) (noting a “long
history of cases” viewing annuity beneficiaries with the same analysis used in the
life insurance context).
140
Ohio’s code does not define insurance or annuities, and its insurable
interest rules are primarily based on common law, with uncertain applicability to
annuities. See, e.g., Donahue v. Carpenter, No. 91WD057, 1992 WL 66564 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1992) (sustaining appeal of judgment on interpleaded proceeds
of annuity contract, but not directly addressing the parties’ dispute regarding
whether insurable interest rules applied to annuities).
141
Pennsylvania’s insurable interest requirement only applies to a “policy of
life insurance,” 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 1999), but the code does not define
that term or distinguish it from annuities. Some case law exists distinguishing the
two types of products, but not in the context of insurable interest. E.g., In re Estate
of Bayer, 26 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. 1942) (noting “obvious differences” between
annuities and life insurance contracts and finding that they are to be treated
differently for taxation purposes).
142
See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d
270, 276-78, 280 (D.R.I. 2010).
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might be made by insurers seeking to recover market losses paid to the
investors in the form of GMDBs, such as by bringing causes of action for
fraud or material misrepresentations. The annuity contract’s contestability
clause may bar such claims against the contract owner. However, courts
may, as in Conreal, still allow insurers to seek fraud damages from the
other various sponsors, agents, and other collaborators in STAT
schemes.143 An insurer might also claim that conduct by participating
agents breached brokerage service agreements with the company,144 or a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in such contracts.145 STAT
promoters might also be subject to criminal liability and potential civil
actions relating thereto, such as for forging annuitant signatures,146 paying
money in exchange for such signatures,147 or insurance fraud.148
Insurance companies should be well-prepared for the possibility
that courts and juries may be skeptical of insurers’ claims because of
companies’ failure to eliminate the potential risks of STATs. Insurers draft
the annuity applications, contracts, and prospectuses. They do not request
additional information or engage in thorough underwriting before issuing a
variable annuity. They control the assumptions used to set prices for the
annuity fees, and have decided that the annuitant’s health is not a relevant
factor. Yet, none of these arguments should have any impact on whether a
court is willing to enforce the public policy that is part and parcel of an
insurable interest analysis. Further, insurers might contend that they had no
way of knowing that their annuity products would be exploited in this
manner, and that their business decisions regarding the degree of
underwriting needed were reasonable in light of historically low mortality
rates for annuity applicants. Even Conreal, after condemning the insurers
for their lack of foresight in declining to recognize an insurable interest

143

Id. at 281-82.
Such contracts, for example, often require the brokerage firm to train and
supervise its agents, to indemnify the insurer for its agents’ wrongful acts, see, e.g.,
Complaint and Jury Demand at 16-17, W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v.
Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270 (2009) (No. 09-564-S), and might also obligate
agents to use only approved materials to market the insurer’s products (which,
presumably, do not include flyers distributed at hospices and churches).
145
E.g., id. at 16.
146
E.g., id. at 18.
147
See Consolidated Memorandum in Response to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss at 45, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lifemark Sec. Corp., No. 09-549/S
(D. R.I. Feb. 1, 2010).
148
E.g., Complaint, supra note 144, at 18.
144

145

146

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.1

requirement,149 still allowed the insurers to proceed with their fraud claims
against the non-owner defendants despite not having specifically asked for
the information withheld.150
Conreal also acknowledged additional arguments for voiding the
contracts that, like insurable interest, could “rope the owners back into the
lawsuits” despite the contestability clauses.151 The plaintiff insurers raised
arguments that the contracts might be void due to forgery of the annuitant’s
signatures and fraud in the factum, based on the theory that the annuitants
were tricked into signing without knowing the contracts’ true nature or
contents. The court declined to address the merits of such arguments,
noting that the complaints had failed to adequately plead such claims, but it
did grant them leave to amend.152 Importantly, the court recognized that
such forgery or fraud in the factum could render the annuity contracts “void
and not merely voidable,” thus depriving the owners of their
incontestability defense because the pertinent clauses “never would have
come into effect.”153 Thus, depending on the facts of a particular STAT
case, such arguments could certainly be made to suggest that the annuity
contracts were not validly formed and should be held void.
One other potential argument relating to valid contract formation is
also worth discussing, that there was no meeting of the minds between the
owner and the insurer. In other words, the insurer might contend that there
was a mistake of fact—that the insurer reasonably believed that the selected
annuitant was a typical, self-selecting individual whose life expectancy
would be of sufficient duration to justify the long-term investment strategy
ordinarily expected of the variable annuity product. Mistake arguments,
however, have historically been rejected in cases involving annuitants
whose health problems were unknown at the time of the annuity
purchase.154 Such cases might theoretically be distinguished based on the
149

Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79.
Id. at 281-82.
151
Id. at 287 n.16.
152
Id.
153
Id. (citing R.I. Depositors Econ. Protection Corp. v. Bowen Court Assocs.,
763 A.2d 1005, 1009 (R.I. 2001); Giannone v. Ayne Inst., 290 F. Supp. 2d 553,
563 (E.D. Pa. 2003)).
154
See, e.g., Aldrich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 56 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Mass. 1944)
(“It is difficult to see how any company could carry on an annuity business if the
estate of an annuitant could rescind whenever it turned out that the condition of his
health did not ‘warrant a reasonable expectation of life.’”); Am. State Bank of
Bloomington v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 17 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938);
Woodworth v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
150
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fact that they were mutual mistake cases brought by unknowingly ill
annuitants,155 while STATs involve a unilateral mistake on the insurer’s
part. But the problem with a unilateral mistake argument, again, is the
insurer’s typical decision not to inquire as to the annuitant’s health. The
Restatement of Contracts, for example, holds that the mistake of one party
makes a contract voidable only when the mistaken party does not “bear the
risk of the mistake.”156 It further explains that a party does bear the risk of
a mistake—and thus, is not entitled to rescission—if “he is aware, at the
time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect
to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as
sufficient.”157 An insurer invoking the “meeting of the minds” argument
should be prepared to address these considerations.
In sum, various remedies might be sought from collaborators in
STAT schemes. Insurers may even in some cases be able to establish that
the contracts should be held void for fraud vis-à-vis the annuitant. But if
the annuitant did participate knowingly, or there is not enough evidence to
prove otherwise, rescission of a STAT contract will likely hinge on
whether the insurable interest requirement applies to variable annuities
under applicable state laws.
XII.

CONCLUSION

STAT investors exploit a practical loophole in the variable annuity
product, but it is far from clear whether there exists a legal loophole
making such exploitation lawful. To address the former, insurance
companies should consider whether it still makes business sense to
continue to engage in limited underwriting of annuity applications, and
whether contestability clauses in their annuity contracts should be revised.
With respect to the latter, however, it is not yet clear how legislatures and
courts will address the issue. Insurable interest requirements at common
law and based upon public policy concerns may, depending on the laws of
the pertinent jurisdiction, arguably already prohibited any strangeroriginated contracts that enable the stranger to benefit from the death of
another human being. Insurers may also pursue a number of other
155

Such cases typically involve suits by the annuitant’s estate, seeking to
rescind a policy based on the fact that neither the annuitant nor the insurance
company knew of the annuitant’s failing health. See generally sources cited supra
note 154.
156
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. b (1981).
157
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 introductory cmt. (1981).

147

148

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.1

arguments if considering legal actions against the STAT originators and
agents, but rescission of the annuity contracts will in many cases hinge on
how courts choose to interpret the scope of existing insurable interest laws.

SUPERVISORY COLLEGES: IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL
SUPERVISORY COORDINATION
KELLY KIRBY
***
This article looks at the insurance industry in the context of its role
as a key player in the international financial system. Specifically, how
insurers and regulators alike are working towards a higher level of
cooperation and coordination, both within their own jurisdictions and
beyond, to assure that events such as the 2008 Financial Crisis are never
repeated. The article focuses on the rise of supervisory colleges and
explains the need for states to meaningfully participate in these
international forums which have the potential to identify and eliminate
systemic risk. The benefits as well as the obstacles presented by such a
grand scheme of international supervision are laid out in detail by the
author, who closes by making the case for supervisory colleges as a “step
in the right direction for international regulatory success.”
***
The 2008 Financial Crisis was a devastating wake up to how
institutions, both domestically and internationally, are systemically
connected in ways regulators did not know existed. To prevent a future
breakdown, the United States is working towards identifying risks that are
inherent in those connections, and mitigating potential harm to the financial
system before it occurs. Inextricably tied into this equation are insurance
companies.
In the realm of insurance regulation, there are two trends working
towards the same goal of international coordination and cooperation to
create a more globally sustainable system of supervision. First, there are
the efforts of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”), representing state regulated insurance. The NAIC has created
task groups to address flaws in the United States insurance regulatory
scheme to better identify weaknesses before they escalate into systemic
risks. Second, there is the creation of the Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”),
representing the federal government’s movement into the realm of state
dominated insurance. The FIO has been charged with monitoring all
aspects of the insurance industry to identify gaps in the regulatory regime
that could lead to a systemic financial crisis. In theory, it appears that the
state and federal efforts are near mirror images of each other, but in
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practice, the states still hold the power. In order to keep control of that
power, states and the NAIC are overhauling certain parts of the current
insurance regulatory scheme to ensure that the FIO has no other reason but
to remain an ally.
In particular, the NAIC is encouraging state insurance
commissioners to participate in international forums where supervisors
from across the world come together for the regulation, evaluation, and
investigation of those insurance companies under their jurisdiction that are
part of groups with cross-border operations. These forums are called
supervisory colleges. This paper posits that supervisory colleges are a way
to enhance state based insurance regulation in an increasingly international
environment, but there are several obstacles that must first be addressed,
and several concerns that may never go away.
The discussion will read as follows: Part I will introduce the
relevant NAIC initiatives for improved supervision; Part II will discuss the
controversial new revisions to the Insurance Holding Company System
Model Act that exponentially expand a state commissioner’s access to
information; Part III provides an overview and introduction to supervisory
colleges; Part IV discusses confidentiality amongst participating regulators
in a supervisory college; Part V briefly discusses the potential implications
of the FIO’s covered agreements and preemption powers; Part VI looks at
Connecticut as a case study for recent developments in state involvement
with supervisory colleges and international members; Part VII explains
how the NAIC has facilitated state and foreign participation in supervisory
colleges, as well as other efforts they have made in conjunction with the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors; Part VIII addresses
several obstacles and concerns presented by supervisory colleges; Part IX
thoroughly discusses whether the authority for state insurance
commissioners to participate in supervisory colleges, as well as the
commissioner’s expansion of powers, are within the McCarran-Ferguson
Act’s definition of the ‘business of insurance’; and Part X concludes by
recommending that the efforts taken thus far for state participation in
supervisory colleges be continued in the future.
I.

SOLVENCY MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE:
THE
INCEPTION OF SUPERVISORY COLLEGES TO IMPROVE
GROUP SOLVENCY ISSUES.

The Solvency Modernization Initiative (“SMI”) is a critical selfexamination of the U.S. insurance solvency system by state insurance
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regulators that began in June of 2008. 1 Through SMI the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) is working to identify
potential weaknesses in the current regulatory scheme exposed by the 2008
financial crisis. The NAIC outlined its objectives for SMI in the “Work
Plan,” ranking US solvency framework (the “Framework”), group solvency
issues, capital requirements, international accounting and regulatory
standards, reinsurance, and corporate governance the top issues in need of
attention. 2 Of particular relevance for this examination is the Group
Solvency Issues Working Group (the “GSI Working Group”) and its Draft
Memorandum on Groupwide Supervision (the “Draft Memorandum”), and
the recently adopted amendments (the “Amendments”) to the NAIC’s
Insurance Holding Company System Model Regulatory Act and Regulation
(the “IHCA”).3
Insurers and their holding companies are no longer limited to their
domiciliary states as separate legal entities; rather, they are more akin to
financial enterprises with their operations extending across borders into
multiple jurisdictions. In addition to the issues presented by cross-border
operations, insurance companies are also subjected to cross-sector risks as
part of a larger holding company. The GSI Working Group addresses how
these issues impact U.S. insurers, and how state insurance commissioners
and regulators can best mitigate the attendant risks.
The Draft
Memorandum notes that the U.S. insurance regulatory system has long
operated with a “solo entity” approach to regulation, where focus channels
on the insurer, whereas other jurisdictions have a more consolidated

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Insurance Oversight: Policy Implications for U.S. Consumers, Businesses
and Jobs: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Ins., Hous., and Cmty. Opportunity
of the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 10 (July 28, 2011) (statement of Susan
E. Voss, President, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs) [hereinafter Statement of Susan E.
Voss].
2
Leah Campbell & Tonisha Calbert, Overview of the NAIC’s Solvency
Modernization Initiative, 18 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 20 (June 2010).
3
The SMI Task force of the NAIC charged the GSI Working Group with
“studying the current state of play of US group supervision recommending needed
enhancements to the oversight of U.S. based insurers operating within corporate
groups.” See Memorandum from The Group Solvency Issues (EX) Working Group
to Director Christina Urias, Chair of the Solvency Modernization Initiatives (EX)
Task Force 1 (Feb. 26, 2010) (regarding: “Report to Solvency Modernization
Initiative (EX) Task Force on Suggested “Windows and Walls” Approach for
Regulation of United States Based Insurers Operating within Corporate Groups)
[hereinafter Draft Memorandum].
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approach to regulation, with focus on the entire holding company system.4
The GSI Working Group’s examination adopts an approach more
analogous to the latter, investigating how the enterprise group’s risks as a
whole could potentially affect the insurance companies that operate under
the group’s direction.
To enhance group supervision, the Draft Memorandum suggests
using a “windows and walls” approach to “provid[e] a window into group
operations, while building upon, rather than rejecting, the existing walls
which provide solvency protection to U.S. insurers.”5 In general, windows
are regulatory enhancements that will strengthen review and access to
group affiliate information, increase cooperation between regulatory
jurisdictions, expand group financial assessment, and improve standards
across regulatory jurisdictions.6 Participation in supervisory colleges for
internationally active groups fall under these ‘windows.” 7 More
specifically, a selection of regulatory “windows” suggested by the Draft
Memorandum includes: state coordination on a national basis for sharing
confidential information with international regulators, a “proactive
confidential communication” approach in crisis situations between state
regulators and international supervisors,8 access to meaningful information
about unregulated entities, which include non-operating holding
companies, 9 and a “panoramic” view of group capital. 10 Former NAIC

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1. The Draft Memorandum goes
on to explain that in some cases, the U.S. regulatory scheme could perhaps more
accurately be described as “solo plus.” Id. For instance, the U.S. supervisory
regime employs a “lead” state concept for when two or more insurers that operate
within a single group are domiciled in two separate states. Id.
5
See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. The goal of the “windows and
walls” approach is to “provide much needed breadth and scope enhancements to
solvency regulation while retaining the highest level of policyholder protection that
exists currently.” Id.
6
See Solvency Modernization in the Spotlight, NAIC UPDATE 3, Deloitte LLP,
(Spring 2010); See also Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2-3.
7
See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. The GSI Working Group
believes supervisory colleges to be, “the best optics . . . to be used to navigate
through any potential financial crisis.” Id.
8
The Draft Memorandum suggests an enhanced “Master MoU” as the
mechanism to use when communication must be elevated to a higher standard. See
Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
9
The Draft Memorandum suggests that the U.S. group solvency structure
should enhance “broader access to information upstream and with regard to all
holding company groups with regulated insurance entities and all affiliates in all
tributaries.” Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
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President Susan Voss emphasized the importance of the GSI Working
Group’s objectives when she reflected on the organization’s experience
with insurance companies and their holding entities, affirming that it “is not
enough to focus solely on transactions with insurance companies.”11 Voss
suggested that the insurance industry needed “to look through our
“windows” and understand the contagions that could impact insurers,” but
to maintain “an appreciation of the “walls” in place when examining
material exchanges between the insurers and other parts of the group” in
order to safeguard the assets supporting policyholder obligations.12
II.

THE AMENDMENTS TO THE INSURANCE HOLDING
COMPANY SYSTEM REGULATORY
ACT
AND
REGULATION CHANGE THE PLAYING FIELD FOR STATE
INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS

Supervisory colleges are authorized under the NAIC’s December
2011 Amendments to the IHCA Model Act (the “Amended Model Act”),
the model statute governing control over and acquisitions of insurance
companies. 13 Generally, the Amendments strengthen a state insurance
commissioner’s access to information so that he may better regulate group
financial strength. They affect a greater sharing of regulatory information
among states and countries where the affiliates of an insurer conduct
business, with the parent company’s central place of business designated as
the lead regulatory authority. More specifically, the Amendments
authorize multi-state coordination of regulatory filings, authorize insurance
commissioners’ participation in supervisory colleges, strengthen regulators’
access to group affiliate information, and provide for the assessment of
group financial strength upon initial application for control of a U.S.
insurer.14
The implementation of supervisory colleges would not take away
any of the state insurance commissioner’s power to regulate and supervise
the insurers or their affiliates within its jurisdiction—on the contrary, it
would afford them more power than they previously had before the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3.
See Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 8.!
12
See id.
13
NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGS., AND GUIDELINES:
INS. HOLDING CO. SYS. REGULATORY ACT § 7 (2011) [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
14
Id. §§ 6-7. See, e.g., Campbell & Calbert, supra note 2, for a succinct
summary of the Amendments.
11
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Amendments to the IHCA. The Amendments provide for an insurance
regulator, and in particular, a state insurance commissioner, to participate
in a supervisory college with other regulators in order to better supervisor a
domestic insurer that is part of a group with international operations, and to
ensure the insurer is in compliance with the state code.15
Additionally, the Amendments make weighty changes to the ways
in which state commissioners are empowered to oversee and examine not
only domestic insurers, but also the insurer’s holding company and its
affiliates outside the commissioner’s jurisdiction.16 To facilitate the best
use of these new powers, the Amendments provide for a state insurance
commissioner’s participation in Supervisory Colleges to enhance the
regulation of insurers that are part of an insurance holding company system
with international operations. The hope is that examination of the entire
group’s operations will enhance the commissioner’s ability to ascertain the
potential enterprise risks posed by the holding company system and
affiliates to the domestic insurer. These changes can primarily be found in
Sections 6 and 7 of the Amended Model Act.
First, Section 6 addresses the insurance commissioner’s powers to
obtain the information necessary to best examine an insurer. Section 6A
grants state insurance commissioners the authority to examine insurancecompany affiliates to “ascertain the financial condition of the insurer,
including the enterprise risk to the insurer by the ultimate controlling party,
or by any entity or combination of entities within the insurance holding
company system . . . .”17 “Affiliate” is defined in Section 1A of the Model
Act to mean, “a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15

MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 7; For a discussion of the Amendments, see
Memorandum from Debevoise & Plimpton LLP to Clients, DEBEVOISE &
PLIMPTON LLP (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.debevoise.com/files/
Publication/a096850b-2e74-40c1-a497-fbbca9cdce5c/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/d4fdb451-ac27-46fa-9906-2012904fabc4/NAIC2011SpringNational
Meeting.pdf; Daniel A. Rabinowitz, NAIC Approval of “Supervisory College”
Leaves Key Implementation Issues Unresolved, 5 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—
INSURANCE LAW (2011), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/
Publication/b0bfb51a-ff95-4b41-ba76-cfa397b83f16/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/19c14f19-e13c-4b4f-b2e4-da0bf56a7420/Rabinowitz_
BloombergArticle_April11.pdf.
16
MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 6; see also, Rabinowitz, supra note 15
(discussing state insurance commissioner’s expansion of powers).
17
Id. § 6A.
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with, the person specified.”18 Additionally, “enterprise risk” is defined in
Section 1F of the Model Act to mean, “any activity, circumstance, event or
series of events involving one or more affiliates of an insurer that, if not
remedied promptly, is likely to have a material adverse effect upon the
financial condition or liquidity of the insurer or its insurance holding
company system as a whole.”19
Section 6B explains how the commissioner may gain access to this
necessary information for examination.
Under Section 6B(1), the
commission may order any insurer to, “produce such records, books, or
other information papers in the possession of the insurer or its affiliates as
are reasonably necessary to determine compliance.”20 If the commissioner
deems such information necessary to determine compliance with the act,
Section 6B(2) describes the procedure for obtaining information not in
possession of the insurer.21 The commissioner may order an insurer to,
“obtain access to such information pursuant to contractual relationships,
statutory obligations, or other method.”22 In the event that an insurer does
not comply, or cannot obtain the requested information, the insurer must
provide to the commissioner a detailed explanation of its reasons for
failure.23 The commissioner may then use his own discretion to determine
whether the explanation is compelling, or whether it is without merit.
Upon finding the explanation is without merit, after notice and hearing, the
commissioner may then charge the insurer who failed to provide the
information a penalty for each day of delay, or suspend or revoke the
insurer’s license.
Section 6E further extends how a commissioner may deal with an
insurer that fails to produce documents, by providing the power, “to
examine the affiliates to obtain the information,” and “to issue subpoenas,
to administer oaths, and to examine under oath any person for purposes of
determining compliance with this section.” 24 Failure to comply with a
subpoena is punishable as contempt of court.25
These changes are significant because prior to the Amendments the
commissioner’s authority was considerably more restricted.
A
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Id. § 1A.
Id. § 1F.
20
Id. § 6B(1).
21
Id. § 6B(2).
22
MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 6B(2).
23
See id. § 6B(2).
24
Id. § 6E (emphasis added).
25
See Id.
19
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commissioner could only examine an insurer’s affiliates in the limited
situations where, “the regulator had ordered the insurer to produce copies
of books and records that were ‘reasonably’ necessary in order to determine
compliance with laws, and [where] the insurer had failed to comply with
such order.” 26 The Amended Model Act “extend[s] the extra-territorial
reach of state insurance regulators to examine and control insurance
holding companies and insurers beyond their state borders.”27
Second, Section 7 provides for a state insurance commissioner’s
participation in supervisory colleges. Under Section 7A of the Model Act,
the Commissioner is granted, “the power to participate in a supervisory
college for any domestic insurer that is part of an insurance holding
company system with international operations in order to determine
compliance by the insurer with this Chapter.”28
Section 7C further clarifies what the commissioner’s participation
in the college will entail. This section provides that the commissioner may
participate in a supervisory college “with other regulators” to assess the
“business strategy, financial position, legal and regulatory position, risk
exposure, risk management and governance process” as part of his
examination process of individual insurers in accordance with Section 6.29
“Other regulators” include those other “state, federal and international
regulatory agencies,” responsible for the supervision of the insurer and its
affiliates.30 Section 7C also gives the commissioner the power to enter into
agreements with other jurisdictions’ regulators to ensure cooperation, as
long as those agreements are consistent with the confidentiality
requirements provided in Section 831 of the Model Act.32
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Rabinowitz, supra note 15 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MODEL
LAWS, REGS., AND GUIDELINES: INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM
REGULATORY ACT § 440-1 (1993)).
27
Mary Jane Wilson-Bilk et al., United States: NAIC Proposes Expansive New
Governance, Risk Management and Reporting Duties on Insurance Holding
Company Systems; A New Liability Profile Emerges for Directors and Senior
Management, SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP 1 (July 26, 2010),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=105416
(discussing
development of the Amendments).
28
MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 7A.
29
Id. § 7C.
30
Id.!
31
Id. § 8 (discussing confidential treatment of information obtained by the
commissioner in the course of an examination).!
32
Id. § 7C.!
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Additional Amendments of interest include the requirement that a
holding company report its Enterprise Risk at least annually on the newly
created “Form F.”33 Form F, originally discussed as a supplement to Form
B, requires the ultimate controlling person of an insurer to file an annual
report with the state commissioner, identifying material risks within the
holding company system that could pose financial and/or reputational
“contagion” to the insurer. 34 The form outlines ten areas of a holding
company’s operations which could potentially pose Enterprise Risk to an
insurer, including items such as: business plans of the insurance holding
company for the next twelve months, identification of material concerns of
holding company raised by supervisory colleges, and identification of any
negative movement with rating agencies.35
Section 8A, Confidential Treatment, of the Amended Model Act
authorizes the commissioner to use the “documents, materials or other
information in the furtherance of any regulatory or legal action brought as
part of the commissioner’s official duties. The information contained in
Form F would fall under this description. As such, the commissioner
would be within his boundaries to share such information with members of
a supervisory college, including foreign regulators. 36 To ensure
compliance with all the adopted revisions, it is likely the NAIC will modify
their current accreditation standards to guarantee State implementation of
the changes into their respective insurance holding company acts.
III.

INTRODUCTION TO AN OVERVIEW OF SUPERVISORY
COLLEGES

Succinctly put, “supervisory colleges are groups of regulators from
different countries that work together to oversee large cross-border
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Anthony Roehl, NAIC Adopts Revised Holding Company System Model Act
Requiring Enterprise Risk Disclosure, MORRIS MANNING & MARTIN LLP (Mar.
23, 2011), http://www.mmmlaw.com/media-room/publications/newsletter/ naicadopts-revised-holding-company-system-model-act-requiring-enterprise-riskdisclosure. !
34
Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 7 (discussing the Enterprise Risk
Report in its preliminary context of the “Annual Report”). The Annual Report
would have been a supplement to the existing Form B, but instead was made into
its own Form F. Id.; see also Roehl, supra note 33.!
35
See Roehl, supra note 33; see also Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, for a
discussion of the Form F development.!
36
Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 8.!
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financial organizations.”37 They are not decision-making bodies; rather,
they are designed to share prudential information about cross-border
institutions.38 Supervisory colleges are also meant to supervise companies
at the group level, rather than legal entity level.39
Supervisory colleges serve to provide a forum that facilitates a
more comprehensive view of “all the activities of a multi-faceted, multijurisdictional enterprise that could present a systemic risk to the individual
enterprise and the financial system as a whole.40 They purport to act as a
further element of an international framework for group-wide supervision,
and function to provide a permanent forum for cooperation and
communication between its involved members.41 Furthermore, supervisory
colleges operate as a mechanism to develop cooperation and exchange of
information among involved supervisors,42 and to coordinate supervisory
activities on a group-wide scale under both baseline and worst-case
scenarios.43
Proponents of supervisory colleges emphasize the numerous
potential benefits the forums could bring to the insurance industry.
Supervisory colleges would enhance supervisory cooperation and
coordination of internationally active groups by providing a uniform forum
for crisis management, 44 help to close regulatory gaps, and increase
information flow between home and host supervisors.45 As opposed to a
temporary committee that is organized for a unique purpose in response to
a crisis, supervisory colleges are flexible and permanent, enhancing
cooperation and coordination among supervisory authorities.46 They would
assist in avoiding redundant work because of the expanded coordination
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Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 9. !
38

Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and
Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57,
78 (2010). !
39
Rabinowitz, supra note 15.!
40
Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 9.!
41
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, Guidance
Paper on the Use of Supervisory Colleges in Group-Wide Supervision, Guidance
Paper No. 3.8, § 1, ¶ 14 (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter IAIS Guidance Paper]. !
42
Id.!
43
Id. § 5.3, ¶ 62-72.!
44
Id. § 5.3.!
45
Id. § 5.1, ¶ 38; see also id. § 5.3, ¶ 63.!
46
Id. § 4, ¶ 34.!
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and communication, and would help to maintain the necessary levels of
protection for policyholders.47
Supervisory colleges are also designed to contribute to the stability
of financial markets overall.48 Aggregated information may help to shed
light on systemic risks that would not have been identified with an
individual entity analysis. In particular, a supervisory college may be able
to consider the impact of a particular group on the insurance industry, on
other sectors of an economy, as well as any systemic risks the group may
present.49 Additionally, a supervisory college would facilitate information
collection and analysis at the group level, including the compilation and
analysis of information available on risk exposures, financial soundness,
and governance of group entities.50 This creates a forum for the insurer to
provide clarity to the supervisors, with respect to its operations and
strategy, at a group-wide, as opposed to an individual entity, level.51
The concept of supervisory colleges within the insurance sector is
not entirely unique.
Europe has employed similar concepts with
coordinating committees and the United States has a process in place for
supervisory cooperation across its state based regulation system. 52 In
particular, the European Union has utilized colleges to supervise financial
institutions operating in multiple Member States.53
Supervisory colleges would not replace entity level supervision;
rather they would supplement that solo level supervision of single entities
within a group, by using the exchange of information to coordinate
supervisory activities on a group-wide basis.54 Effectively, the operation of
a supervisory college is based on mutual trust and confidence among the
involved supervisors. 55 Functionally, supervisory colleges will work
differently depending upon the circumstances of the group and the
jurisdiction in which the group operates.56
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IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.3.!
48
Id. § 2.2, ¶ 28; § 5.2, ¶ 57.!
49
Id. § 5.1, ¶ 42, § 5.2, ¶ 57.!
50
Id. § 5.1, ¶ 42.!
51
Id. § 5.2, ¶ 60.!
52
Id. §1, ¶ 17.!
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See generally Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389 (2006).!
54
IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 2.1, ¶ 19-21.!
55
Id. § 2.2, ¶ 25.!
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Id. § 5.1, ¶ 46.!
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Supervisory colleges will be particularly useful because, as the
IAIS guidance paper on the use of the colleges points out, “[t]here is a high
level of divergence in the insurance industry regarding the nature of
organisations [sic], the nature of regulation and supervision, and the
development of markets and supervisory regimes in different
jurisdictions.” 57 Supervisory colleges are strongly recommended for
insurance groups that operate in multiple jurisdictions.58 More specifically,
they are necessary where: “significant cross-border activities and/or intragroup transactions are conducted”;59 “effective group-wide supervision is
essential to the protection of policyholders”;60 and, “effective group-wide
supervision is essential to the financial stability of the market as a whole.”61
IV.

THE
DISSEMINATION
OF
INFORMATION
IN
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH
THE APPLICABLE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENTS

A major concern with the use of supervisory colleges is ensuring
that the dissemination of information is consistent with the applicable
confidentiality requirements. It will be the group-wide supervisor’s role to
gather the relevant information, but it will also be his role to disseminate
that information in accordance with the pertinent confidentiality
agreements.62 Because there is no global law or regulation on confidential
information, this responsibility to handle sensitive information
appropriately will fall solely to the individual supervisor and the college.63
Section 8 of the Amended Model Act discusses how a
commissioner may use confidential documents, obtained in the
examination process of an insurer, to assist in the performance of his
duties. Amongst the included parties with which the commissioner may
share this information, are members of a supervisory college. The section
states that a commissioner, “may share documents, materials or other
information, including the confidential and privileged documents, materials
or information . . . with other state, federal and international regulatory
agencies . . . including members of any supervisory college described in
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Id. § 6.1, ¶ 74.!
58
Id. § 6.1, ¶ 75.!
59
Id.!
60
IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 6.1, ¶ 75.!
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Id.!
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Id. § 4, ¶ 36.!
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Id. § 6.2, ¶ 102.!
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Section 7, provided that the recipient agrees in writing to maintain the
confidentiality and privileged status of the document.” 64 As previously
discussed, Section 6 of the Amended Model Act provides for a
commissioner to gain access to extensive information from both an insurer
and its affiliates as long as he deems it required for an accurate
examination.65
These confidentiality agreements should touch upon when and
what information can be disclosed to third parties and the insurance
group. 66 Pertinent parties could include local supervisory/regulatory
bodies, international organizations, or the public where appropriate. 67
Agreements should also lay out any differences in the confidentiality
requirements of information sharing during a normal basis, and sharing
during a crisis situation.
Despite the college’s reliance on supervisors laying all known
information on the table, in certain circumstance, a “’need to know’ basis”
for information sharing may be appropriate. 68 Such restrictions would
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MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 8C(1) (additionally providing that the
recipient of such information in a supervisory college has “verified in writing the
legal authority to maintain confidentiality”).!
65
Id. § 6.!
66
The Basel Committee’s Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges,
recommends what to do before passing confidential information received from a
fellow supervisor to a third part with a legitimate interest, as well as what to do in
the event that a supervisor is legally compelled to disclose such information. Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Good Practice Principles on Supervisory
Colleges (Oct. 2010), at 22. First, in the event of a legitimate third party request
for confidential information, the Basel Committee recommends that, “[p]rior to
passing information to the third party, the recipient should consult with and seek
agreement from the supervisor that originated the information, who may attach
conditions to the release of information, including whether the intended additional
recipient is or can be bound to hold the information confidential.” Id. Second, in
the event that a supervisor is legally compelled to disclose information obtained
confidentially to a third party, including a third party supervisory authority, the
Basel Committee recommends that, “information that has been provided in
accordance with a statement of mutual cooperation, [the supervisor that has been
legally compelled to disclose] should promptly notify the supervisor that originated
the information, indicating what information it is compelled to release and the
circumstances surrounding its release.” Id. In all instances, the supervisor
disclosing the information should use his best efforts to maintain the
confidentiality of the information to the extent permitted by law. Id. !
67
IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.3, ¶ 73.!
68
Id. § 5.3, ¶ 65.!
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likely be dictated in previously drafted confidentiality agreements to avoid
unintended turmoil. For instance, during a crisis, the premise of
widespread information may need to be limited to ensure timely responses.
The timing and content of information to be disclosed to third
parties must also be deliberated carefully. Group-wide supervisors may
find it wise to establish appropriate contacts with other sector participants,
but they must consider their existing relationships within the college, and
weigh these relationships against the potential value of the information
additional new members may be able to provide.69
Members must also be aware of any existing legal or jurisdictional
restraints. Supervisory colleges do not override the various individual
jurisdiction’s’ legal responsibilities or standing supervisory relationships.70
Where there are legal constraints to information sharing in a particular
jurisdiction, supervisors looking to participate in the college should address
these constraints to maintain the effectiveness of the college.71 Ultimately,
a supervisory college will need to safeguard against any plan going beyond
the authority of a supervisor, or surpassing any jurisdiction’s existing legal
framework.72
An alternative method of confidentiality to a traditional
confidentiality agreement is a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoUs”).
MoUs are information sharing agreements that ensure confidentiality and
define the parameters in which information can be used.73 They are formal
statements of mutual cooperation that outline procedures and provisions for
confidentiality.74 A MoU should recognize that information must be shared
between the relevant authorities in two countries in order to facilitate
effective consolidated supervision of institutions that operate across their
national borders.75
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Id. § 4, ¶ 37.!
70
Id. § 5.1, ¶ 40.!
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Id. § 6.1, ¶ 77.!
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Id. § 6.2, ¶ 80.!
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IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.2, ¶ 54.!
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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 66, at 20. The
publication further emphasizes that MoUs must be underpinned by, “trust and a
network of relationships that are required for effective information sharing,
particularly where confidential information is concerned.” Id.!
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Additionally the MoU between the two countries should recognize the
practice of information sharing in order to facilitate “solo supervision of group
entities in the host jurisdiction.” Id. The Basel Committee identified information
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Jurisdictions that are part of the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on
Cooperation an Information Exchange (“IAIS MMoU”) are required to
have their legislative regimes assessed to ensure strict confidentiality
requirements are met as a precondition for joint supervisory activity.76 If
each member of the supervisory college were a part of the IAIS MMoU,
there would be no need for individual bilateral MoUs between the
members.77 The IAIS MMoU allows regulators in different countries to
work together in overseeing insurers, and it has 17 jurisdictions—though
currently none are US regulators.78 A subgroup of the NAIC’s SMI Task
Force working on the issue of supervisory colleges was given the task of
surveying state laws to better see if states could participate in the IAIS
MMoU.79
V.

THE FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE’S AUTHORIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN COVERED
AGREEMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR PREEMPTION
OF STATE LAWS

The Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) Act authorizes the United
States to jointly negotiate and enter into Covered Agreements with foreign
governments, authorities, or regulatory bodies, and once entered into,
authorizes the FIO to preempt a state insurance measure that conflicts with
the Covered Agreement.80 A Covered Agreement is defined by the Act to
be “a written bilateral or multilateral agreement regarding prudential
measures with respect to the business of insurance,” entered into between
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supervision of ongoing activities and during the handling of problem institutions.”
Id.!
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IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.2, ¶ 54.!
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Id. § 6.2, ¶ 103.!
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Matthew Sturdevant, Connecticut Insurance Regulators Join Forces With
Swiss
Counterparts,
HARTFORD
COURANT
(Sept.
23,
2011),
http://blogs.courant.com/connecticut_insurance/2011/09/connecticut-insuranceregulato-1.html. !
79
NAIC Pursues International Agenda, NAIC UPDATE (Deloitte LLP), Spring
2010, at 7.!
80
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 502, 124 Stat. 1376, 1587 (2010). A “state insurance measure” is
defined by the Act to include “any State law, regulation, administrative ruling,
bulletin, guideline or practice relating to or affecting prudential measures
applicable to insurance or reinsurance.” Id.!
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the United States and a foreign entity that relates to the business of
insurance in order to achieve a level of protection “substantially
equivalent” to that received under State regulation. 81 This means that the
covered agreement must effectuate at least the same level of protection for
insurance consumers as they receive under state regulation. 82 This
preemption provision is awakened when a state measure is inconsistent
with a Covered Agreement, and produces less favorable treatment for a
non-U.S. insurer whose domiciliary jurisdiction is party to the
Agreement.83
Imagine a situation where a state joins a supervisory college with a
non-U.S. member, and that state shares confidential information with the
foreign entity. If that foreign entity were to share that information with its
government, and that foreign government were to decide it did not like
what it saw, it could potentially used the information obtained from the
supervisory college as leverage to wrangle the U.S. into a Covered
Agreement that afforded the foreign government’s insurers more
protection/similar treatment by a state that was previously afforded.
Presented with this new information, the U.S. government may feel
pressured into a Covered Agreement. This may not be a bad thing, and the
scenario is grossly obscure and unspecific, but should it be decided that the
state measure now violates the new Covered Agreement and must be
preempted, the state may be worse off than it was before participating in,
and sharing information with, the supervisory college. The chances of this
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Id. More specifically, the covered agreement may be entered into between
the United States and “one or more foreign governments, authorities, or regulatory
entities.” Id. Additionally, the agreement must employ “prudential measures” in
achieving said level of protection for insurance consumers. Id.!
82
The phrase “substantially equivalent to the level of protection achieved” is
defined by the Act to mean that, “the prudential measures of a foreign government,
authority, or regulatory entity achieve a similar outcome in consumer protection as
the outcome achieved under State insurance or reinsurance regulation.” § 502, 124
Stat. at 1587. See e.g., Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 7. Voss
additionally pointed out that the FIO does not have general supervisory or
regulatory authority over the business of insurance, but that the NAIC was willing
to work with the FIO in terms of suggestions for improvements. Id. at 7-8.!
83
§ 502, 124 Stat. at 1583 (“A State insurance measure shall be preempted
pursuant to this section or section 314 if . . . the measure—(A) results in less
favorable treatment of a non-United States insurer domiciled in a foreign
jurisdiction that is subject to a covered agreement than a United States insurer
domiciled, licensed, or otherwise admitted in that State; and (B) is inconsistent
with a covered agreement.”).!
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happening, if at all, are most likely few and far between, but states should
be aware of the potential consequences that the FIO’s preemption provision
could have, when it is examined in conjunction with the role of foreign
governments and their possible access to confidential information through
supervisory colleges.
VI.

CONNECTICUT AS A CASE STUDY FOR RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH
SUPERVISORY
COLLEGES
AND
INTERNATIONAL
MEMBERS

Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Thomas B. Leonardi has
been a proponent of the proposals recommended by the NAIC for the
Amended Model Act since his appointment in February 2011. According
to Commissioner Leonardi, “The model Holding Company Act would
allow everyone to come to the table together, share information in a unique
way, and would inevitably lead to more collaboration and cooperation in
the insurance market.”84
Although Connecticut has not yet officially adopted the changes
into its insurance holding company system act, the state has made several
moves towards international coordination and supervision. A recent
agreement between the Connecticut Insurance Department and the Swiss
Financial Supervisory Authority provides for both parties to work together
to regulate insurers. 85 The Connecticut Courant reported that, “A
memorandum of understanding between the two is the formal basis for
cooperation and coordination, including investigative assistance and the
exchange of information, [according to] Donna Tommelleo, the insurance
The Courant additionally reported
department's spokeswoman.” 86
statements by Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Leonardi saying that:
“‘The insurance industry is an international one and continues to expand its
global reach . . . . Regulating it cannot stop at the border and must be
looked at in its totality. This commitment will allow Connecticut and
Swiss regulators to work effectively together and ensure market stability
for consumer protection.’”87
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Pullman & Comley LLC, A Conversation With Connecticut’s New
Insurance Commissioner Thomas B. Leonardi, CT INS. LAW UPDATE, 2,
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Connecticut also has an agreement already in place with De
Nederlandsche Bank in the Netherlands which is similar to the one between
the state and Switzerland.88 In addition to Switzerland and the Netherlands,
Connecticut has a third agreement pending with the Germany Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority (“BaFin”).89 The agreements with these
countries in particular were pursued because Swiss Re and Munich Re are
examples of companies that have a presence in Europe and Connecticut.90
Furthermore, Connecticut’s Insurance Department is one of at least two
states that have applied to be a part of the IAIS MMoU on Cooperation and
Information Exchange.91
VII.

THE NAIC’S FACILITATION OF US AND INTERNATIONAL
REGULATOR
PARTICIPATION
IN
SUPERVISORY
COLLEGES, AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
INSURANCE
SECTOR
WORKING
TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Within the last year the NAIC took serious steps to facilitate states
participation in supervisory colleges. The NAIC recently created an online
form that allows international regulators to request a particular State’s
participation in an international supervisory college.92 The “International
Supervisory Colleges Request Form” is submitted to the insurance group’s
appropriate leader and/or domestic supervisor who in turn will contact the
international regulator directly.93
Former NAIC President Susan E. Voss, is quoted on the NAIC
website as saying,
U.S. insurance regulators recognize the important
role supervisory colleges can play in providing a
forum
to
foster
improved
international
communication and coordination regarding the
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and Information Exchange supra p. 163.!
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oversight of significant global insurance operations
. . . . We hope this web-based tool will aid
international regulators to promptly notify the
appropriate U.S. state insurance regulators
regarding a particular supervisory college and
secure the appropriate representation.94
Furthermore, supervisory colleges are not the only way the NAIC and the
IAIS are working towards international supervisory coordination. There
are two other significant solutions worth mentioning: one, the Supervisory
Forum; and two, the “Common Framework for the Supervision of
Internationally Active Insurance Groups” (“ComFrame”). The NAIC
chairs the Supervisory Forum at the IAIS.95 In addition to the increased use
of supervisory colleges, state regulators are advocating the use of the
Supervisory Forum to improve coordination. 96 Former NAIC President
Susan E. Voss described the objective of the Supervisory Forum as a way
“to strengthen the effectiveness of insurance supervision and to foster
convergence of supervisory practices through the exchange of real-world
experiences.”97
First proposed by the IAIS,98 ComFrame lays out how supervisors
around the globe can work together to supervise internationally active
insurance groups.99 The GSI Working Group is aiding in this project by
providing its own insight on how to identify internationally active
insurance groups, and how to resolve jurisdictional issues.100 Participation
in the development of ComFrame is an effective way for the GSI Working
Group to further its original task to find a method of supervision that will
allow state insurance regulators to monitor the combined capital adequacy
of all entities within an insurance holding company system, including
internationally active insurers.101
There has been some concern that ComFrame would not be
consistent with NAIC principles of state autonomy. The GSI Working
Group responded to this concern by stating that, “given the uniqueness and
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complexity of large insurance group issues, ComFrame should focus on
general principles and high-level concepts, rather than specific compliance
issues and capital requirements that more likely would be a source of
conflict.” 102 Former NAIC President, Susan Voss, further characterized
ComFrame as a “multijurisdictional” approach to supervision. 103 She
stated that, “If done right, ComFrame has the potential to create a
multijurisdictional approach to supervision that emphasizes robust
oversight and cooperation while maintaining the proper balance between
home and host jurisdictions.”104
VIII.

POTENTIAL OBSTACLES AND CONCERNS PRESENTED BY
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES

The design of a supervisory college turns on the assumption that all
regulators will have the goal of group solvency and stability above all in
mind. This may not be the case. Each individual regulator may be more
focused on his own relevant market or sector in his own country or state.105
In addition to a lack of consistency between regulator’s jurisdictional goals,
there may also be an inconsistency within groups themselves. Entity-level
risks vary within a group, and regulators may not agree on how each
individual entity should be treated.106 These differing objectives can be
illustrated through how different regulators “in favor” of different entities
within a group, may want to treat the group’s liquidity differently. Imagine
a scenario where a U.S.-based insurance company is owned by a foreign
entity. In this case, it is possible that the state insurance regulator will most
want to keep capital with the insurer, while the foreign holding company
regulator will want it to flow up as dividends. 107 These inter-affiliate
dividends are a potential “zero-sum” problem that could arise in a
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Id. at 4-5 (explaining the GSI Working Group’s response to such concerns);
Susan Voss expressed a similar sentiment on ComFrame’s limited purpose, when
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supervisory college,108 and impede on the ultimate success of coordination
and cooperation.
Supplemental to the above concern, is the potential for weakness
due to a supervisory college’s strong reliance on supervisor cooperation
and trust. Because there is no mandatory mediation process to resolve
supervisor disagreement on an action, supervisors are still legally free act
on their own and not in coordination with their peers.109 It is not a farfetched argument to make that supervisors will first strive to protect their
national interest, and the rights of the residents within their jurisdiction,
before conceding to compromises that may not be in their jurisdiction’s
best interest. This focus could cause inconsistencies in resolutions if
individual supervisors do not approach issues with the college’s end goals
in mind.
An additional concern is that the decision-making schemes for
supervisory colleges are not consistent with the NAIC. In particular, there
is concern that international supervisors may be more accustomed to one
lead supervisor making the decisions, whereas the NAIC fosters a system
of “consensus” decision-making. 110 The GSI Working Group has
responded to such a concern by addressing the role of the “group
supervisor” of a supervisory college, and affirming that such supervisor
will primarily have a coordinating, rather than decision-making function.111
It has already been stressed that in recent years, international
coordination has been an essential goal for the NAIC. Each project,
solution, and suggestion the NAIC has proposed was ultimately made with
the U.S. and global insurance industry’s success in mind; however, it
should be noted that opening doors in one area could leave potential holes
in another. With this in mind, another potential concern resides in the
NAIC’s recently adopted “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Model
Act” (“ORSA”) that requires an insurance company, or insurance group, to
produce a self-risk assessment report that must be filed with the insurer’s
state insurance commissioner. 112

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108

Id.
IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.1, ¶ 40.
110
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, supra note 15, at 5.
111
Id.
112
On September 12, 2012, the NAIC adopted the Draft version of the Model
Act with some minor changes. The heart of ORSA, the “ORSA Summary Report,”
is detailed in Section 5 of the Model Act. It reads as follows: “[u]pon the
commissioner’s request, and no more than once each year, an insurer shall submit
to the commissioner an ORSA Summary Report or any combination of reports that
together contain the information described in the ORSA Guidance Manual,
109

!

170

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 19.1

Several concerns were raised at the NAIC’s Spring 2011 meeting
in regards to the proposed U.S. “ORSA” plan. One concern addressed
confidentiality issues in particular, pointing out that information requested
by the ORSA would have the potential to expose a company’s competitive
advantage because the document would contain models that included
competitively sensitive and forward-looking information. 113 Should the
ORSA reports ever be shared within a supervisory college in the future, this
concern would literally be projected onto an international level. When
considering whether to allow an ORSA report to be shared and discussed in
a supervisory college, the benefit of potentially exposing a risk through a
window into an insurance company’s capital levels in light of its unique
business strategy would have to be carefully weighed against the detriment
if such valuable information were to be abused. However, this does not
seem to be a major concern of the NAIC.
Section 8 of the ORSA Model Act discusses confidentiality, but
not without many opportunities for sharing. After initially addressing that
all information collected by commissioners will be recognized as being
proprietary and to contain trade secrets, subsection A provides a caveat for
disclosure: “However, the commissioner is authorized to use the
documents, materials or other information in the furtherance of any
regulatory or legal action brought as a part of the commissioner’s official
duties.”114 Subsection C(1) extrapolates the commissioner’s ability to share
information in order to assist the commissioner in the performance of his
regulatory duties, and specifically addresses a commissioner’s ability to
share such confidential information within a supervisory college.115 With
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applicable to the insurer and/or the insurance group of which it is a member.
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this allowance for sharing, the NAIC is likely predicting scenarios where
the ORSA Report becomes a substantial part of the Commissioner’s
evaluative and investigatory process when evaluating an insurance
company that is within its jurisdiction. Section 8 further expands the
commissioner’s ability to share ORSA-related confidential information in
supervisory colleges by including the complementary subsection C(2),
which provides for a commissioner’s ability to also receive confidential,
ORSA-related materials while participating in a supervisory college
forum.116
Abuse of confidential information obtained through ORSA-related
materials may not manifest in a typical breach; however, members of a
supervisory college may become privy to sensitive information that could
alter their personal opinions as to whether they would choose to do
business with a particular insurer in the future after gaining access to a
report that literally outlines the company’s greatest risks. The NAIC may
implement endless provisions to ensure that the confidential nature of an
ORSA Summary Report is legally upheld, but it would be impossible to
control how such information could potentially influence each individual’s
private judgments. Despite group discussions within the forum, whether
disclosure of a particular insurer’s risks actually warrants such trepidation
in future dealings will be a matter each member alone will ultimately
decide.
Yet another concern lies with the Form A. Supervisory colleges’
influences on Form A are yet to be determined. All acquisitions of
insurance companies are subject to prior approval via submission of the
Form A under the IHCA. Where a state regulator normally feels neutral
towards an acquisition as long as the transaction does not affect
policyholder protection or insurer solvency, other interested parties might
have a more biased view of controversial terms, like the purchase price.117
This could potentially pose a problem if the domiciliary regulator is part of
a supervisory college with these other interested parties. For instance, the
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group that is selling its insurance entity will want to be sure that the
purchase price is fair, and likely, is a smart deal. As such, the regulator
representing the interests of this holding company may feel more inclined
to frame the situation to the state commissioner in a light more favorable to
the holding company. 118 This could pose problems in the form of
unnecessary complexity during the Form A proceedings, as well as
misguided decisions by state commissioners receiving biased advice.
Issues with inter-collegiate influence could cause problems of its
own if the regulatory community decides to ostracize a particular
commissioner that does not heed ill-motivated advice. If a domestic
regulator proposed that the supervisory college was treating one of his
domestic insurers too aggressively, they could run the risk of effectively
excluding themselves from discussions henceforth. Furthermore, conflict
at this level has the potential to affect not only the commissioner’s personal
status in the college, but also his domestic insurers if his fellow regulators
choose to collectively lash out as a punishment. It is worth re-mentioning
that participants in these colleges represent supervisors and regulators from
jurisdictions across borders, as well as jurisdictions across sectors. How
each participant is connected with one another is likely to be incestual at
times, and these relationships could just as easily be exploited in a negative
manner as they could be used to the college’s advantage. Regulators are
people, and congruency between people—especially those who don’t
choose to work together—is not a guarantee.

IX.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER SUPERVISORY COLLEGES ARE
OUTSIDE ‘BUSINESS OF INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED IN THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
THE ‘BUSINESS OF INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED IN THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

A.

There are potential legal challenges that arise with the new powers
afforded to a state insurance commissioner under the Amendments to the
IHCA. In particular, there are issues concerning whether a state insurance
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commissioner’s new powers are within the accepted definition of the
“business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Policing
enterprise risk is outside the traditional realm of policyholder protection,
and a commissioner’s involvement in a supervisory college is more likely
to focus on enterprise risks rather than policyholder interest.119
Put succinctly, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (hereafter “the Act”) is
the response by Congress to a Supreme Court decision that would have
placed regulation of insurance in the hands of the Federal government
pursuant to the interstate Commerce Clause.120 The Act states that the
“business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business,” and that “[n]o
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.” 121 As such, what is outside the “business of insurance,” is
outside the Act’s immunity, and thus subject to Federal regulation.
The Supreme Court decided three major cases to shape the present
day definition of what constitutes the “business of insurance” under the
Act.122 First, in Security & Exchange Commission v. National Securities,
Inc., the Court highlighted that the Act “did not purport to make the states
supreme in regulating all activities of insurance companies; its language
refers not to the persons or companies who are subject to state regulation,
but to laws ‘regulating the business of insurance.’”123 The case involved a
merger between two insurance companies that the state insurance
commissioner believed to be fraudulent and borne from ill intent.124 The
commissioner argued that if the Securities Exchange Act were to apply, it
would supersede the state laws in place; however, the SEC argued that
there was no conflict between the state and federal law, because the
applicable state statutes did not give the state insurance commissioner the
power to determine whether the interested parties in the merger had made
full disclosure.125
The court held that it did not believe that “a state statute aimed at
protecting the interests of those who own stock in insurance companies
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comes within the sweep of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”126 Therefore, the
court held that such a statute was not an attempt to regulate with ‘business
of insurance’ as the phrase is used in the Act.127 The Court went on to
distinguish the ‘business of insurance’ from the activities of insurance
companies in general, by narrowing the scope of the definition to concern
only those statutes aimed at protecting the relationship between the
insurance company and the policyholder. 128 Because the activity in
question involved the insurance company’s relationship with its
stockholders, not its policyholders, the court found that such activity was
not within the ‘business of insurance.’129
In the second major case, the Supreme Court in Group Life and
Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Co. proposed a three-prong test to
determine whether an activity falls within the Act’s scope of the ‘business
of insurance.’130 This test is still used by courts today. The facts of Royal
Drug concerned agreements between the insurance company and local
pharmacies, requiring the insured to pay only $2 for prescription drugs.131
The Court began its examination of whether these agreements were within
the Act’s business of insurance by emphasizing what had already been
decided in National Securities—that the ‘business of insurance’ was
categorically distinguishable from the business of insurance companies.
From here the Court’s opinion laid out three key points of consideration
when determining whether an activity falls within the business of
insurance.
First, the Court determined that the “significance of
underwriting or spreading of risk [is] an indispensible characteristic of
insurance.”132 The insurance company argued that these agreements fell
within the scope of ‘spreading risk’ because such agreements would reduce
the premiums policyholders would have to pay in the long run.133 The
Court adamantly disagreed with this argument and held that:
By agreeing with pharmacies on the maximum
prices it will pay for drugs, Blue Shield effectively
reduces the total amount it must pay to its
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policyholders. The Agreements thus enable Blue
Shield to minimize costs and maximize profits.
Such cost-savings arrangements may well be
sound business practice, and may well inure
ultimately to the benefit of policyholders in the
form of lower premiums, but they are not the
‘business of insurance.’134
Because the arrangements with the pharmacies did not spread policyholder
risk, they did not satisfy the first prong.
Second, the Court extrapolated that Congress’ primary concern in
enacting the Act was, “‘[t]he relationship between insurer and insured, the
type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and
enforcement-these were the core of the ‘business of insurance.’”135 It then
held that the cost-saving effect the agreements produced for policyholders
was not enough to satisfy the second prong’s insurer-insured relationship
standard. 136 The Court then again stressed the difference between the
‘business of insurance’ and the business of the insurance company, stating
that if activity such as the agreements in question were deemed included,
then almost every business decision of an insurance company could be
included in the ‘business of insurance[,]’” and that “[s]uch a result would
be plainly contrary to the statutory language.”137
Finally, the Court in Royal Drug consulted a brief legislative
history of the Act, concluding that Congress intended to shield intraindustry cooperative rate making from anti-trust laws because such activity
was essential to underwriting risks accurately.138 Staying true to this intent,
the Court held that, “[t]here is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative
history that Congress in any way contemplated that arrangements such as
the Pharmacy Agreements in this case, which involve the mass purchase of
goods and services from entities outside the insurance industry, are the
‘business of insurance.’”139 As such, the last prong of the Royal Drug test
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requires courts to consider whether parties are wholly within the insurance
industry.140
The last chief case where the Supreme Court revisited the question
of what comprised the ‘business of insurance,’ was Union Labor Life
Insurance Co. v. Pireno.141 In Pireno, the Court examined whether the use
of a peer review committee to determine if a chiropractor’s treatments were
unnecessary, or his rates unreasonable, was not within the ‘business of
insurance,’ and thus not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 142 The Court
concluded that the peer review committee failed all three prongs of the
Royal Drug test, and thus was outside the ‘business of insurance.’ In
regards to the third prong of the test, whether the involved parties were
wholly within the insurance industry, the Court stated that such a failure
alone need not deny the anti-trust exemption, but that “the involvement of
such parties, even if not dispositive, constitutes part of the inquiry
mandated by the Royal Drug analysis.” 143 More generally, the Court
refined the test by asserting that none of the three elements alone are
determinative of whether an activity is within the ‘business of insurance’;
rather, all three elements must be taken together to form a collective
picture.144
These three cases left strong themes for future courts to consider,
most notably, that the ‘business of insurance’ is not synonymous with the
business of insurance companies. In regards to supervisory colleges, the
present concern proponents of the colleges should consider, is whether the
new power of a state insurance commissioner to examine not only domestic
insurers, but also affiliates, and to subsequently share such information
with other regulators, is within the boundaries set by this definition. If the
activities and information sharing engaged in under supervisory colleges
are considered outside the ‘business of insurance,’ there inevitably arises a
corresponding argument that supervisory colleges are outside the power of
states’ regulation, and are perhaps more appropriately situated under the
jurisdiction of the Federal government.
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A Supreme Court of Nebraska case concerning the acquisition of a
domestic insurer by a foreign holding company provides an exemplary
discussion of how courts have since muddled the lines of the Royal Drug
test. Furthermore, the Court’s holding that a state statute providing for its
insurance department to approve the acquisition of control of any domestic
insurer pursuant to its Insurance Holding Company System Act is within
the boundaries of the McCarran-Ferguson definition of ‘business of
insurance,’ is a strong argument that the new Amendments to the NAIC’s
IHCA do not trigger scrutiny of the Amendment’s validity under the Act.
In CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co., Ltd., Nebraska’s Insurance
Holding Company System Act required applicants looking to acquire a
domestic insurance company to file a “Form A,” but the Act allowed an
acquiring party to avoid the insurance department’s scrutiny by filing a
disclaimer of control.145 CenTra, the foreign holding company in question,
filed such a disclaimer. 146 The insurance department approved the
disclaimer, but on the condition that CenTra cease to purchase the
insurance company’s stock.147 In the following years, CenTra did not obey
the order and continued to purchase the insurance stock from other
stockholders until CenTra controlled 49.2 percent of the insurance
company.148
CenTra next took steps to officially acquire the insurance
company, but following submission of the Form A, and the Form A
hearing, the insurance department denied the applicant’s request.149 The
department supported its decision by reasoning that, the financial condition
of applicants could jeopardize the financial stability of the insurer or
prejudice its policyholders; that applicants' competence, experience, and
integrity were such that their acquisition of the insurer would not be in the
policyholders' best interests; and that the acquisition of the insurer was
likely to be hazardous to the public.150
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska employed the three-prong
‘business of insurance’ test to determine “whether a restriction on the sale
of stock in a domestic insurer is sufficiently connected to ‘the business of
insurance’ to be shielded by the MFA from Commerce Clause attack,” or
whether this restriction, “intrudes impermissibly into the federal realm of
securities regulation.”151 Under the first prong, the court held that, “the
restriction on stock disposition relates, albeit indirectly, to the transferring
and spreading of risk . . . . The Act affords the Director of Insurance a
chance to review the financial stability of the acquiring company so that he
can determine whether acquisition is in the best interests of Nebraska
policyholders.”152 The court further found that the power of the director to
“bring any threatened change of control under his own control” concerned
policyholder protection because it allowed him to consider the impact such
changes would have on policyholders.153 Ultimately it held that whether a
domestic insurer will remain reliable to its policyholders does relate to the
transferring and spreading of risk, because a change of control can affect
the quality and stability of policies.154
In discussing the second prong, the court found that the Nebraska
Act satisfied the insurer-insured relationship requirement because the
statute gives the director the power, ability, and statutory responsibility to
ensure, “that the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder is
one of mutual understanding and not one of deceit.” 155 The court
reconciled the indirect nature of their connection by broadly recognizing
that, “the individual policyholder is not in a position to understand the
ramifications of a change of control in his insurer until the insurer becomes
insolvent and unable to pay claims.”156
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Finally, the court found the third prong of the ‘business of
insurance’ test to be satisfied as well. The court held that, despite the Act’s
effects on investors and stockholders seeking to own stock in Nebraska
domestic insurers, and despite that the Act restricts when an out-of-state
stockholder may sell his interest in the domestic insurer, because the
ultimate focus of these restrictions remains with the individual
policyholder, the statute still fell within the ‘business of insurance.’157 The
court categorized those looking to acquire the insurance company as those
“who wished to control the handling of CenTra's insurance claims . . . who
sought to gain control of their insurer by owning its stock; and . . . who
chose to cast into jeopardy the one policy concern for whose protection the
department was created: that an insurer should remain as reliable as it
promises its insureds it will be.”158
Prior to concluding, the court went on to distinguish the present
case from the issue presented in National Securities. Where the Court in
National Securities held that, “regulation whose focus is the protection of
stockholders does not sufficiently relate to the MFA to be shielded from
Commerce Clause attack,” the court in CenTra thought the present statute
in question did not purport to protect stockholders as in National Securities;
rather, the Nebraska Act was purely concerned with policyholders and had
no stake in the “security of or services rendered to stockholders; whether
merger or acquisition is equitable to stockholders is immaterial in the eyes
of the director.” 159 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the Court in
National Securities, “found that the section of the Arizona act that
empowered the director to determine whether acquisition would
substantially reduce the security of policyholders' interests clearly relates to
the ‘business of insurance.’”160
B.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ADOPTED REVISIONS TO THE
AMENDED MODEL ACT BEING WITHIN THE ‘BUSINESS OF
INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED BY THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON
ACT
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If a court were to accept the fairly broad interpretation of the Royal
Drug test from the CenTra holding, claims asserting that the Amendments
to the IHCA are outside the ‘business of insurance’ would likely fail.
Under CenTra, the extension of a state commissioner’s oversight
jurisdiction to out-of-state affiliates would satisfy the first prong of the
Royal Drug test because the Amendments afford the commissioner, like
Nebraska’s Director of Insurance, a chance to review the financial stability
of the holding company so that he can determine whether the group’s
health as a whole is in the best interests of the policyholders.
Similarly, under CenTra the commissioner’s powers would pass
the second prong, relating to the insurer-insured relationship, because the
individual policyholder is not in a position to understand the ramifications
of multi-jurisdictional supervision, and would not become aware of the
risks until the insurer becomes insolvent and unable to pay claims.
Finally, the court in CenTra would most likely opine, despite the
commissioner’s power to reach outside of his jurisdiction, and,
furthermore, to reach outside of the insurance industry per se by examining
non-insurance affiliates, that the commissioner’s actions were still
ultimately for the benefit of the insurance industry.
This expansive reasoning is easily extended to a state’s
participation in supervisory colleges. Supervisory colleges are also
provided for under the Amendments to the IHCA, and, under CenTra, a
court would likely find that the activity fell within the ‘business of
insurance,’ because the colleges are ultimately meant to benefit
policyholders. Currently, the NAIC has put forth, “existing U.S. case law,
[the] interests of other countries, and the renewed vigor that regulators
enjoy . . . as a result of the 2008 crisis,” as reasons why the new IHCA
Amendments should still be upheld under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.161
Justice Brennan once wrote that “‘[t]he prevention of insolvency and the
maintenance of ‘sound’ financial condition in terms of fixed-dollar
obligations is precisely what traditional state regulation [of insurance] is
aimed at.’” 162 However, should no opposition arise to supervisory
colleges’ validity under the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s definition of the
‘business of insurance,’ this concern would be entirely moot.
C.

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ADOPTED REVISIONS TO THE
AMENDED MODEL ACT BEING WITHIN THE ‘BUSINESS OF
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INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED BY THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON
ACT
Conversely, an alternative argument can be made for why the
IHCA Amendments, particularly the state commissioner powers, and
state’s participation in supervisory colleges, do not fall within the accepted
definition of the ‘business of insurance.’ Where the CenTra court took a
very macro approach to the Royal Drug test, a more micro examination of
the recent changes could be considered outside the accepted ‘business of
insurance’ and more inside the business of insurance companies.
Challenges to the commissioner’s cross-jurisdictional reach and
participation in supervisory colleges, would likely be brought by a variety
of interested parties. These opponents to the revisions have two potential
grievances under which they may wish to challenge the Amended Model
Act: one, the state commissioner’s ability to demand insurance holding
company systems and insurance affiliate information; and two, the
authority for a state’s participation in supervisory colleges.
The first group encompasses those opponents that are most
unsettled by the ability of a state insurance commissioner to request
sensitive information from whomever they deem relevant. An insurance
holding company system’s affiliates are wide ranging—some may be less
willing than others to relinquish confidential information all in the name of
international coordination. Affiliates that shelter information from their
own regulators will be vehemently opposed to sharing such information
with a state insurance commissioner.
The second group includes potential supervisory college members
who may choose not to participate because they have certain risks they do
not want to surface. The extensive information sharing environment a
supervisory college fosters will create an ideal opportunity to unveil hidden
perils. For some, this exposure may be exactly what they wish to evade. A
successful challenge to the validity of supervisory colleges under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act could result in the assurance that, at least while
insurance remains under state regulation, information sharing across
jurisdictional borders will be avoided.
It was previously discussed that supervisory colleges run the risk of
fostering adverse relationships amongst regulators in response to members
of the community that do not “go with the flow,” so to speak. With the
potential for these adverse relationships to escalate into adverse actions,
may come feelings of ill will towards what was supposed to be a
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harmonious solution to international coordination and supervision. 163
Shunned members pose a risk to the success of supervisory colleges as a
whole if the injured parties decide their unfavorable experience with a
college is indicative of its unruly powers. Ostracized regulators could
challenge the validity of the Amendments under the McCarran Ferguson
Act to ensure the supervisory college’s failure. In this case, a regulator,
whether domestic or otherwise, may not even be opposed to the state
insurance commissioner’s expansive powers; rather, he would be using the
commissioner’s cross-jurisdictional reach as an additional argument for the
colleges’ violative nature.
In Pireno, the court determined that the use of a state peer review
committee to share information and make evaluations of its members was
outside the business of insurance as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.164 The peer review board did not satisfy the first two prongs of the
Royal Drug test because it did not spread policyholder risk, nor was it part
of the insurer/insured relationship. 165 It is not a stretch to equate a
supervisory college to a peer review board as a basis for a challenge against
their validity. In Pireno, the committee worked together to determine
whether a fellow chiropractor’s treatments were unnecessary, or his rates
unreasonable. In a supervisory college, members work together to
determine whether a particular insurer, holding company system, or
enterprise pose risks to global insurance stability. Both groups have the
goal of a safer environment for their practice to thrive, and both groups
share sensitive information to achieve that goal.
Additionally, a state’s participation in a supervisory college, or a
state commissioner’s authority to access insurer affiliates, are both
activities not wholly limited to entities within the insurance industry. A
supervisory college involves regulators from a spectrum of sectors, and an
insurer affiliate could literally be any entity affiliated with the operations of
an insurance company. As such, it would not be a hard argument to make
that the revisions in question to the Amended Model Act fail the third
prong of the Royal Drug test as well.
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CONCLUSION: SUPERVISORY COLLEGES WILL HELP
FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY SUCCESS IN
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Supervisory Colleges are a way to enhance state based insurance
regulation in an increasingly international environment. Where the concept
of insurance companies as a completely independent entity is now more a
legal fiction than reality, the success of supervisory colleges would help to
appease those claims that a federal regulatory system is more adept to
handle a global industry than the current state based system. States have
expressed that they are willing to implement the necessary regulatory
revisions to ensure that the positive track record of state-based insurance
regulation continues to evolve with the changing times. 166 State
commissioners view themselves not only as policemen of individual
insurance companies, but also as stewards of highly interconnected
financial systems.
The Amendments to the IHCA are only effective if adopted by
individual state legislatures; however, the NAIC is moving to incorporate
the changes into the required state accreditation standards, increasing the
likeliness of states to comply. Even without the threat of losing its
accreditation, already some states are beginning to adopt the recent
revisions. West Virginia was first to make the changes to its own
regulations in April of 2011, followed by Texas in June. 167 States like
Connecticut haven’t officially adopted the Amended Model Act as part of
their insurance laws, but the state insurance commissioner is mimicking
many of the changes the Model Act suggests on their own.
Those opposed to the Amended Model Act should move forward
with caution. With the determination that the Model Act’s revisions step
outside state jurisdiction comes a corresponding argument that such powers
should reside with the Federal government. Proponents for Federal
insurance regulation could argue that the invalidity of state supervisory
control in the international regulatory sector is indicative of the need for a
more centralized approach to regulation—a more Federal approach.
Banning state participation in supervisory colleges, and limiting a state
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Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 7-8.
Van R. Mayhall, III, Form F and Enterprise Risk: NAIC Expands
Regulatory Authority under the Model Insurance Holding Company System
Regulatory Act, BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, LLP (July 20, 2011),
http://www.insuranceregulatorylaw.com/2011/07/form-f-and-enterprise-risk-naicexpands.html.
167
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insurance commissioner’s access to information, may prove to be a
temporary dam that subsequently opens a floodgate of Federal regulatory
power.
The creation of the FIO should be viewed as the first step in this
direction. Even the FIO’s description of the Office’s function is alarmingly
similar to what supervisory colleges set out to achieve. The FIO has the
authority “to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry, including
identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute
to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the United States financial
system.” 168 Whereas states are limited to the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s
definition of the “business of insurance,” the Dodd-Frank Act expands the
federal government’s reach to “all aspects of the insurance industry.”
Furthermore, the power for the Federal government to enter into a covered
agreement with respect to the “business of insurance” with foreign parties
should draw attention. Covered agreements touch three important points:
one, the federal government; two, international parties; and three, the
business of insurance. Alternatively, supervisory colleges touch nearly the
same three points: one, state insurance regulators; two, international
parties; and three, the business of insurance. A centralized regime could
require international information sharing where no entity or enterprise
would escape its reach.
Supervisory colleges are a step in the right direction for
international regulatory success, and the provisions of the Amended Model
Act that expand the state commissioner’s power will help to facilitate
success in a college forum. If not the state insurance commissioner, then it
will be another regulatory body that will have access to affiliate
information in order to best examine enterprise risk. States should move
forward with their commissioner’s participation, and opponents should
mind that the alternative to colleges and extended commissioner power
may prove to be even more evasive than option at hand.
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, tit. V, § 313(c)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1580 (2010) (emphasis added).
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADVERTISING INJURY
EXCLUSION IN THE INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, INC.’S
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
POLICY FORMS
KYLE LAMBRECHT
***
This article examines the issue of whether Comprehensive General
Liability (CGL) insurance policy forms provide coverage for third party
patent infringement claims under the forms’ “advertising injury”
provision. The paper traces the evolution of these Comprehensive General
Liability forms, from the 1973 CGL standard forms through the 1986 forms
and even up to the most recent set of revisions as reflected in the 1998 and
2001 CGL broad form versions. The article then discusses three leading
cases on the issue, all of which stand for the proposition that insurers have
a duty to defend policyholders against third party patent infringement
claims when the insured was alleged to have infringed an advertising
technique that was itself patented. In the aftermath of these decisions,
however, changes were made to the CGL policy forms which are likely to
benefit the insurer seeking to avoid coverage and further the trend towards
increasingly limited policyholder coverage for third party patent
infringement.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Internet commerce is growing at an exponential rate. It is
estimated that global usage doubles every one hundred days and increases
between 200-600% annually.1 The drastic increase in internet commerce is
directly attributable to the availability and affordability of personal
computers and handheld devices equipped with internet connectivity.2 As a
result of this increase in global usage, some insurance carriers have

1

See Robert P. Norman, Virtual Insurance: Is Your Old Policy from
InvisibleINC.com? If so, what Cyber Policy Adequately Covers Your Risks?, 673
PLI/LIT 557, 565 (2002).
2
See, e.g., id.
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suggested that internet commerce will be the “single biggest insurance risk
of the twenty-first century.”3
Internet advertising is a relatively inexpensive and efficient means
of marketing to a broad audience situated throughout the world. Insurance
policyholders engaged in internet business and advertising have seen an
increase in intellectual property liability claims, including but not limited
to, third party patent infringement claims based on the content and design
of company websites. This paper first discusses the evolution of the
Insurance Service Office, Inc.’s (“ISO”) standard Comprehensive General
Liability (“CGL”) insurance policy forms and then focuses on an insurer’s
duty to defend against third party patent infringement claims under the
“advertising injury” provision in these forms. Subsequently, this paper will
analyze the reasoning espoused by three separate courts holding that the
advertising injury provision of a standard CGL insurance policy creates a
duty for insurers to defend against third party patent infringement claims,
in situations where the advertising technique itself was patented by the
third party claimant.
II.

ADVERTISING INJURY COVERAGE IN ISO COMMERCIAL
OR COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
FORMS

The ISO is a subsidiary of Verisk Analytics Incorporated and it
drafts standardized insurance policy forms that are utilized by over 1,400
member companies operating in every state.4 Most of the member
insurance companies “adopt ISO forms verbatim while … other[s] use
[general] ISO forms as a starting point for their own modified forms.”5
Although the forms used by member companies to service policyholders
are substantially similar, standard ISO CGL insurance forms have
historically provided varying degrees of coverage for policyholders within
the purview of the advertising injury provision.
3

See id. at 565 (quoting UDAY KHANDEPARKAR, Indian Security Firm Expects
“Love Bug” Boost, REUTERS ENG. NEWS SERV. (May 9, 2000); J. OF COM., VIRUS
UNDERSCORES RISKS IN E-COMMERCE (May 18, 2000), available at WestLaw
2000 WLNR989539.
4
INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, INC., http://www.iso.com (last visited Oct. 2,
2012).
5
Jerold Oshinsky & Damon A. Thayer, A Primer on Coverage for
Infringement Suits, LAW360.COM, (Feb. 22, 2011, 1:56 PM) http://www.law360
.com/articles/225699/a-primer-on-coverage-for-infringement-suits.
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Generally, an advertising injury is understood to be any injury to a
third party brought about through the advertisement of a business’ goods
and services. Presently, ISO CGL insurance forms indemnify the
policyholder from liability to third parties for bodily injury, personal injury,
advertising injury and property damage under two primary policy
provisions: (i) “Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability,
and (ii) Coverage B Personal and Advertising Liability.”6 The ISO CGL
insurance forms have been modified extensively since 1973, and the
current advertising injury provisions differ greatly from those forty years
ago. However, despite these extensive changes, many CGL insurance
policies used today still contain the language of older ISO CGL
endorsements.
A.

THE 1973 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS

Prior to 1973, ISO CGL insurance forms did not include coverage
for advertising injury and only a few insurers offered advertising coverage
as an additional endorsement to their standard CGL policies.7 In 1973, the
ISO radically altered its standard forms by making “advertising injury” and
“personal injury” coverage available through the purchase of a Broad Form
CGL endorsement or a Personal Injury Liability endorsement (“PIL”).8
This was the first time the ISO specifically adopted an advertising injury
coverage provision into its Broad Form CGL endorsement.9
6

See Dawn Dinkins, Internet Liabilities: A Look at Coverage Under the
Traditional Commercial General Liability Policy, 16 NO. 6 ANDREWS CORP.
OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY LITIG. REP., Jan. 2, 2001, at 2-; INS. SERVS.
OFF., INC., COM. GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 10 01 (2000).
7
See Lawrence O. Monin, ISO Advertising and Personal Injury Revisions:
Major Surgery of Just a Band-Aid Fix?, 4-16 MEALEY’S EMERGING INS. DISPS. 6
(1999).
8
The PIL endorsement covered only personal injury, while the 1973 CGL
Broad Form combined coverage for personal injury and liability arising out of
advertising. See JAMES L. HAIGH & SARAH L. SHOWALTER, HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE CHANGES TO COVERAGE B, reprinted in COUSINEAU LAW FORUM SERIES,
http://cousineaulaw.com/forum/historical_analysis_of_the_changes_to_coverage_b
(last accessed Oct. 2, 2012). As such, this article will not explore the revisions of
the PIL endorsement.
9
See Bruce Telles, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Torts, 602
PLI/LIT 629, 645 (1999); Robert H Jerry, II & Michele L, Mekel, Cybercoverage
for Cyber-Risks: An Overview of Insurers’ Responses to the Perils of E-Commerce,
8 CONN. INS. L.J. 7, 17 (2001).
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The 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement provided policyholders
with coverage for “all sums which the insured [became] legally obligated to
pay as damages because of . . . advertising injury to which the insurance
applie[d] . . . arising out of the conduct of the named insured’s business . . .
and the [insurance] company shall have the right and duty to defend. . . ”10
Advertising injury was defined as any “[i]njury arising out of an offense
committed during the policy period occurring in the course of the named
insured’s advertising activities, if such injury ar[ose] out of libel, slander,
defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy, unfair competition, or
infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”11
Claims for “advertising injury arising out of … infringement of
trademark, service mark or trade name, other than titles or slogans, by use
thereof on or in connection with goods, products, or services sold, offered
for sale, or advertised” were typically excluded from coverage for
policyholders in the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement.12 In addition to
these exclusions, coverage was not provided for any claims: (i) “[a]rising
out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction
of the insured with knowledge of its falsity,” (ii) “[a]rising out of oral or
written publication of material whose first publication took place before the
beginning of the policy,” and (iii) “[a]rising out of the willful violation of a
penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the consent of the
insured,” or (iv) “[f]or which the insured ha[d] assumed liability in a
contract or agreement.”13 The advertising injury provision also did not
apply to liabilities arising from damages that the policyholder incurred in
the absence of the contract or agreement.
Similar to most other occasions when the ISO implemented
detailed changes to an endorsement, certain coverage issues surrounding
the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement were highly litigated. Most of the
litigation relating to third party patent infringement claims focused on the
ISO’s failure to define the term “advertising,” in the relevant policy
language. When faced with multiple propositions for the appropriate
definition of the term “advertising,” courts repeatedly construed the term in
favor of the carrier, and in most cases, the policyholder failed to persuade
10

Richard Bale & Patrick J. Boley, Advertising Injury Coverage 1-2 (2007),
available
at
http://www.larsonking.com/ArticleUploads/Advertising%20
Injury%20Coverage.pdf.
11
Id. (quoting Lebas Fashion Imps. of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Grp., 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
12
HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8.
13
Id.

2012 EVOLUTION OF THE ADVERTISING INJURY EXCLUSION 189
the court that the insurer had a duty to defend against third party patent
infringement and other intellectual property claims under the advertising
injury provision in their CGL policy.14
B.

THE 1986 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS

In 1986, the ISO made several major revisions to the 1973 Broad
Form CGL endorsement which subsequently enabled courts to find that an
insurer had a duty to defend against third party patent infringement claims
under the “advertising injury” provision.15 In an attempt to clarify and
expand the coverage provided in the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement,
the ISO introduced “Coverage B.”16 “Coverage B” combined the
“advertising injury” and “personal injury” provisions of the 1973 Broad
Form CGL endorsement into one section and made changes to several of
the enumerated offenses covered under the endorsement.17 Following these
revisions to the 1986 Broad Form CGL endorsement, policyholders
automatically received coverage for both types of injuries and no longer
needed to purchase separate ISO CGL endorsements for “advertising
injury” and “personal injury” coverage.18
Similar to the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement, the ISO again
failed to define the term “advertising.” However, the ISO attempted to
eliminate some of the previous uncertainty by enumerating several offenses
to which advertising injury would apply. The ISO 1986 Broad Form CGL
endorsement stated that the “advertising injury” provision would provide
coverage for any injury, committed during the coverage period, arising out
of one of more of the following offenses: (i) “[o]ral or written publication
of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a
person’s or organization’s goods, products or services,” (ii) “[o]ral or
written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy,”
(iii) “[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,” or
(iv) “[i]nfringement of copyright, title or slogan.”19 In an attempt to further
14

But see, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769
F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1985); CNA Cas. of Cal. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 222 Cal. Rptr.
276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
15
See discussion infra Part III.
16
See Telles, supra note 9, at 646; Monin, supra note 7, at 2-6.
17
See Telles, supra note 9, at 646; Monin, supra note 7, at 2-6.
18
See Telles, supra note 9, at 646; Monin, supra note 7, at 2-6.
19
Policy form CG 00 01 11 85 (copyrighted in 1982 and 1984 by the ISO)
(public promulgation and adoption of the states did not occur until the mid-1980s);
see HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8, at n.5.
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clarify issues that had plagued 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement, the
ISO inserted the same set of advertising injury exclusions, as well as
defined a new set of exclusions.20 The new exclusions applied to any of the
following claims: (i) a “[b]reach of contract, other than misappropriation of
advertising ideas under an implied contract, (ii) “[t]he failure of goods,
products, or services to conform with advertised quality or performance,”
(iii) “[t]he wrong description of the price of the goods, products or
services,” and (iv) any “[o]ffense committed by an insured whose business
is advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.”21
The 1986 Broad Form CGL endorsement differed from its 1973
predecessor in that it no longer provided coverage for “piracy” nor the
specific exclusion for “infringement of trademark, service mark or trade
name other than titles or slogans.”22 Additionally, the ISO provided
coverage for “misappropriation of advertising ideas and style of doing
business” which replaces the 1973 endorsement’s “unfair competition”
coverage. Despite these changes to the 1986 Broad Form CGL
endorsement, the ISO described the revisions as “non-substantive
clarifications of prior coverage.”23 However, policyholders had greater
success in obtaining coverage under the new revisions, despite the ISO’s
characterization of the changes.24 This paper focuses on the 1986 Broad
Form CGL endorsement language, “misappropriation of advertising ideas
and style of doing business,” specifically, when the provision creates a duty
for insurers to defend against third party patent infringement claims.

20

Policy form CG 00 01 11 85 (copyrighted in 1982 and 1984 by the ISO)
(public promulgation and adoption of the states did not occur until the mid-1980s);
see HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8, at n.5.
21
Policy form CG 00 01 11 85 (copyrighted in 1982 and 1984 by the ISO)
(public promulgation and adoption of the states did not occur until the mid-1980s);
see HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8, at n.5.
22
Telles, supra note 9, at 652.
23
Jerry, II & Mekel, supra note 9, at 18 (discussing the success of
policyholders in obtaining coverage for trademark infringement under the
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business” provision,
despite the deletion of the term “trademark”).
24
See ROBERT D. CHESLER & CINDY TZVI SONENBLICK, INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT (Bloomberg Finance
L.P. Law Reports, 2008).
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III.

DUTY TO DEFEND AGAINST THIRD PARTY PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
UNDER THE “MISAPPROPRI
ATION OF ADVERTISING IDEAS AND STYLE OF DOING
BUSINESS” PROVISION IN COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES

In the United States, a patent is a property right which grants the
owner the power to exclude others from making, using, selling and offering
to sell a new, non-obvious, useful invention in the United States for up to
twenty years.25 Prior to 1994, it was well settled that patent infringement
was not covered under the advertising injury provisions.26 In reaching this
conclusion, courts looked to the language of the patent statute which
prohibited “making, using or selling” a product which infringed on a
patent.27 Based on this language, a majority of courts unequivocally
rejected coverage for claims involving patent infringement under the
advertising injury provisions of CGL policies.28
In order to comply with the requirements of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Treaty, Congress amended the Patent Act

25

See James R. Warnot, Jr. & Daniel C. Glazer, Insurance Coverage for
Intellectual Property and Cyberspace Liability, 652 PLI/LIT 407, 409 (2001).
26
See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Frosty Bites, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 101,
103 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); BATES, CAREY & NICOLAIDES, LLP., PATENT CLAIMS NOT
COVERED
AS
ADVERTISING
INJURY
(2004),
available
at
http://www.bcnlaw.com/newsandarticles/newsletter1_patentclaims.asp (noting that
“[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court recently joined the majority of courts in ruling
that claims involving patent infringement are not covered under the advertising
injury section of a commercial general liability policy.”); Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Advanced Polymer Tech., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 913, 930 n.10 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(stating that patent infringement cannot be misappropriation of style of doing
business); Auto Sox USA Inc. v. Zurich N. Am., 88 P.3d 1008, 1011 n.1 (2004)
(noting that “the majority of cases hold that patent infringement is not covered by
the misappropriation of an advertising idea in an insurance policy”); LINDA A.
GALELLA, LIMITATIONS ON ADVERTISING INJURY COVERAGE CLAIMS (2000),
available at http://www.capehart.com/Legal-Alerts-Table-of-Contents/Limitationson-Advertising-Injury-Coverage-Claims.shtml (concluding that “New Jersey
courts do not find coverage for patent infringement under the advertising injury
provisions of CGL policies”).
27
See Auto Sox, 88 P.3d at 1011; GALELLA, supra note 26.
28
See Auto Sox, 88 P.3d at 1012; Frosty Bites, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 106;
Heritage, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 930 n.10.
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in 1994.29 One of the amendments to the Patent Act was the inclusion of
“offers to sell,” as a type of conduct that constituted a direct patent
infringement.30 With the changes to the definitions in the patent statute,
particularly, the inclusion of “offers to sell,” most courts have since
concluded that advertising can give rise to a direct patent infringement.31
Despite the generally accepted view that advertising can give rise to a
direct patent infringement, some courts unequivocally reject insurance
coverage for third party patent infringement claims under the advertising
injury provisions of a CGL policy.32 However, a few courts have been
willing to extend coverage against third party patent infringement claims
when a policy contains language similar to that of the ISO 1986 Broad
Form CGL endorsement.33
Generally, misappropriation of a patented advertising idea must
occur in the “elements of the advertising itself – in its text[,] form, logo, or
pictures – rather than in the product being advertised.”34 In determining
whether a third party patent infringement claim is covered under the
advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy, courts examine several
different factors. To establish coverage, a policyholder must generally
prove three elements; (i) that the alleged conduct potentially falls within the
scope of the policy’s enumerated advertising injury provisions, (ii) that
there is a causal nexus between the policyholder’s advertising activities and
the alleged offense, in order to satisfy a typical policy’s requirement that
the infringement “occur in the course of the insured’s advertising
activities,” and (iii) that the conduct constitutes “advertising activity”

29

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (and accompanying Historical and Statutory
Notes re 1994 Amendments and Effective Date of 1994 Amendments).
30
See id.
31
See, e.g., HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (advertisements may be “offers to sell” and, thus, give rise to direct patent
infringement claim); Homedics Inc. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 315 F.3d 1135, 1138
(9th Cir. 2003); Maxconn Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 750 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (“[T]he amendment of the [patent] statute has nullified the argument
that patent infringement could not arise out of the insured's advertising activities as
a matter of law.”).
32
See Homedics, 315 F.3d at 1137.
33
See e.g., Amazon.com Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 85
P.3d 974 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2004); DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins.
Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1028 (10th Cir. 2011); Hyundai Motor Corp. v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010).
34
See Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1506 (9th Cir. 1994).
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within the meaning of the policy. Decisions finding no duty to defend
typically involve either:
(i) direct infringement from the manufacture of sale of a
patented subject matter that lacks the necessary causal
relationship between an insured’s advertising activities
and the infringement;35 (ii) induced infringement that
lacks the necessary causal relationship between the
insured’s advertising activities and the infringement;36
(iii) overly technical readings of the scope of a policy’s
advertising injury coverage for undefined offenses;37 or
(iv) spurious statements of public policy that reflect a
courts misunderstanding of the scienter requirement for
induced patent infringement.38
The majority of courts which unequivocally reject coverage under the
advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy typically find that an insurer
does not have duty to defend against a third party patent infringement claim
because there is no causal connection between the policyholder’s
advertising and the alleged offense.39 Specifically, the courts find that the
alleged patent infringement did not occur in the course of advertising.40
35

See David A. Gauntlett, Patents and Insurance: Who Will Pay for
Reimbursement, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 200, 203 (1998); Iolab Corp., 15 F.3d at
1506-07; Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Polaris
Indus., L.P. v. Continental Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
36
See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 203; Gencor Indus., Inc. v. Wausau
Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1994); N.H. Ins. Co. v.
R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1452, 1458-59 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Gitano
Group, Inc. v. Kemper Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
37
See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 203; Iolab Corp., 15 F.3d at 1506; I.C.D.
Indus., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 879 F. Supp. 480, 485-86 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Gencor
Indus., Inc., 857 F. Supp. at 1565-66; Classic Corp. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co.,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1726, 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
38
See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 203; Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. United Nat’l
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1994); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 447-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also David A.
Gauntlett, Changing Winds: Recent Decisions Favor Policyholders in Intellectual
Property Coverage Claims, 1, 20 COVERAGE, (May-June 1995).
39
Brian W. Klemm, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Claims: A
Changing Landscape, 563 PLI/LIT 421, 424 (1997) (“When considering whether a
claimed injury is a covered offense, courts have been asked to interpret the
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Three situations currently support an insurer’s duty to defend and
indemnify a policyholder against third party claims of patent infringement
under the advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy; (i) when “a
manufacturer advertises [a] component, which is used in a product patented
by another party [and] the advertising induces a third party to combine the
component with other element, the combination of which produces the
product covered by the patent and infringes the patent claims”;41 (ii) when
“a product manufactured using a protected process is advertised in such a
way that, although the advertisement itself does not constitute
infringement, the advertisement induces others to use the process to create
the product”;42 and (iii) when “a manufacturer demonstrates the viability of
its non-infringing process by using advertising that infringes another
process.”43 In each of the cases discussed subsequently, the courts
addressed a different situation and found that an insurer had a duty to
defend a policyholder against third party patent infringement claims under
the advertising injury provision of their CGL policy.44 The courts analyzed
the “misappropriation of advertising or style of doing business” language in
three different CGL policies, each of which contained language mirroring
the “advertising injury” provisions of the ISO’s 1986 Broad Form CGL
endorsement.45 Reaching the same conclusion, the courts found that a duty

meanings of the terms piracy, unfair competition, and infringement of copyright,
title, or slogan under the 1976 [ISO] form policy and policy, because typical CGL
policies provide no definition of these terms.”)
40
Brian W. Klemm, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Claims: A
Changing Landscape, 563 PLI/LIT 421, 424 (1997) (“When considering whether a
claimed injury is a covered offense, courts have been asked to interpret the
meanings of the terms piracy, unfair competition, and infringement of copyright,
title, or slogan under the 1976 [ISO] form policy and policy, because typical CGL
policies provide no definition of these terms.”)
41
See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 204; Union Ins. Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc.,
529 N.W.2d 773, 774-75 (Neb. 1995)
42
See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 204; Norton Alcoa Proppants v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., No. C-4012-91-A (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 1993); Hyundai, 600 F.3d
at 1103 n.4 (“There may be situations in which an advertisement induces another
to infringe a patent.”).
43
See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 204; Omnitel v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1933, 1937-38 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993).
44
See, e.g., Amazon.com, 85 P.3d 974; DISH Network, 659 F.3d 1010;
Hyundai, 600 F.3d 1092.
45
See id.
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to defend existed when the insured was alleged to have infringed an
advertising technique that itself was patented.46
A.

AMAZON.COM INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. AMERICAN DYNASTY
SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY

The first case to find that an insurer had a duty to defend a
policyholder against a third party patent infringement claim was
Amazon.com International, Inc. v. American Dynasty Surplus Lines
Insurance Company. Applying Washington state law, the Court of Appeals
of Washington reversed a decision by the Superior Court of King County
granting summary judgment in favor of the insurers.47 In the underlying
action, Intouch, a software manufacturer alleged that Amazon had infringed
upon its patents for “interactive music preview technology, which enabled
customers to listen to samples of music products at kiosks and over the
internet.”48 Specifically, Amazon used Intouch technology to permit its
customers to preview music products available for sale on Amazon’s
corporate website.49
Amazon tendered a defense to its insurers under both its primary
insurance and excess carrier policies.50 Each policy promised to defend
and indemnify Amazon against third party claims alleging “advertising
injury,” among other things.51 One of the enumerated offenses under the
“advertising injury” provision mirrored that of the ISO’s 1986 Broad Form
CGL endorsement and provided coverage for the “misappropriation of
advertising ideas or style of doing business.”52 The court stated that
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business” could be
satisfied by: (i) the “wrongful taking of another’s manner of advertising,”53
(ii) the “wrongful taking of an idea concerning the solicitation of business

46

See id.
See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 978.
48
See id. at 975.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 976 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v.
Vortherms, 5 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Fluoroware, Inc. v. Chubb
Grp. of Ins. Cos., 545 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)).
47
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and customers,”54 or (iii) the “wrongful taking of the manner by which
another advertises its goods or services.”55 The court determined that
“patent infringement may constitute an advertising injury where an entity
uses an advertising technique that is itself patented.”56 The court’s
conclusions and rationale set precedent for subsequent courts to find a duty
to defend against third party patent infringement claims, when the language
of the advertising injury provisions in a CGL policy mirrors that of the ISO
1986 Broad Form endorsement.57
After concluding that patent infringement could constitute an
advertising injury, the court determined that the injury to Intouch occurred
in the course of advertising goods for sale.58 In the absence of a specific
definition of the term “advertising,” the court noted that advertising
typically refers to “any oral, written, or graphic statement made by the
seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business, … [or
the] widespread distribution of promotional material to the public at
large.”59 Finally, the court concluded that a causal connection existed
between the advertising injury and the policyholder’s advertising activities,
stating that “an injury that could have occurred independent and
irrespective of any advertising is not an advertising injury.”60 In most
cases, the requisite causal relationship does not exist because the claim
against the policyholder is based on the sale of an infringing product, not
an advertisement.61 Courts reject these claims because an advertising
injury does not occur “where the injury is caused by the subsequent
54

Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 976 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Green
Mach. Corp v. Zurich-American Ins. Grp., 313 F.3d 837, 839 (3d Cir. 2002));
Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 748 (3d Cir. 1999).
55
Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 976-77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Applied Bolting Tech. Prod., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 942 F.
Supp. 1029, 1034 (E.D.Pa. 1996)).
56
Id. at 977 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard
Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1507 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Bank of the West v.
Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 559 (Cal. 1992)) (emphasis added); State Auto Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 F.3d 249, 258, 258 n.12 (4th
Cir. 2003).
57
See DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1018
(10th Cir. 2011); Hyundai Motor Am. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pa., 600 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2010).
58
See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 977 (citing Vortherms, 5 S.W.3d at 544).
59
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
See id. (citing Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 F.3d
1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1996)).
61
See also Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 977 n.20.
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advertising of an already infringing product.”62 As such, the injury derived
from the use of the software code as the means to market goods for sale
satisfied the causation requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that it is irrelevant whether the customer or policyholder has actual
knowledge of the infringement.63
B.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA

The first federal court case finding that an insurer had a duty to
defend a policyholder against a third party patent infringement claim was
Hyundai Motor America v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA.64 Applying California law, the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed a decision by the United States District
Court for the Central District of California granting summary judgment in
favor of the insurers.65 Similar to Amazon and most other major
corporations, Hyundai maintained an interactive website.66 Hyundai’s
corporate website allowed users to “build [their] own” vehicle by
navigating through a series of questions on different menus pertaining to
colors, engine types, transmission types, etc.67 In response to each user’s
input, the corporate website “displayed customized vehicle images and
pricing information.”68 The website also contained a similar feature that
allowed customers to select customized parts for the very same vehicles.69
In the underlying action pertaining to Hyundai’s interactive website, Orion
IP, LLC, a patent-holding company alleged that the “build your own
vehicle” feature and the parts catalogue feature infringed on Orion’s
patented computer-based system which created customized product
proposals, including pictures and text, to be used in the creation of a
proposal.70 Hyundai tendered a defense under its primary insurance policy,
which promised to defend and indemnify Hyundai against claims alleging
62

See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 977-78 & n.21.
See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 978 n.25 (rejecting the insurer’s argument that
Intouch’s injury could not have been caused by Amazon’s advertising because
customers would not have been aware that they were using an infringing product).
64
600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010).
65
See Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1104.
66
See id. at 1095.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1095-96.
63
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“advertising injury,” among other things.71 Similar to the provisions of the
insurance policy at issue in Amazon, one of the enumerated offenses under
the “advertising injury” provision mirrored that the of the ISO 1986 Broad
Form CGL endorsement, and provided the policyholder with coverage for
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.”72
To determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend Hyundai
under the “advertising injury” provision of its insurance policy, the court
looked to find the existence of three elements: (i) whether Hyundai
engaged in “advertising” during the relevant policy period when the alleged
“advertising injury” occurred, (ii) whether Orion’s allegations created a
potential liability under one of the covered offenses (i.e., misappropriation
of advertising ideas), and (iii) whether a causal connection existed between
the alleged injury and the “advertising.”73 The court stated that “patent
infringement can qualify as an advertising injury if the patent involves any
process or invention which could reasonably be considered an advertising
idea,” i.e., if the third party “allege[d] violation of a method patent
involving advertising ideas.”74
Similar to the ISO 1986 Broad Form endorsement, the CGL policy
at issue in this case failed to define “advertising,” and the court was forced
to determine the appropriate meaning of the undefined term.75 In the
context of the insurance policy provision, the court concluded that the term
“advertising” referred to the “widespread promotional activities usually
directed to the public at large,” but it did “not encompass solicitation”
under California law.76 The court determined that the BYO feature was
“widely distributed to the public at large, to millions of unknown webbrowsing potential customers, even if the precise information conveyed to
each … varie[d] with user input … [because] the users [we]re using the

71

Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1095-96.
Compare Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1096, and Amazon.com ,
85 P.3d at 976 , with INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 11 85 (1984).
73
Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Hameid v. Nat’l Fire Ins. of Hartford,
71 P.3d 761, 764-65 (Cal. 2003)).
74
Id. at 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Homedics, Inc. v.
Valley Forge Ins. Co., 315 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003)).
75
See id. at 1098; INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 11 85 (1984).
76
See Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Hameid, 71 P.3d at 764-65)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
72
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same BYO feature.”77 Therefore, the BYO feature was not a solicitation
insofar as it varied for each different user, but rather, it was a widely
distributed, public advertisement. After concluding that the interactive
website was not merely a “solicitation,” the court determined that Orion’s
patent infringement claim constituted a “misappropriation of advertising
idea,” because a lay person would reasonably understand the phrase to
include Orion’s patent infringement claim.78 In reaching its conclusion, the
court noted dicta in Iolab stating that “patent infringement may constitute
an advertising injury where an entity uses an advertising technique that is
itself patented.”79 The court also relied on Amazon, which it found
analogous to the present case, because the BYO feature was the “form of
the advertisement itself … and plainly is not the product being
advertised.”80
Agreeing with the Court of Appeals of Washington in Amazon, the
court stated that a causal relationship does not exist when the alleged
infringement concerns patents covering the underlying product for sale.81
The court summarized the causal connection requirement and concluded
that “[w]hen the patent infringement occurs independent of the actual
advertisement of the underlying product, because the patent concerns the
underlying product … then the causal connection typically is not
established, even when the advertising exposes the infringement.”82
Conversely, “[w]hen the patent infringement occurs in the course of the
advertising . . . the causal connection is established.”83 In the summary of
the causal connection requirement, the court noted that many of the
previous Ninth Circuit decisions suggested that a causal connection would
never exist, even when the patent concerned the method of advertising.84

77

Id. at 1099-1100 (alteration in original) (noting that the “patent’s raison
d’etre is to create customized proposals, specific to an individual user.”).
78
Id. at 1101.
79
Id. at 1102 (emphasis added) (quoting Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15
F.3d 1500, 1507 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)).
80
Id. at 1101-02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Amazon Int’l, Inc.
v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Linens Ins. Co., 85 P.3d 974, 977 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)).
81
Id. at 1102.
82
Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1103 (alteration in original). But see Hyundai, 600
F.3d at 1103 n.4 (suggesting that situations where advertisements induce others to
infringe on a patent may produce the requisite causal connection).
83
Id. at 1103 (alteration in original).
84
See id. at 1102-04; see also Simply Fresh Fruit v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 F.3d
1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the advertising activities must cause the
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However, the court distinguished the case on the basis that the infringement
was Hyundai’s use of patented techniques as part of its own “marketing
method” or “marketing system” and the claim potentially alleged
advertising injury within the insurance policy coverage.85 Based on these
differences, the court concluded that a duty to defend against the third party
patent infringement existed under the CGL insurance policy “advertising
injury” provision.86
C.

DISH NETWORK CORPORATION
INSURANCE COMPANY

V.

ARCH

SPECIALTY

The most recent case finding that an insurer had a duty to defend a
policyholder against a third party patent infringement claim was DISH
Network Corporation v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company. Applying
Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
reversed a decision by the District of Colorado granting summary judgment
in favor of the insurers.87 In the underlying action, Ronald A. Katz
Technology, Licensing, L.P. filed one or more claims on twenty-three
different patents, alleging that by DISH Network committed patent
infringement by “making, using, offering to sell, and/or selling …
automated telephone systems, including … the DISH Network customer
service telephone system, [which] allow[ed] [DISH’s] customers to
perform pay-per-view ordering and customer service functions over the
telephone.”88 DISH Network tendered a defense under its primary
insurance and excess coverage policies, all of which promised to defend
and indemnify DISH against claims alleging “advertising injury,” among
other items.89 Four of DISH Network’s five insurance policies enumerated
four categories of offenses which constituted “advertising injury,” in
language identical to the advertising injury provisions in the ISO 1986
Broad Form Endorsement.90 The fifth insurance policy explicitly excluded
injury,” not merely expose it) (emphasis in original); Microtec Research v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1994).
85
See Hyundai, 600 F.3d 1092.
86
Id.
87
DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1028 (10th
Cir. 2011).
88
Id. at 1012-13 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The language of the
underlying action mirrors that of the revision to the Patent Act in 1994.
89
Id. at 1013.
90
Id.; INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL COMMERCE
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, CG 00 01 11 85 (1984).
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from coverage, “any claim … [a]rising out of the infringement of
copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property
rights,” however, the exclusion did not apply to “infringement, in [the
insured’s] ‘advertisement,’ of copyright, trade dress or slogan.”91
Reviewing the lower court decision de novo, Colorado law
required the Tenth Circuit to adhere to a “four corners rule,” under which
the court was required to “compare the allegations of the underlying
complaint with the terms of the applicable insurance policy.”92 In the
context of a duty to defend against a third party patent infringement claim,
the rule requires an insurer to tender a defense if the underlying action
alleges any facts or claims that might fall within the insurance policy’s
provisions.93 Adhering to the “four corners rule,” the court applied a threepart test to determine whether the insurers owed a defense to DISH
Network under the advertising injury provisions.94 Specifically, the court
analyzed: (i) whether DISH Network “engaged in ‘advertising’ during the
relevant period, (ii) whether the underlying complaint alleged the predicate
“advertising injury” offense under the policy, and (iii) whether a causal
connection existed between the advertising activity and the alleged injury
suffered by the third party patent holder.95
Prior to the analysis of the three-part test, the court first determined
whether patent infringement could ever fall within the applicable CGL
advertising injury provisions.96 Looking to other jurisdictions for guiding
precedent, the court noted that a clear majority view had emerged and
courts “routinely distinguish between claims based on the manufacture and
sale of an infringing product-in which case the claim is not covered even if
the product is used in advertising and a claim based on the unauthorized
use of a patented advertising idea or method- in which case the claim is
covered.”97 Despite the substantial number of cases suggesting that
infringement of a patented idea will qualify for coverage under the
advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy, the court noted that many
91

DISH Network Corp., 659 F.3d at 1013-14 (citation omitted); See id. at
1028-29 (remanding the case to the district court to determine whether the unique
language regarding the intellectual property exclusion in the fifth insurance barred
a duty to defend against the underlying third party patent infringement claim.).
92
Id. at 1015.
93
Id. (citing Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294,
301 (Colo. 2003)).
94
Id. at n.4.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
97
Id. (citation omitted).

202

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

19.1

cases “unequivocally reject patent coverage,” where it is not expressly
included in the policy.98 Distinguishing the existing case law from the
present facts, the Tenth Circuit explained that “[t]he bulk of the published
case law addressing patent infringement as advertising injury deals with
products the insured happened to advertise, rather than a means of
advertising that the insured used to market its own [non-infringing]
products.”99 The court concluded that “[d]epending on the context of the
facts and circumstances of th[e] case, patent infringement can qualify as an
advertising injury if the patent involve[s] any process or invention which
could reasonably be considered an advertising idea,” noting that such cases
are rare, in which an “allegedly infringed patent is itself and advertising
idea rather than merely an advertised product.”100 In the underlying action,
the court explained that DISH Network “allegedly committed patent
infringement by using [patented] technology to sell Dish’s own noninfringing … products and services.”101 The holding seems to suggest that
coverage is only appropriate when both the accused activity and the
patent’s claims are within the scope of advertising. However, the logic
espoused by the court clearly demonstrates a willingness to provide
reasonable protection to policyholders in light of the broadly encompassing
language in a CGL policy similar to the ISO 1986 Broad Form
endorsement.
After determining that patent infringement could fall within the
applicable CGL advertising injury provisions, the Tenth Circuit applied the
Novell analysis, and analyzed “whether the complaint potentially alleged a
predicate offense, viz., ‘misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business.”102 As was previously noted, the ISO 1986 Broad Form
endorsement failed to define the meaning of the term “advertising,” and the
definition varies between jurisdictions. The court noted that some
jurisdictions apply broadly encompassing definitions for “advertising,”
such as; (i) the “action of calling something to the attention of the
public,”103 or (ii) any oral, written or graphic statement made by the seller
98

Id. at 1019 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Frosty Bites, Inc., 232
F.Supp.2d 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
99
DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1017-18 (alteration in original).
100
Id. at 1020 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotations
marks omitted) (quoting Hyundai Motor Am. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa., 600 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010)).
101
Id. at 1018 (alteration in original).
102
Id. at 1020.
103
Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Adolfo House Distrib. Corp. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
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in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business.”104
Conversely, other jurisdictions provide a strict definition: “widespread
distribution of promotional materials to the public at large,” in contrast
with a one-on-one promotional activity known as a “solicitation.”105 The
court failed to reach a conclusion as to which definition should apply to
third party patent infringement claims, however, it concluded that the
underlying complaint could be read to potentially allege the
Reasoning that the patented
misappropriation of advertising ideas.106
functions conceivably allowed DISH Network to sell their product, and
conceivably make selling offers to the specific caller, the court stated that
“the complaint … allege[d] misappropriation of a product specifically
designed … for advertising purposes.”107
After concluding that the complaint potentially alleged
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business under the
advertising injury provisions of the insurance policies, the court then
analyzed whether the requisite causal connection existed.108 Specifically,
the court examined whether the alleged injury arose in the course of
advertising as the policy language mandated.109 The causal requirement is
important for public policy reasons because:
“[v]irtually every business that sells a
product or service advertises, if only in the
sense of making representations to potential
customers. If no causal relationship were
required between “advertising activities and
‘advertising injuries, the advertising injury
165 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1339 (S.D.Fla. 2001)); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
(noting this definition of “advertising” is similar to that of the 1998 ISO Broad
Form Endorsement).
104
See Amazon.com Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 85 P.3d
974, 977 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004) (quoting State Auto Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2003)).
105
See Hayward v. Centennial Ins. Co., 430 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Hameid v. Nat’l Fire Ins. of Hartford, 71 P.3d 761, 763 (Cal. 2003)).
106
See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1022 (alteration in original). It is important
to note that under Colorado law the issue is not whether the complaint definitively
delineates the specific advertising activities Dish engaged in, but rather whether
the alleged facts even potentially fall within the scope of coverage.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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coverage, alone, would encompass most
claims related to the insured’s business.”110
In DISH, the court delineated several different approached, applied by
various courts, to determining whether the requisite causal connection was
satisfied. In the first approach, causation was satisfied if the “alleged
advertising activities alone would be actionable.”111 Another approach
required that “the advertising activities must cause the injury-not merely
expose it.”112 The final approach taken by courts fails to find the requisite
causal connection “if the injury could have arisen in the absence of
advertising,” specifically, if “any advertising done through the use of the
software [wa]s incidental to [the underlying plaintiff’s] core complaint.”113
The court declined to follow the final approach, which was utilized by the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit in Delta Computer Corp. v.
Frank, 196 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1999), because the approach was
inconsistent “with Colorado’s rule that a duty to defend arises wherever the
complaint even potentially alleges conduct within the policy language.”114

110

Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 989 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration
in original) (quoting Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 525, 560 (Cal. 1992)).
111
See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1026 (citing Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., Inc.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 750 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999)).
112
See id. (citing Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d at 989); see also
Microtec Research v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1994)
(alteration in original) (“If the [insured] does some wrongful act and then
advertises it, harm caused by the wrongful act alone is not within the scope of the
term advertising injury.”).
113
See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1026, 1028 (quoting Delta Computer Corp.
v. Frank, 196 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Delta Computer Corp. v.
Frank, 196 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (concluding that
the underlying claim was “essentially for infringement of [a] copyrighted software
program,” not for any advertising the plaintiff may have done with it, and noting
that the “underlying pleading state[d] nothing about advertising.”).
114
See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1028 (citing Compass Ins. Co. v. City of
Littleton, 984 F.3d 606, 614 (Colo. 1999)) (The court citing Cyprus Amax
Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 301 (Colo. 2003), that Colorado
requires a duty to defend the entire suit when any claim “might fall within the
ambit of the policy”)).
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IV.

RECENT CHANGES LIMITING ADVERTISING INJURY
COVERAGE IN INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, INC.
COMMERCIAL
OR
COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL
LIABILITY POLICY FORMS
A.

THE 1998 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS

In 1998, the ISO made several major revisions in an attempt to
resolve some of the issues surrounding the 1986 Broad Form endorsement.
The first substantial change was the combination of the definitions of
“personal injury” and “advertising injury” into Part B coverage, “Personal
and Advertising Injury.”115 In this section, the ISO defined the term
“advertisement” for the first time in the advertising injury provisions, as
“notice that is broadcast to or published to the general public or specific
market segments … for the purpose of attaining customers or
supporters.”116 The second substantial change from the ISO 1986 Broad
Form endorsement was the replacement of the provision providing
coverage for “infringement of copyright, title or slogan,” with a new
provision providing coverage for “infring[ement] upon another’s copyright,
trade dress or slogan in your advertisement.”117 Additionally, the ISO 1998
Broad Form endorsement removed the provision providing coverage for
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,” and
replaced the provision with coverage for “the use of another’s advertising
idea in your advertisement.”118 Although the effects of these changes are
unclear, these revisions may force courts to reach different conclusions
under circumstances similar to those of the previously discussed decisions
by the Court of Appeals of Washington and subsequently by the United
States Court of Appeals, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
B.

THE 2001 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS

The ISO 1998 Broad Form endorsement revisions were released in
2001 following major increases in the global use of electronic

115

See INS. SERVS. OFFICE INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
FORM CG 00 01 07 98 (1997); See also INS. SERVS. OFFICE INC., COMMERCIAL
GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 11 85 (1986).
116
INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC. supra note 115.
117
Id. (alteration in original).
118
Id.
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communications which raised concerns among ISO member companies.119
In the ISO 2001 Broad Form endorsement, advertising injury coverage is
described under six enumerated offenses: (i) false arrest, detention or
imprisonment, (ii) malicious prosecution, (iii) libel, slander, or
disparagement, (iv) violation of the right of privacy, (v) use of another’s
advertising idea in your advertisement, and (vi) infringement of copyright,
trade dress, or slogan in your advertising.120 The ISO 2001 Broad Form
endorsement explicitly excludes coverage, any injury “arising out of the
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other
intellectual property rights” from the “Personal and Advertising Injury”
provisions.121 However, this exclusion “does not apply to infringement, in
your ‘advertisement,’ of copyright, trade dress of slogan.”122 These
changes appear to be in response to attempts by policyholder to secure
coverage for third party patent infringement claim, as described in the
previous sections. Insurance policies that utilize language mirroring the
newer editions of the Broad Form endorsements are likely to prevent
policyholders from obtaining coverage.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether the new
exclusions in the “Personal and Advertising Injury” provision of the ISO
2001 Broad Form endorsement bar coverage when the policyholder
infringes on a patented advertising idea, but it is only a matter of time
before the question is presented to a court. Generally, courts faced with
issues surrounding CGL policies are increasingly limiting policyholder
coverage for infringement of intellectual property rights and third party
patent infringement. Although the previously discussed cases are a
significant victory for policyholders, the ISO CGL endorsements now
contain exclusions which are likely to prohibit courts from following the
logic espoused by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and the Washington Court
of Appeals. The revisions in the ISO 1998 and 2001 Broad Form
119

See INS. SERVS. OFFICE INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
FORM CG 00 01 10 01 (2000). (alteration in original) (“Notices that are published
include material placed on the Internet, or on similar electronic means of
communication; and [r]egarding web-sites, only the part of a web-site that is about
your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or
supporters is considered an advertisement.”).
120
See id.
121
See id. (emphasis added).
122
See id.
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endorsements create more impediments for policyholders and limit the
ability to obtain coverage for third party patent infringement claims.123
“The combination of the sharply curtailed advertising injury coverage with
the new IP exclusions mean[s] that, except for a tiny number of cases, the
commercial general liability [insurance policies] no longer provides
coverage for IP infringement generally, including for patent
infringement.”124

123

See Robert D. Chesler & Cindy Tzvi Sonenblick, Insurance Coverage for
Intellectual Property Infringement (pt. 3), BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (2008),
http://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/33ad0bf9-ca30-4c15-a20e05d8048333be/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/05af2561-74b2-4f37-951e0b181131c92b/Privacy%20Liability%20Part%203%20Bloomberg%20RC%20and
%20CS.%2006.08.pdf, (“[M]any companies now have essentially no coverage for
intellectual property infringement.”).
124
See id. (alteration in original).

MEDICALLY UNNECESSARY: HOW THE FLAWS IN
MEDICARE PART D’S COVERAGE OF OFF-LABEL
MEDICINES WITH DEMONSTRABLE MEDICAL NECESSITY
PREVENTS BETTER HEALTHCARE OUTCOMES, INCLUDING
FOR BENEFICIARIES WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
ALEXANDER W. WING*
***
This article examines the hardships faced by Medicare Part D patients, and
especially mental health patients, with respect to obtaining coverage for
necessary but off-label drug prescriptions. The article posits that the
Medicare Part D system, as it currently exists, is failing not only in its
mission for quality of care, but also in its cost-effectiveness. The paper
advocates a comprehensive approach to Medicare Part D that addresses
both deficiencies by allowing for exceptions to the FDA approved use
requirement, on a case-by-case basis, where such exceptions are supported
by scientific evidence. An exception process of this nature would allow
deserving beneficiaries to acquire the prescriptions they need while also
avoiding the heightened costs associated with an abundance of undertreated or mistreated patients.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2011, a psychiatrist published an article describing a
problem the likes of which she has seen repeatedly in her practice.1 Her
Medicare Part D enrolled patient was refused an antidepressant that he had
been stable on for nearly a decade.2 Now he was required to go through a
laborious prior authorization process that left him unmedicated and

*

Alexander W. Wing; Juris Doctor Candidate – University of Connecticut
School of Law. I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting me
while I wrote and worked on this note. I would also like to thank the professors
who gave me feedback and the late Jennifer Jaff for introducing me to this area of
the law.
1
Elissa Ely, The Run-Around with Medicare Part D, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
26, 2011, at A.11.
2
Id.
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unstable.3 This unfortunate story is an exemplar of coverage issues faced
by mentally disordered Medicare Part D beneficiaries. A correlated and
serious coverage problem faced by Medicare Part D patients, both mentally
disordered and otherwise, is the unreasonable denial of medically necessary
off-label medications.
Medicare Part D was created by an amendment to the Social
Security Act called, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (MMA).4 The MMA was enacted in 2003 and became
effective in 2006.5 The MMA provides an outpatient prescription drug
coverage program for Medicare beneficiaries, on a voluntary basis, by
offering a variety of plans from private insurers who have contracted with
the Department of Health and Human Services.6
Off-label drug use is the use of a drug, approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), for an indication other than that specified in
FDA drug labeling.7 Beyond prescribing approved drugs for unapproved
conditions, off-label use also includes prescribing medication for different
populations (e.g. age groups) and at doses higher or lower than approved.8
Pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), new medications
are granted FDA approval only after being proven safe and effective for
specific ailments at particular dosages.9 In 2000, the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that, “neither Congress nor the FDA has
attempted to regulate the off-label use of drugs by doctors and consumers.
A physician may prescribe a legal drug to serve any purpose that he or she
3

See id.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (2011).
5
Id.
6
See e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-366R, MEDICARE
PART D FORMULARIES: CMS CONDUCTS OVERSIGHT OF MID-YEAR CHANGES;
MOST MID-YEARS CHANGES WERE ENHANCEMENTS 1 (2011).
7
See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE COMM’R, OFFICE OF
POLICY, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON
UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED
MEDICAL DEVICES 1 n.2 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/
DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf.
8
See also With Precautions, Psychiatrists Need Not Shun Off-Label
Prescribing, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, June 6, 2008, at 1, available at
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=111823.
9
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2010).
4
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deems appropriate, regardless of whether the drug has been approved for
that use by the FDA.”10 Off-label prescribing is a very common medical
practice that is even “ubiquitous in certain specialties.”11 On its website,
the FDA cautions physicians to prescribe off-label only when such use is
supported by “sound medical evidence” while clearly distinguishing such
practices from investigational uses that would fall under their scrutiny.12
One district court has held that statute restricts Medicare Part D
coverage to FDA approved uses and off-label uses endorsed by statutorily
Another court has
designated medical compendia of drug uses.13
interpreted the statute to be more encompassing and permissive of off-label
uses not published in the compendia, provided that the off-label use at issue
is medically necessary as supported by scientific evidence.14 At present,
there is proposed legislation in Congress that would expressly require
coverage of such meritorious off-label uses.15
This note advocates for Medicare Part D coverage of off-label
medications that are demonstrably necessary as indicated by an appropriate
amount of reliable medical evidence. Moreover, this note argues that such
a process should have protections built into it to address the particular
needs and problems faced by mentally disordered patients. The political
debates over Medicare, and Social Security in general, are outside of this
note’s scope. Rather, this note aims to make Medicare Part D, a new social
safety net, as efficient as possible while still providing the base quality of
care that is its objective. By correctly providing optimal care for patients,
Medicare would be more compassionate and cost-effective. To curb costs
at the expense of reasonably proper healthcare is contrary to Medicare’s
purpose of providing coverage for a vulnerable high-risk insurance pool,
while also combating the moral hazards posed when insuring these
populations.
In part II, this note provides more background information about
Medicare Part D including: costs and mechanisms, an explanation of offlabel drug uses, and the use of formularies and drug compendia in
10

Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
11
Id. (citation omitted).
12
“Off-Label” and Investigational Use Of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and
Medical Devices - Information Sheet, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm
(last
updated Aug. 10, 2011).
13
Kilmer v. Leavitt, 609 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
14
Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
15
Part D Off-Label Parity Act, H.R. 1055, 112th Cong. (2011).
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determining coverage. Part III will explore problems and issues with offlabel uses and the utilization of compendia under Medicare Part D, and will
also examine legal and legislative action pertaining to off-label coverage.
The concerns of mentally disordered Medicare Part D beneficiaries will be
analyzed in part IV by establishing the frequency of mental disorders
among Medicare patients. Part IV will continue with an examination of
coverage for off-label medications in mental health contexts, followed by a
discussion of policy that would expressly ensure mental health parity and
facilitate proper access to medically necessary off-label drugs. The note
will conclude in Part V, with an emphasis on the mentally disordered,
wherein the problems with off-label coverage under Medicare Part D will
be recapped and policy solutions will be examined.
II.

MEDICARE PART D
A.

WHO IS COVERED UNDER
IT WORK?

MEDICARE PART D AND HOW DOES

In order to be entitled to Medicare Part D prescription benefits, one
must be eligible under Medicare Part A or enrolled in Medicare Part B.16
The MMA also established a program called Medicare+Choice under
Medicare Part C.17 It provides coverage plans that are alternatives to those
under Medicare Part A or Part B, and makes Part D coverage available.18
Medicare Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage) prescription plans
are called MA-PD, short form for Medicare Advantage prescription drug,
and other Part D plans are called PDPs (prescription drug plans).19
Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) entitlement extends to seniors aged 65
and older who are eligible for Social Security benefits, as well as to those
who have been qualified to receive Social Security Disability benefits for at
least two years.20 Medicare Part B (medical insurance) coverage requires
enrollment, and eligibility extends beyond that of Part A.21 Medicare Part
B covers persons entitled to Social Security Benefits, as well as all that
16

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a)(3)(A) (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a) (2011).
18
Id.
19
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-366R, MEDICARE PART
D FORMULARIES: CMS CONDUCTS OVERSIGHT OF MID-YEAR CHANGES; MOST
MID-YEARS CHANGES WERE ENHANCEMENTS 1 n.3 (2011).
20
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (2011).
21
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o) (2011).
17
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have attained the age of 65 (provided that they are a citizen or an alien who
has lawfully resided in the United States for at least 5 years).22 Social
Security Disability benefits are available for a broad variety of
impairments,23 including mental disorders in both adults24 and children.25
While Medicare Part D prescription drug plans must meet certain
statutory guidelines, they differ in implementation when it comes to
premiums, gap coverage, copayment tiers, deductibles, and other pricing
structures.26 The MMA requires that Medicare Part D plans provide either
“standard prescription drug coverage with access to negotiated prices,” as
defined by the statute, or the actuarial equivalent thereof.27 The MMA
definition of standard prescription drug coverage is codified in 42 U.S.C. §
1395w-102 (b).28 It specifies that many of the listed patient costs be
subjected to yearly price increases.29 This is determined by the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter Secretary),
based on the “annual percentage increase [of the] average per capita
aggregate expenditures for covered Part D drugs.”30 When the MMA came
into effect in 2006, plan providers could charge beneficiaries a deductible
of $250 that has since been raised to reflect the aforementioned annual
percentage based price increase.31 The standard plan also requires that the
patient pay 25% coinsurance until the costs expended reach $2,250,
adjusted for the annual percentage increase.32 After reaching this cap, Part
22

See id.
See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part III –Listing of
Impairments, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/
professionals/bluebook/listing-impairments.htm (last modified Jul. 6, 2012).
24
See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: 12.00 Mental Disorders Adult,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
ONLINE,
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/
professionals/bluebook/12.00-MentalDisorders-Adult.htm (last modified Jul. 6,
2012).
25
See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: 112.00 Mental Disorders Childhood,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
ONLINE,
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/
professionals/bluebook/112.00-MentalDisorders-Childhood.htm (last modified Jul.
6, 2012).
26
JACK HOADLEY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS IN 2011 AND KEY TRENDS SINCE 2006 1 (2011),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8237.pdf.
27
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(a) (2011).
28
See id. § 1395w-102(b).
29
See id. § 1395w-102(b)(6).
30
Id.
31
See id. § 1395w-102(b)(1).
32
Id. § 1395w-102(b)(2)–(b)(3).
23
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D beneficiaries enter a coverage gap, infamously known as the doughnut
hole.33 While in the coverage gap, beneficiaries pay the next $3600 (plus
the annual increases) for their prescriptions, after which they pay 5%
coinsurance.34 The recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (PPACA), also known as Obamacare, contains provisions aimed at
ameliorating this problem.35 From 2011 onward, the PPACA will provide
price discounts and government subsidies for Medicare Part D enrollees
mired in the doughnut hole, with plans to phase out the coverage gap
entirely by 2020.36 Moreover, most Part D plan insurers tend to opt for
actuarial equivalency as implemented via tiered cost sharing schemes.37 As
of November 2011, 53% of PDPs had a deductible and 43% used the
standard plan amount.38 After charging a deductible, most plans utilized
cost contingent tiered copayment schemes instead of the flat 25%
coinsurance of the standard plan.39 In 2012 the standard plan deductible
was $320 and the coverage gap was between $2930 and $6730.40 There are
also provisions to provide subsidies and assistance to poor beneficiaries.41
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reported that over
10 million enrollees received such help in 2011, although an estimated
additional 2 million enrollees were eligible for such assistance but did not
receive it.42 This figure is alarming, and starkly presents some of Medicare
Part D’s problems, because 29.5 million people were enrolled under
Medicare Part D as of September 2011.43
The MMA directs the Secretary to promulgate an administrative
grievance process by which a Part D enrollee may appeal a decision
33

JACK HOADLEY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART D 2011:
THE COVERAGE GAP 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicare/upload/8222.pdf.
34
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)(4) (2011).
35
See HOADLEY, ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS, supra
note 26, at 1.
36
See HOADLEY, THE COVERAGE GAP, supra note 33, at 1.
37
See HOADLEY, ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS, supra
note 26, at 4.
38
See THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
MEDICARE
POLICY
FACT
SHEET
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7044-12.pdf.
39
See id.
40
See id.
41
See id. at 2.
42
See id.
43
See id.
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denying drug coverage.44 There are four levels of administrative appeal
prior to district court jurisdiction.45 The four levels of administrative
review are: internal to the provider, independent and external review,
administrative law judge review, and finally a hearing before the Medicare
Appeals Council.46 Not surprisingly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third and Ninth Circuits have each held that the federal district
courts have no jurisdiction until administrative remedies are fully
exhausted, as required by law.47 Therefore, an individual may appeal in a
federal district court, only if the amount in controversy is $1,300.00 or
greater and only after the fourth level of appeal has been determined.48
B.

OFF-LABEL DRUG USE

Prescribing FDA approved medications for off-label use is legal
because regulation of the practice of medicine is outside the FDA’s
purview.49 This policy makes sense because once safety is established,
innovation in research may find new uses and verify them at a rate faster
than the FDA approval process. Such regulation could also pose logistical
problems and might raise debate over governmental authority. In 1982, the
FDA acknowledged that prescribing off-label drugs often reflects valid
clinical applications as established by thorough research.50 Since the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not forbid such usage, many safe
and innovative uses of approved drugs aren’t promptly added to the FDA
medical labeling, because of the time and expense involved.51 That offlabel prescribing is often dangerous or uncertain due to a lack of scientific
44

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104 (f)-(i) (2011), cross referencing 42 U.S.C. §
1395w-22 (2011); see appended flowchart infra p. 252.
45
See appended flowchart infra p. 252.
46
See appended flowchart infra p. 252.
47
See Kopstein v. Indep. Blue Cross, 339 F. App’x 261, 264-65 (3d Cir.
2009); Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010).
48
See appended flowchart infra p. 252 (note that the amount in controversy
requirements are modified yearly to reflect the consumer price index).
49
See More Information for Better Patient Care: Hearing of the Comm. On
Labor and Human Res. U.S. S., 104th Cong. 81-82 (1996) (statement of William
Schultz, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food and Drug Administration), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960222a.html.
50
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled
Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 3, 4-5 (Apr. 1982), available at
http://www.circare.org/fda/fdadrugbulletin_041982.pdf.
51
See id.
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support has been well documented elsewhere.52 However, one need only
look to the news to learn that FDA approval alone is no guarantor of safety
or efficacy.53 Unfortunately, medication errors are so common that the
FDA has a program, called MedWatch, whose sole purpose is to monitor
adverse drug reactions.54 Concurrently, off-label use is frequently well
supported by medical research and has therapeutic value embraced by
health providers.55 A common and prominent example of a drug used for
non-FDA sanctioned uses is aspirin.56 Aspirin’s efficacy in combating
heart disease has long been known by the medical community yet its

52

See, e.g., David C Radley, et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006), available at
http://archinte.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/166/9/1021 (statistical analysis of drug
use surveys found 21% of prescriptions are for off label use but only 27% of these
uses had strong scientific support and cautions that off-label use without such
support could be dangerous or fiscally wasteful).
53
See, e.g., Shari Roan, Avastin Loses Approval as Breast Cancer Drug, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at 9, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/nov/18/health/la-he-avastin-breast-cancer-20111119
(FDA
approval
withdrawn for breast cancer because harms greater than therapeutic benefit,
endorsement remains for other cancer types); Rita Rubin, How did Vioxx Debacle
Happen?, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm (Vioxx manufacturer Merck withdrew
dangerous drug from market in spite of FDA approval causing many to question
and critique FDA).
54
FDA 101: Medication Errors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048644.htm#Examples
ofMedicationErrors (last updated Feb. 20, 2009) (this service monitors all adverse
drug events, many of which occur independently of the drug approval process).
55
See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (Apr. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107.
56
See
Bayer:
Science
for
a
Better
Life,
BAYER.COM,
http://www.bayer.com/en/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2012); Joseph Sirven,
New Uses for Older Drugs: The Tales of Aspirin, Thalidomide, and Gabapentin,
85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 508, (June 2010), available at http://171.67.112.83/
content/85/6/508.full.pdf+html (aspirin is a complicated example because its use
and discovery profoundly predates the founding of the FDA and its regulatory
scheme); Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (Apr. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107 (aspirin is used off-label to
prevent heart disease among diabetes sufferers).
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approved indications were slow to reflect that understanding.57 Thus, an
off-label use of an approved drug is often supported by the medical
community and can be of great benefit to a patient’s health. A flexible
prescription coverage regime predicated on medical evidence and best
practices would be the most humane and efficient. Therefore it is of
paramount importance to ensure that off-label use, when it occurs, is
meritorious. It is illegal for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to label an
approved drug for an unapproved indication and for them to market or
promote an off-label use.58 This law hopefully helps reduce pressure on
doctors to base their prescribing practices on biased information. In the
absence of information from drug companies, doctors must inform
themselves about off-label uses “through compendia, journal articles,
continuing medical education programs, symposia, and professional
meetings.”59 To that end, the FDA has recently published guidance for the
healthcare industry that stipulates what standards to look for in evaluating
medical evidence for off-label use.60
57

See Bayer: Science for a Better Life, BAYER.COM, http://www.bayer
.com/en/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2012); Joseph Sirven, New Uses for
Older Drugs: The Tales of Aspirin, Thalidomide, and Gabapentin, 85 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 508, (June 2010), available at http://171.67.112.83/content/
85/6/508.full.pdf+html (aspirin is a complicated example because its use and
discovery profoundly predates the founding of the FDA and its regulatory scheme);
Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role of the
FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.nejm.
org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107 (aspirin is used off-label to prevent heart
disease among diabetes sufferers).
58
E.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332-33 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (citations omitted); United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 n. 2
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
59
Testimony on Unapproved Uses of Prescription Drugs: Before S. Comm. On
Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. (Feb. 22, 1996) (statement of William Schultz,
Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food and Drug Admin.), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960222a.html.
60
See also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF THE
COMM’R, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf
(last
updated Aug. 6, 2009). This guidance was published when 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa,
which in certain contexts allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to disseminate
information on their product’s off label uses, was still in effect. While such
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FORMULARIES AND COMPENDIA

The prescription drug plans available to Medicare Part D
beneficiaries all provide basic coverage, but often differ in terms of pricing,
which pharmacies may be used, and which medicines are covered.61
Medicare Part D plans typically release a list of which medications are
available with a given plan, in a compilation called a formulary.62 It is
important to understand that a formulary is merely a list of prescriptions
available. The formulary does not dictate which ailments a given medicine
may be prescribed for. Still, these formularies must be developed and
reviewed by a committee of doctors and pharmacists pursuant to scientific
evidence.63 While compiling a formulary, a provider is required to provide
coverage for certain pharmaceuticals, and classes of pharmaceuticals, as
identified by the Secretary.64 Finally, the statute mandates that the
formulary be periodically evaluated,65 explained to patients and healthcare
professionals,66 and that patients and their healthcare providers are given
notice of any adverse changes to the formulary.67 Prompted by statute,
CMS has promulgated regulations that require formularies to contain “[a]ll
or substantially all drugs in the antidepressants, antipsychotics, [and]
anticonvulsants.” categories.68
However, this regulatory provision does not guarantee that Part D
patients suffering from mental disorder will be granted coverage or
reimbursement for an off-label prescription drug. This is significant
because one study found that as many as 74% of anticonvulsant, and 60%
dissemination is no longer permitted by statute, off label use remains legal and the
FDA’s guidance on evaluating medical literature is helpful. See id. at 6 & n.9.
61
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, How Medicare Prescription
Drug Plans and Medicare Advantage Plans with Prescription Drug Coverage
(MA-PDs) Use Pharmacies, Formularies, and Common Coverage Rules, CMS.
GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11136.pdf (last updated Feb.
2011).
62
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(i)(I) (2006).
63
Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(A)(i).
64
Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(C), (b)(3)(G).
65
Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(F).
66
Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(D).
67
Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(E).
68
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT MANUAL, CMS Pub. 100-18, ch. 6, § 30.2.5 (Rev. 10, Feb. 19, 2010),
https://www.cms.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Chapter6.pdf
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of antipsychotic, prescriptions were for off-label uses.69 Moreover, under
this provision, formularies do not necessarily contain both the generic and
brand name versions of drugs, all formulations of a drug (such as regular
versus extended release), nor all isomers of a molecule.70 These classes of
drugs are also subject to plan management techniques, such as prior
authorization, which have historically chilled the utilization of such
drugs.71 Coverage is similarly uncertain for all medications listed in a
formulary if the prescribed use is off-label because of how the MMA
determines whether an off-label use is medically necessary.
While the various plans available under Medicare Part D vary in
their coverage and cost, regulation stipulates that coverage of a medicine
under Medicare Part D is predicated on a “medically accepted indication”
as defined by statute.72 This terminology is distinguishable from the legal
concept of medical necessity and should not be.73 A drug in a plan’s
formulary may be denied coverage if the prescription is for a use that does
not satisfy the statute’s criteria. Under the MMA, a “medically accepted
indication” is defined in various ways.74 When the pharmaceutical
treatment in question is chemotherapeutic, the use is medically accepted
when it is FDA approved, or supported by a designated medical
A chemotherapeutic medication is also medically
compendium.75
acceptable if the carrier determines the use is medically necessary pursuant
to established medical practices and peer reviewed empirical literature,
commensurate with the guidance of the Secretary.76 At least for
chemotherapeutic medicines, Medicare Part D coverage is synchronous
with typical definitions of medical necessity.
A medical compendium is a compilation of endorsed drug uses
and adverse interactions that is supported by established medical practices
69

Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role
of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (2008), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107.
70
See Haiden Huskamp, et al., Coverage and Prior Authorization of
Psychotropic Drugs Under Medicare Part D, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 308, 30809 (2007), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3797/
07ps308.pdf.
71
Id. at 308.
72
42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2011). This regulation’s construction of statute was
held to be invalid. Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 579, 587 (2011).
73
See 12 LEE R. RUSS ET. AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 181:2 (2011).
74
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e)(4) (2011).
75
Id. § 1395x(t)(2)(B).
76
Id.
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and scientific research.77 Under Medicare Part D, all other types of drugs
(non-chemotherapeutic) are medically accepted only if they are FDA
approved for an application, or if their use is indicated by the medical
compendia listed in 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i).78 There are no
exceptions for non-chemotherapeutic medicines. Recall that 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(ii) provides that the medical acceptability of a
chemotherapeutic drug’s usage can be determined by reference to peer
reviewed literature and medical practices. But, this fact-based exception
was not included in the MMA framework for non-chemotherapeutic drugs.
Furthermore, the statute, as originally drafted, did not allow for exceptions
to the compendia for chemotherapeutic drugs either.79 This provision came
from an amendment contained in the Medicare Improvements for Patients
and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA).80 This came two years after the
enactment of Medicare Part D, which even now is a relatively new
program. Since FDA approval of a drug also determines approved uses,81
in practice these compendia are used to determine whether an off-label
usage is medically acceptable.
Under the MMA, the Secretary also has the authority to revise and
update the list of approved compendia to insure that medically accepted
indications are identifiable by carriers, patients, and health care providers.82
Regulation requires that the formation of a federally used compendium be
conducted through a transparent process subject to review by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).83 The compendia listed in
statute are: American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, the
United States Pharmacopeia–Drug Information, and the DRUGDEX
Information System.84 However, the United States Pharmacopeia-Drug
Information is now defunct and the DRUGDEX Information System was
added to this list at a later date.85 Thus, CMS configures and revises its
77

See 42 C.F.R. § 414.930(a). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(g)(1)(A) to 8(g)(2) (2011).
78
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e)(4) (2011)(cross referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r8(k)(6) (2011)).
79
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, H. R. 6331,
110th Cong. § 182 (2008).
80
Id.
81
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2010).
82
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(w)-102(e)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 2011).
83
See 42 C.F.R. § 414.930(b) (2011).
84
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
85
See Ross McKinney et al., White Paper: Potential Conflict of Interest in the
Production of Drug Compendia, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH &
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own working list of compendia pursuant to its regulatory authority.86 As of
this writing, the agency has adopted National Comprehensive Cancer
Network (NCCN) Drugs and Biologics Compendium87 and Clinical
Pharmacology88 to serve alongside Thomson Micromedex DRUGDEX and
American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information as the current
The various CMS approved
working compendia for Medicare.89
compendia differ in their compilation process, but generally all strive to be
unbiased and evidence based in their determinations.90 Unfortunately,
medical compendia also tend to have a substantial price tag. For example,
the 2012 edition of the AHFS – Drug Information medical compendium is
$329.00 for a softbound book that comes with access to online updates.91
One could also presume that because the myriad compendia are produced
by independent, competing organizations that the information in a given
compendium is not entirely synchronous with others. This reasonable
inference has empirical support. A study published in 2000 found
discrepancies amongst several leading compendia in their listing and

QUALITY 1-5
(Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.cms.gov/determinationprocess/
downloads/id64TA.pdf.
86
Id.
87
NCCN Compendium Revision Request - CAG-00389, Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (June 5, 2008), available at https://www.cms.gov/medicarecoverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-documentdetails.aspx?MCDId=14&McdName=NCCN+Compendium+ Revision+Request++CAG-00389&mcdtypename=Compendia&MCDIndexType
=6&bc=AgAEAAAAAAAA&.
88
Clinical Pharmacology Compendium Revision Request - CAG-00392,
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (July 2, 2008), available at
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/medicare-coveragedocument-details.aspx?MCDId=17&McdName=Clinical+Pharmacology+
Compendium+Revision+Request+-+CAG-00392&mcdtypename=Compendia&
MCDIndexType=6&bc=AgAEAAAAAAAA&.
89
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
90
See, e.g., Overview, AHFS DRUG INFORMATION, http://www.ahfsdrug
information.com/off_label/overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); DRUGDEX
System, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/
healthcare/healthcare_products/a-z/drugdex_system/ (last visited Jan. 5 2012).
91
AHFS
Drug
Information
2012,
ASHP
STORE,
http://store.ashp.org/ProductDetails/tabid/216/Default.aspx?ProductID=25018234
(last visited Jan. 5 2012).
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evaluation of drug-drug interactions.92 For further discussion of issues visà-vis medical compendia, see part III infra.
In short, whether or not a (non-chemotherapeutic) medication is
deemed medically appropriate for a given patient under Medicare Part D is
dependent on either FDA approval for a given usage, or a listed indication
in an approved medical compendium (whether it be designated by statute or
adopted by the agency). However, this statutory interpretation is in
contention and this issue is the crux of this note. How restrictive the term
“medically accepted indication” is on coverage has been subject to
reasonable debate between courts. In Kilmer v. Leavitt, the District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio interpreted the statute as limiting coverage
to “medically accepted” as determined by FDA approval or compendia
endorsement.93 The District Court for the Southern District of New York
disagreed in Layzer v. Leavitt and interpreted the statutory term “include”
to be inclusive rather than exclusive, thereby making strict compendia
based restrictions at odds with the statute.94 This issue could develop into a
circuit split, which would adversely impact the health of many, unless
Congress more clearly addresses this issue. To grant these compendia an
oligopoly on off-label coverage decisions makes little sense on either a
human or fiscal level. There should be more than a limited ability, if any,
to appeal for an exception. If cause for an exception exists that is grounded
in medical research, there should be a mechanism to pursue that eventuality
to counteract the mistake or omission of a compendium. Otherwise any
Medicare Part D enrollee, mentally disordered or otherwise, who is
prescribed a non-chemotherapeutic medication will only have their drug
covered if an approved compendium endorses its use. It is clear such a
framework will sometimes deny Medicare enrollees optimal, or perhaps
necessary, healthcare.

92

See Thomas R. Fulda et al., Disagreement Among Drug Compendia on
Inclusion and Ratings of Drug-Drug Interactions, 61 CURRENT THERAPEUTIC RES.,
540, 540-48 (2000).
93
Kilmer v. Leavitt, 609 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
94
Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 583-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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MEDICARE PART D ISSUES WITH OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS
AND COMPENDIA USE.

In its relatively short term of life, Medicare Part D has already seen
a great deal of litigation regarding how coverage decisions are made. This
is particularly interesting given the amount in controversy threshold and the
multi-step administrative grievance process that must be exhausted before a
federal district court even has jurisdiction.95 The holding of Layzer v.
Leavitt, whose appeal was dismissed by the United States Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, has the best prospect of serving as an impetus to
meaningful reform of Medicare prescription drug coverage policies.96
Recent proposed legislation and regulatory amendments have also
coincided with recent cases. Recall that coverage exceptions to compendia
indications for chemotherapeutic drugs, based on Secretary approved peerreviewed medical literature, only came with amendments contained in the
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA).97
While this reform is a step in the right direction, it is not enough. A
Medicare Part D enrollee should be expressly allowed to appeal for
coverage of any medication (not expressly excluded) whose medical
necessity has empirical support. This process should also contain
protections for the unique needs of the mentally disordered. As of this
writing, there is a bipartisan bill proposed in the House of Representatives,
currently under committee review, that encapsulates the spirit of Layzer v.
Leavitt by promoting coverage parity for off-label uses when based on
medical evidence.98 Unfortunately, the likelihood of this bill passing seems
scant, so such legislation should be pursued in subsequent Congresses with
the needs of all beneficiaries in mind.

95

See e.g., Kopstein v. Indep. Blue Cross, 339 F. App’x 261, 264-65 (3d Cir.
2009); Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010); See also
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Prescription Drug (Part D):
Coverage Determination/Appeals Process, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/
MedPrescriptDrugApplGriev/Downloads/PartDAppealsFlowchart.pdf (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011).
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Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, H. R. 6331,
110th Cong. § 182 (2008).
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Part D Off-Label Parity Act, H.R. 1055, 112th Cong. (2011).
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While the plethora of legal action regarding Medicare Part D
coverage is indicative of problems experienced by beneficiaries, it is useful
to examine what sorts of difficulties arise. By law, Medicare Part D
prescription plans must cover all FDA approved uses.99 In 1996, then FDA
Deputy Commissioner for Policy, William Schultz, testified before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources regarding off-label drug
use.100 He repeatedly stressed that “many off-label uses are quite
appropriate, and some may even be the treatment of choice.”101 While
arguing for the necessity of combating off-label promotion, the Deputy
Commissioner also cautioned that it was imperative for medical
professionals to make informed choices before prescribing off-label, given
legitimate concerns about the speed and cost of FDA approval.102
However, even off-label use that has been embraced by the medical
community is often denied coverage summarily. Frequently off-label
usage of medicines, most notably for cancer treatment, is reflexively denied
coverage or reimbursement on the grounds that the indication is
“experimental” or “investigational” even when that is not the case.103 This
experience is corroborated by a patient advocacy group who wrote to the
Internal Revenue Service to convey that in the course of business they had
seen medication coverage denials for many diseases on the grounds that the
treatment was experimental or investigational when in fact it was an
established and supported off-label use.104
A report published by the Government Accountability Office found
that many physicians are forced to resort to medication regiments that are
less efficacious than the off-label use that was denied coverage or
99

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(x)(t)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
Testimony on Unapproved Uses of Prescription Drugs: Before S. Comm.
On Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. (Feb. 22, 1996) (statement of William
Schultz, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food and Drug Administration),
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960222a.html.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
American Society of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer
Treatment: Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1,
1 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.asco.org/ASCO/Downloads/Cancer
%20Policy%20and%20Clinical%20Affairs/Off-Label%20Drug%20Indications/
Off-label%20statement.pdf; Katherine Tillman, et al., Compendia and Anticancer
Therapy Under Medicare, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 348, 348 (Mar. 2009).
104
Public Comment Letter from Jennifer Jaff, Advocacy for Patients with
Chronic Illness, Inc., to Internal Revenue Service (Sep. 15, 2010) at 2, available at
Reg-125592-10 Jaff, 2010 WL 3829485 (I.R.S. Sept. 15, 2010).
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reimbursement.105 Logically, a patient on a medication that is not optimal
may be sicker and sicker people are likely to have greater total health costs.
This is all the more worrisome for patients suffering from mental disorders
because of the risk of healthcare prejudice and hardship they already
face.106 The fact that competency issues render many incapable of selfadvocacy or thorough understanding of their plight makes this all the
worse. The report concluded that while the FDA’s process for updating a
drug’s label to include new uses was faster and more efficient than it once
was, the situation could still be improved because erroneous coverage or
reimbursement denials persisted.107 It is perhaps due to this problem that,
on its website, the FDA distinguishes investigational drugs from off-label
use.108 Part of why off-label prescribing persists with such prevalence is
that the time and expense of garnering FDA approval for a new use is often
greater, or perceived to be greater, than any benefit FDA use approval
carries.109 In an industry guidance about approving new uses for approved
cancer drugs, the FDA conceded:
[T]here are substantial disincentives, including (1) the cost
and effort involved in completing new research (where
necessary) to verify whether a product provides patient
benefit in a new indication; (2) the cost and effort involved
in submitting an application for regulatory approval of new
clinical uses; and (3) the lack of perceived commercial
benefit of revised labeling if the product is already being
used for the new indication — especially if it no longer has

105

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS-96-212,
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG LABELING AND OFF-LABEL USE 4
(1996).
106
See also Are People With Mental Illness Getting the Help They Need? New
Findings About Parity Laws, Insurance Coverage, and Access to Care, RAND
CORP. (2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB4533/index1.html (last
visited Jan. 12, 2011).
107
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 105, at 6-8.
108
See “Off-Label” and Investigational Use Of Marketed Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices - Information Sheet, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm
(last
visited Jan. 12, 2011).
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See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of OffLabel Drug Prescribing, 5 INDEP. REV. 27-29 (2000), http://www.
independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_1_tabarrok.pdf.
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patent protection.110
Some Medicare beneficiaries have diseases so rare that there are no
medications that have FDA approved indications for their ailments.111
Thus, it is foreseeable that compendia endorsement is similarly difficult to
obtain for such afflictions. Uncommon diseases pose a commensurate
difficulty in research because of the small population affected, making it
difficult to enlist a sufficient number of study participants. Such was the
case with the cancer suffered by Ms. Layzer, the plaintiff in Layzer v.
Leavitt.112 Even with common diseases, proper studies are difficult, as
patients often have multiple ailments and treatments. Moreover, the
possibility of being given a mere placebo is unappealing to those afflicted
with debilitating, or fatal, diseases. There is also little incentive to apply
for new use approval when the drug is generic. Here too, aspirin is a poster
child for off-label use. As a generic drug that predates the formation of the
FDA, some of its new use approvals have been initiated by the agency,
independent of pharmaceutical manufacturers.113 There would seem to be
little incentive to seek additional FDA labeling when the medication is
producing profit without it and the accompanying ability to promote such
use. Imagine a pain medication. Because innumerable maladies cause pain
it would be impractical to have a pain reliever approved for every possible
application.
The highest profile area with off-label coverage issues is the field
of oncology, where desperate patients are often forced to pursue all

110

Guidance for Industry: FDA Approval of New Cancer Treatment Uses for
Marketed Drug and Biological Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 2 (Dec. 1998),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm071657.
111
See, e.g., Off-Base: The Exclusion of Off-Label Prescriptions from
Medicare Part D Coverage, MEDICARE RIGHTS CENTER, 4 (Aug. 2007),
http://www.medicarerights.org/pdf/Off_Base.pdf; See also Ross McKinney et al.,
White Paper: Potential Conflict of Interest in the Production of Drug Compendia,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY 41 (Apr. 2006),
http://www.cms.gov/determinationprocess/downloads/id64TA.pdf.
112
Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting
the rareness of plaintiff’s disease made FDA approval difficult).
113
See Joseph Sirven, New Uses for Older Drugs: The Tales of Aspirin,
Thalidomide, and Gabapentin, 85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 508, 508 (June 2010),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2878253/pdf/mayoclinproc_85_6_
002.pdf.
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possible treatment options in a field with finite viable therapies.114 In fact,
the National Comprehensive Cancer Network recently estimated that as
much as 50 to 75% of cancer treatments were being used off-label.115 As
such, it is perhaps unsurprising that cancer medicines were the first
category under Medicare Part D to be given an evidence based exception to
the compendia requirement.116 All beneficiaries, including the mentally
disordered, also deserve to prove they need particular medications covered.
As discussed in part IVb, infra, off-label use is very common in the mental
health field as well. Faced with an overabundance of coverage denials to
patients prescribed meritorious off-label uses, Congress relied on medical
compendia to curtail these improper denials.117 The utilization of
compendia has reduced, but not solved this problem “and concerns have
been expressed about the speed with which . . . compendia review the
available evidence and issue their conclusions about off-label uses.”118
One example of this arose in October 2009 when a bipartisan group of 30
congressional representatives complained to CMS that the Medicare Parts
A and B contractor for their area did not cover an off-label treatment for
ovarian cancer, even though at least 29 other states had coverage for this
use.119 This coverage denial was based on the recommendations of one of
the approved compendia in direct contradiction to indications of safety and
efficacy contained in the other three CMS compendia and the results of
many clinical studies.120
In addition to concerns that compendia may not always reflect the
ever-evolving standards of medical practice, medical compendia, are
susceptible to bias, error, and mistake much like any human artifice. One
study commissioned by the CMS, published in 2009, conducted a
comparatively limited inquiry into off-label use of 14 cancer drugs across
114

See McKinney et al., supra note 111, at 40 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494 (2008) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2008)).
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See, e.g., American Society of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for
Cancer Treatment: Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.asco.org/
ASCO/Downloads/Cancer%20Policy%20and%20Clinical%20Affairs/OffLabel%20Drug%20Indications/Off-label%20statement.pdf.
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Id. at 2.
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2010, 16 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 629, 634 (Oct. 2010).
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six compendia (4 of which were utilized by the CMS at the time) and
discovered some particularly troubling facts that put the reliability of
compendia into question.121 Generally, the study found that the compendia
did not make uniform recommendations of use because of various
evidentiary discrepancies between them.122 Most had lack of transparency
and other indicia of bias.123 Also they used scanty or insufficient citation to
evidence too often, and that is poor support for their listed indications.124
There was a tendency to use old or otherwise questionable research as well
(only one compendium cited research published after 2000 even though all
purported to be current as of 2008).125 The study expressed concern about
the reliability of compendia given their status as “gatekeepers” to drug
coverage decisions.126 It noted the disproportionate authority agencies give
to their recommendations, which is disconcerting in light of their results,
because the study surveyed only 14 oncological applications and forwent a
broader study of more medications and afflictions.127 A report prepared for
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality found that approved
compendia generally did a poor job of citing the evidence for their
endorsements.128 They did not utilize the most current or well-designed
research, and were wracked with potential conflicts of interest and bias.129
For example, one compendium combats bias in their publication by
requiring that their reviewers not work for a drug company or hold a drug
patent while working on the compendium, yet still allows them to hold up
to $25,000 in pharmaceutical company stock.130 Another study published
in 2000 examined the compendia listings of drug-drug interactions for
various sorts of pharmaceuticals and unfortunately found discrepancies
between the compendia.131 In addition to their disagreement, some of the
121
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compendia did not list certain dangerous drug-drug interactions.132 It is
common knowledge that many people, not just Medicare beneficiaries, take
multiple medications for multiple ailments so a deficit in this sort of data is
very worrisome.
In general, these findings show that compendia make mistakes.
Sometimes they recommend uses that are contraindicated by the evidence
and sometimes they omit uses that are indicated. With such authority and a
reasonable chance of occasional error, it seems nonsensical not to have an
expressly provided exception to compendia authority. Such an exception
should require a showing of what compendia purportedly do, that the offlabel use is shown to be effective and safe by medical industry practices
and medical peer-reviewed literature of acceptable quality. That is not to
say that compendia are all bad or that peer-reviewed research is all good.
Rather a compendia based coverage regime should be flexible and allow
for a reasonable margin of error. This can be done by providing a safety
net wherein a patient proves a use to be medically necessary with scientific
evidence. Such a healthcare coverage regime would be more sensible and
effective. Cancer patients shouldn’t exclusively enjoy such an effective
failsafe. Rather, optimal pharmaceutical care of all maladies should be
provided while striving to insure equity for the mentally disordered.
B.

LEGAL ACTION ON OFF-LABEL USE COVERAGE UNDER
MEDICARE PART D

In S.A.B. v. AARP Medicare Rx Plan, the Medicare Appeals
Council considered a claim that a Part D plan should cover CellCept, an
immunosuppressive drug, for the off-label use of controlling the symptoms
of relapsing polychondritis.133 The enrollee suffered from several other
serious conditions that were not deciding factors in this case.134
Polychondritis is a rare chronic malady and it causes recurring
inflammation and affects cartilage, and biochemically similar tissues, in
various parts of the body including: the ears, nose, joints, spine, trachea,
eyes, heart, and blood vessels.135 The beneficiary’s doctors, each of whom
are acclaimed in their fields, declared that CellCept was “medically
132

See id. at 543-46.
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necessary for her condition, and that there would be life-threatening
consequences if the medication was stopped.”136 Methotrexate was used
before CellCept, but the Methotrexate had not controlled her symptoms and
had likely caused pulmonary fibrosis, a serious side effect.137 The
Medicare Appeals Council denied reimbursement for CellCept “since it is
neither FDA-approved nor supported in the compendia for treatment of any
conditions with which the enrollee is diagnosed, it is not a covered
Medicare Part D drug.”138
This outcome is antithetical to the purpose of Medicare Part D and
leaves the enrollee with a quality of life changing, and potentially lifeending, outcome. The fact independent reputable doctors staked their
reputations for an off-label use that seemingly has little potential for
recreational use or fraud should have counted for something. Moreover,
the patient’s record reflects the drug’s efficacy for her at the exclusion of
everything else. This is not to say that observational evidence should be
dispositive of coverage outcomes. Peer-reviewed empiricism and broadly
supported standards of care should be factors. Real people’s health
shouldn’t be subject solely to FDA indications and demonstrably imperfect
compendia. There should be room for exceptions that are supported by a
high scientific evidentiary threshold.
Another Medicare Appeals Council case affirmed the
administrative law judge’s decision and granted the Plaintiff an exception
and coverage by granting her the off-label use of opium tincture for her
Crohn’s disease.139 Factors in the decision included the individual patient’s
long record of effective use of this treatment.140 Indeed the patient’s
history shows it to be the only drug that has worked for her; this was
bolstered by scientific support and the fact that the drug pre-dates the
formation of the FDA, making the drug “grandfathered.”141 The opinion of
the Medicare Appeals Council put great emphasis on the fact that the FDA
has remained relatively silent in regards to opium tincture and many
formularies include the drug while one compendium designates the drug as
grandfathered.142 This Part D beneficiary was fortunate to have a
136
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grandfathered drug that is widely used at issue.
In most other
circumstances, factors such as the medical industry’s standard of care and
the patient’s history would be of no avail absent FDA approval or clear
compendia endorsement. However, this case demonstrates that if an
exception predicated on scientific evidence were to be adopted, meritorious
claims could readily be differentiated from frivolous and unjustified
attempts at obtaining coverage.
While the safety, efficacy, and cost considerations of the drug
whose coverage is contested in the next case is beyond the scope of the
court’s opinion, the human element is compelling and inspires sympathy.
In Kilmer v. Leavitt, the plaintiff was afflicted with systemic lupus
erythematosus and heterotopic bone ossification, a condition that causes
bone to form in multiple areas of her body, such as her joints, where there
would usually be soft tissue.143 As a result, the plaintiff was “unable to
walk, stand, or move without assistance, and is confined to a
wheelchair.”144 For her pain, the plaintiff was prescribed oral transmucosal
fentanyl citrate, also called Actiq, which was provided by the manufacturer,
for a time, at no or reduced charge.145 When the company changed its
policy, her Medicare Part D provider denied coverage.146
She conceded that her prescription did not meet the criteria for
“medically accepted indication” as described in statute.147 Nevertheless,
she asserted the statute concurrently did not restrict coverage only to
medically accepted indications, but rather she should be granted coverage
because the medication was “medically necessary.”148 The plaintiff argued
on appeal to the district court that the “medically accepted indication”
language in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e)(1) should not be read as a limitation
but rather as an illustration of coverable medications.149 The court found
this argument unpersuasive and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute,
reasoning that the phrase “such term includes” most logically means the
conclusion of a list of coverable drugs rather than an example thereof.150
Furthermore, the court goes on to say that while they found the statutory
meaning clear, if poorly drafted, even if they were to find it ambiguous the
agency nevertheless made a reasonable interpretation and regulation
143
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entitled to deference under a Chevron analysis.151 Assuming arguendo that
the court’s statutory interpretation was correct, it compels one to reexamine
said statute. A person afflicted with lupus, as well as a condition that turns
her soft tissue into bone, undoubtedly suffers a great deal of pain. If the
plaintiff could demonstrate that this particular pain medication was
medically necessary for her pain, a law that purports to provide needed care
but summarily denies it due to a technicality is antithetical to its purpose
and seems inhumane.
A few years later a district court in another jurisdiction disagreed
with the statutory interpretation in Kilmer v. Leavitt.152 In Layzer v.
Leavitt, the plaintiff suffered from a granulose cell tumor, an uncommon
form of ovarian cancer.153 Her oncologists prescribed Cetrotide for cancer
control and one oncologist stated that Cetrotide was medically necessary
because there was no alternate treatment at that time.154 Specifically, he
contended (and had other doctors and medical literature to support him)
that Cetrotide was needed to prevent tumor growth and bleeding; even a
temporary cessation in treatment would have dire consequences.155 The
court also repeatedly restated the administrative law judge’s observation.156
Namely, the administrative judge observed that the Plaintiff’s medication
had established medical necessity but that the use had neither compendia
endorsement nor FDA approval most likely because her form of ovarian
cancer was so rare.157
The court held that the compendia requirement is undoubtedly
inconsistent with the purpose of the MMA under the rules of statutory
interpretation, and that even if it were ambiguous, that the Secretary’s
interpretation was unreasonable.158 The chief reason this court disagreed
with the interpretation of Kilmer v. Leavitt is that the language at issue
contains the word “includes.”159 This word was expressly defined in the
definitions section of the Act to not “exclude other things otherwise within
the meaning of the term defined.”160 Thus, the court reasons that had
Congress intended the list of coverable drugs to be exhaustive, they could
151
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have easily included language that would limit the list and impose the
compendia requirement.161 Furthermore, the court notes that the phrase
“medically accepted indication” is a cross-reference to another section of
the Social Security Act.162 As such the Secretary’s argument that the
interpretation they adopt renders the term superfluous, is unavailing.163
Moreover, the court cites precedent requiring them to interpret such
legislation broadly in a way that avoids unjust results.164 In particular, the
court is obligated to interpret Social Security Act provisions in a way
favorable to beneficiaries.165 Finally, the court points out that Medicare
Part D legislation expressly excludes drugs from coverage elsewhere,
thereby implying that “medically accepted indication” is but an addition to
a list and not an end to it.166 As such, the court held that there was no
restrictive compendia requirement in statute and instructed the Secretary to
provide coverage.167 Alone this holding will not resolve this issue; the case
was dismissed from the docket for the United States Second Circuit Court
of Appeals (and was then being litigated by Ms. Layzer’s estate).168 Still,
this outcome is based on a reasonable interpretation, and more importantly,
is facially more equitable. If a Medicare Part D enrollee can demonstrate
the reasonableness and medical necessity of their treatment, lack of FDA
approval or compendia endorsement for a use seems an arbitrary and unfair
basis to withhold life preserving therapy.
Currently there is legislation proposed that would resolve the issue
if enacted. Days after the ruling in Layzer v. Leavitt, a bill was introduced
in the U. S House of Representatives, known as H.R. 1055, that would
expressly allow compendia exceptions based on the guidance of the
Secretary and peer reviewed medical literature.169 That this bill would
clear any statutory ambiguity to align with the ruling of Layzer v. Leavitt is
obvious. The bill would amend the MMA by adding an additional
subparagraph.170 The proposed act’s language when it was submitted to
committee was,
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(D) Clarification. Notwithstanding subparagraph (A)(ii),
none of the provisions of this subsection shall prevent a
PDP sponsor offering a prescription drug plan or an MA
organization offering an MA-PD plan from determining
(whether through a determination, or an appeal of such
determination under section 1852(g) or subsection (g) or
(h) of section 1860D-4, as applicable) that a use of a
covered Part D drug is for a medically accepted indication
for purposes of coverage of such drug under such plan if
such determination is based upon guidance provided by the
Secretary for determining accepted uses of covered Part D
drugs and on supportive clinical evidence in peer reviewed
medical literature.171
U.S. Representatives Mac Thornberry (R-TX) and Russ Carnahan (D-MO)
introduced the bill and Thornberry said,
Doctors and patients should be able to choose the safest and most
effective medications for their treatments. Right now, the
requirements for coverage of the off-label use of a drug are
burdensome and often result in Medicare patients not being able to
get the drug coverage they need. Our bill helps fix that problem.172
Several mental health advocacy groups have given their support for the
provisions of this bill.173 However, the bill does not expressly contain
provisions for parity for mental health prescriptions or any standards
addressing considerations unique to off-label prescribing for mental
disorder.174 Given the critical relationship between mental wellness and
total health, the lack of such language is a mistake. This mistake is more
egregious when considered in light of the historical marginalization of
mental health treatment and the unique problems associated with drugs
used to treat these conditions. Because it seems improbable, at the time of
publication, that this bill will be passed before the next Congress, this note
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urges that this line of legislation be resumed in a manner cognizant of
mental health needs.
IV.

MENTAL HEALTH PARITY CONCERNS IN REFORM
A.

MANY MEDICARE PART D BENEFICIARIES HAVE MENTAL
HEALTH CONCERNS

Mental disorders are extremely prevalent. Published in 2005, the
results of the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R)
demonstrate that approximately 26% of Americans aged 18 and older were
afflicted with a 12 month DSM-IV mental disorder.175 The DSM-IV is the
current, and standard, diagnostic manual for mental disorders in the United
States.176 A 2007 update of this survey viewed a smaller age range, 18-44,
and found that roughly 32% of that population had a mental disorder.177
The results of this study are conservative and are possibly higher in fact,
because only 70.9% of the sample responded and lay people administered
the survey.178 There is also a stigma that discourages those surveyed from
admitting to their mental issues for fear of embarrassment, and the study
design did not allow for the homeless, the institutionalized, or the nonEnglish speaking to be examined.179 Moreover not all DSM-IV diagnoses
were part of the NCS-R, for example schizophrenia was not included.180 A
related study found that 46.4% of Americans will have a DSM-IV disorder
at some point in their lives, whereas 27.7% had two or more such disorders
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and 17.3% had three or more.181 Much like its sister study, the NCS-R was
the evaluative tool and thus the data is similarly conservative, including for
older cohorts.182 Given the prevalence of mental illness it is troubling that
less than half of people with such issues seek treatment, in part due to
cultural norms and stigma, and many who do pursue therapy receive it from
their general physician and not a psychiatrist.183 Clear data reflecting how
Medicare Part D enrollees relate to this generalized health problem is
elusive. A cry for more research is not uncommon in the academic
literature. Part of the difficulty in conducting research on Medicare Part D
enrollees stems from information access issues (such as confidentiality) and
the newness of the program. In March 2008, the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) submitted a report on improving the accessibility
of Medicare Part D claims data while ensuring enrollee privacy.184 At that
time the data was inaccessible even to other government agencies and was
used only for payments.185 Happily, CMS promulgated rules allowing
access to some information, under certain conditions, that May.186 Far
more troubling, a 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office
identified issues with oversight and data reporting for Medicare Part D
complaints and grievances.187 Of particular concern was data (or lack
thereof) from the grievance process wherein a beneficiary files a complaint
181
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with the plan provider.188 This is problematic given that these processes
include coverage appeals, exceptions, and fraud and abuse data.189
In spite of issues with data, available research does indicate
medicine coverage issues for mental health patients enrolled in Medicare
Part D. While various studies and surveys investigating the pervasiveness
of mental disorder among population groups differ slightly in their
conclusions, all conservatively find that psychiatric conditions are
common. The elderly are at greater risk than the rest of the adult
population for certain mental disorders.190 For example, clinical depression
affects at least 15% of seniors.191 Depression among the elderly is
underreported and undertreated.192 In fact, suicide is more common among
people 65 and older than any other segment of the population.193
Concurrently, mental illnesses afflict people with disabilities and chronic
illnesses at rates higher than the general population. For example, people
afflicted with chronic diseases are more likely to have concomitant
depressive disorders.194 Moreover, many are eligible for Medicare Part D
enrollment from a mental illness driven disability.195 Prior to the advent of
Medicare Part D, the 2002 Medicare Beneficiary Survey reported that 27%
of the Medicare population had some form of cognitive or mental
impairment.196 This group commonly has dual eligibility for Medicare and
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Medicaid and they comprise 29% of Medicare Part D enrollees.197 60% of
dually eligible disabled persons, and 20% of the elderly dually eligible,
have at least one mental disorder.198 Thus it is unsurprising that at least a
quarter of the senior, and half of the disabled, people eligible for Medicare
use at least one psychotropic medication.199
Considering that estimations of mental disorder prevalence are
conservative, these usage figures translate into a decidedly sizable problem.
When Medicare Part D came into effect it was estimated that 20% of all
Americans with mental disorders were covered by another section of
Medicare.200 In September 2011 29.5 million people were enrolled under
Medicare Part D, of which 10.7 million had MA-PD plans.201 In 2010, the
CMS published a statistical supplement of Medicare and Medicaid data that
reported 2009 figures that demonstrated that of the nearly 28 million people
enrolled in Part D that year, almost 13% of MA-PD enrollees and nearly
24% of PDP enrollees were under 65 years of age.202 Given the sheer
volume of psychiatric issues in this population, perhaps it is of no surprise
that medications for the treatment of mental conditions were among the
most heavily prescribed under the various drug plans.203 Such prescriptions
are expensive and Medicare beneficiaries with mental disorder historically
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have higher annual prescription costs than those who do not.204 The scope
of this issue is poised to expand. At present, roughly 12% of the total
United States population is 65 or older, by 2030 it is predicted the figure
will be closer to 20%.205 This is concerning because suicide is rampant
among the elderly now.206 Baby-Boomers have historically been more
suicide prone than other generations and the suicide rate amongst this age
bracket is rising again.207 This is concerning when considered alongside
predictions that recent healthcare reform will increase the proportion of
Medicare Part D enrollees with mental health ailments.208 Because people
with mental illness are historically marginalized, and often have issues with
competency and self-advocacy, reform needs to be made to accommodate
them. This is particularly pressing because off-label use in psychiatric
contexts has problems distinguishable from those of generalized health
care.
B.

PROBLEMS WITH OFF-LABEL USE AND COVERAGE FOR MENTAL
DISORDER OR ILLNESS

Off-label use is widespread in mental health contexts. Psychiatric
News, a newspaper of the American Psychiatric Association (APA),
published a story on a study that found 75% of antidepressants, 80% of
anticonvulsants, and 64% of antipsychotics prescribed to Georgia Medicaid
beneficiaries in 2001 were off-label.209 This trend was particularly
204
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prevalent among the elderly.210 The article also characterized these
findings as “certainly no surprise . . .” and noted that some of the uses
found were reassuring in their appropriateness while others were alarming
in their contraindication.211 Much like other pharmaceuticals, off-label
medications used for mental disorders range from safe, established, and
effective, to unsupported and potentially dangerous. Because of this there
was a workshop at the APA’s 2008 national meeting in Washington D.C.
about off-label prescribing and liability.212 There it was stressed that offlabel uses should be prescribed only with adequate medical evidence.213
More importantly, the workshop cautioned practitioners to only prescribe
off-label drugs with well informed consent from the patient, or in the event
of competency issues, from the patient’s family or guardian.214 Such
training about off-label prescribing for the mentally disordered is wise.
Many off-label uses have poor evidence of efficacy and subject patients to
substantial danger. In June 2008 the FDA promulgated an alert cautioning
physicians not to prescribe conventional antipsychotics for dementia
because, much like atypical antipsychotics, use of these drugs to treat
dementia comes with an unacceptably elevated risk of death.215
But, not all off-label uses in mental health contexts are so full of
doom and gloom. For example, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) were FDA approved as antidepressants but have found safe,
common, effective, and well supported off-label uses for conditions such as
anxiety, premature ejaculation, and migraine.216 Moreover there are
demonstrably effective, and much safer, off-label uses for some atypical
antipsychotics.217 While CMS has required formularies to cover “[a]ll or
substantially all drugs in the antidepressants, antipsychotics, [and]
210
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anticonvulsants.” classes that does not ensure coverage of off-label
applications.218 It may come as no shock that compendia are imperfect as
applied to the mental health field as well.219
In response to studies
published regarding compendia in oncological contexts, two doctors found
that, “[t]o its credit, DRUGDEX is the only available compendium
recognized by the U.S. government as a guide to reimbursement decisions
that provides detailed evaluations for off-label indications of psychoactive
drugs.”220 Unfortunately, when they looked into the off-label uses of seven
atypical antipsychotic drugs they found that the compendium cited scanty
evidence to support its endorsements.221
C.

MENTAL HEALTH PARITY LAW IN GENERAL AND AS APPLIED TO
MEDICARE

In 2000, RAND published a study that found that the mentally ill
still lacked healthcare coverage equal to that of the general population and
general illness, despite the passage of laws mandating mental health parity
in the 1990’s.222 To address this issue Congress expanded mental health
parity laws in 2008 with the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act.223 Many applauded President Obama’s signing of the Act despite the
fact that it did not provide total parity, such as its lack of applicability to
Medicaid.224 While the act made advances (as most plans under its scope
218
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provide mental health benefits because it is well accepted that mental
wellness affects total health) it also did not apply to Medicare.225
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act
(MIPPA), was another law passed in 2008 that addressed some mental
health parity concerns and issues with Medicare Part D.226 MIPPA
provided that Part D data be made available for research and evaluation227
and requires the Secretary to collect data to monitor and prevent healthcare
disparities predicated on race, gender, or ethnicity.228 There was no
provision mandating the monitoring of care and coverage disparity between
the mentally ill and the general Medicare beneficiary population. This was
a grievous oversight that should be ameliorated in the future. The act also
added barbiturates and benzodiazepines to the classes of drugs covered
under Medicare Part D229 and installed a compendia exception solely for
anti-cancer off-label uses.230 MIPPA also required Part D formularies to
include drugs that were unique and had no reasonable substitute.231 This
was because a lack of access could be life threatening or force less than
optimal care. The CMS issued rules mandating formulary inclusion of
antidepressants, antipsychotics, and anticonvulsants in response to this
directive.232 While a great step forward, coverage for such drugs still
hinges on FDA approval or the endorsement of a CMS adopted
compendium. Sadly, MIPPA did not explicitly provide a broader off-label
exception or mental health drug parity. For many Medicare Part D
enrollees, coverage is an uncertain thing as demonstrated by the conflicting
holdings of Kilmer v. Leavitt and Layzer v. Leavitt.233 These remaining
defects in Medicare Part D law need to be rectified. This fact is all the
more pressing because MIPPA will also phase out Medicare’s
225
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discriminatory cost sharing scheme for outpatient mental health services by
2014.234 Some commentators argue this was an economic move because
the outpatient pricing scheme for mental health services may have
encouraged the utilization of inpatient services.235 Perhaps now more
patients will use outpatient services and decrease costs for general care
commensurately.236 Furthermore, “studies have shown that improvements
in mental health decrease costs for physical health care.”237 The need to
revise Medicare to ensure medically appropriate access to off-label drugs,
with parity for the mentally ill, is incredibly urgent. This is because,
outpatient cost-sharing reform, when coupled with the aging of the baby
boomer generation, and projections that the PPACA will expand utilization
and coverage of psychiatric services, all forecast a growing problem.238 In
light of litigation within the Second Circuit, a revision of the proposed Part
D Off-Label Prescription Parity Act could address these concerns and
prevent problems that are likely to occur, if such reform is not made, as the
Medicare beneficiary population swells over the coming years. Besides,
there are prescription drug coverage issues for mentally ill Medicare Part D
enrollees at present. That is why it is imperative that such legislation,
mindful of psychiatric ailments, remains a focus until passed.
Restricting coverage of medically necessary medication is
dangerous and costly for all. This includes medically accepted off-label use
in general, and among the mentally ill. As Tom Leibried, APA deputy
director of congressional affairs, aptly told Psychiatric Times, “[l]ook at the
complete cost picture. If a psychotic [person] suddenly loses access to a
medication he has been taking successfully and has to be switched to an
alternative, there may be a problem with compliance. It could result in
higher utilization of emergency room services, for example.”239 In 2009, a
study was published detailing the experiences of dually eligible persons
234
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with mental disorders in the first year of Medicare Part D (2006).240 The
study found that 35% of this population had trouble getting new or refilled
psychiatric medications, while 19% were forced to switch from a stable
medication to a new one.241 After, there was an increased number of
emergency room visits for this cohort and it disproportionately impacted
women.242 Dual eligibles were automatically enrolled in plans at Part D’s
outset and are subject to utilization management techniques such as prior
authorization.243 It goes without saying that an off-label use may have
greater difficulty obtaining prior authorization. However this should be
based on a lack of medical necessity and not a convoluted rule. This is also
concerning because the mentally ill have been subjected to more and more
utilization techniques over time.244 These hurdles and barriers to coverage
have restricted access to needed medication for some.245 For 2010 there
were fewer low-income subsidy plans available.246 Such cost and
utilization management tools have been found to sometimes provide an
economic incentive to prescribe drugs inappropriate for seniors as well.247
Thus, some dually eligible enrollees had to find new prescription plans
where prior authorizations and other drug coverage requirements would
have to be satisfied anew. Because of the expense of psychiatric drugs and
the extended nature of their use, summary denial of coverage for off-label
medications was a concern for some pharmacists and psychiatrists from
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Part D’s inception.248 Remember that different forms of a drug (such as
extended release) or different doses can also be considered off-label use.249
Off-label uses in psychiatric contexts are often dangerous and
poorly proven, despite the frequent appropriateness of off-label prescribing.
As such, it is all the more important to clearly delineate the evidentiary
requirements to support off-label use and coverage in either a compendium
indication or as an exception thereto. The mentally ill often have
competency issues or similar disadvantages and are an easy demographic to
take advantage of.
For example, the FDA reported that Jazz
Pharmaceuticals paid a $20 million dollar settlement for its subsidiary’s
illegal off-label promotion scheme.250 In that scam, they paid off a
psychiatrist to promote one of their drugs for unsafe off-label psychiatric
use and to also help prescribers hide the unsafe off-label prescribing to
ensure that insurers paid for it.251 With such risks it is imperative to make
sure that off-label psychiatric indications listed in compendia are accurate
and that an exception to a compendia also has a sound evidentiary basis.
Real world patients do not reflect the controlled conditions of a study; they
often have multiple conditions, different drug tolerances, and some suffer
from afflictions so rare that good scientific data is unobtainable.252 Such
difficulties are unsurprising.
A well-constructed and statistically
significant experiment has a large sample population and excludes external
variables that skew data. In 2003 a study was published that analyzed how
evidence based practices were formulated in the field of geriatric
psychiatry and it noted that certain limitations,
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[M]ay result in overly conservative exclusion of
informative studies, or alternatively, may cluster studies
with inadequate attention to important differences. For,
example, common problems affecting meta-analyses and
evidence-based reviews include small sample sizes and
lack of power, study heterogeneity, lack of interchangeable
instruments, lack of extractable data, definitions of
outcomes, quality and duration of studies, and reliance on
statistical (as opposed to clinical) significance.253
While randomized, placebo controlled, studies are valuable they
have limitations because their narrow, variable controlled approach does
not adequately predict important facets of clinical efficacy.254 The results
of studies designed to test for one condition are not easily applicable to real
world patients suffering from multiple conditions and comorbidities, or
those who are refractory and need different medications or a combination
thereof.255 Refractory patients are undoubtedly at issue in off-label use
controversies. These people are non-responsive to many drugs.256 Why
then deny them a medication that works for them, provided it is safe and
has solid evidentiary support? Because patients often have multiple
conditions and take multiple medications, it is imperative to verify and
document data on such treatment. The study suggested that evidence based
practices should be established by various types of data such as: medical
expert consensus guidelines, clinical studies, randomized controlled
studies, patient records, and other medical data.257 Peer-reviewed studies
that are not randomized or controlled still can provide scientifically valid
and informative data on drug use.258 The study concluded that there were
problems with various types of evidence, and the biases therein, and
therefore called for evidence based practices to be predicated on as much
credible data as possible as applied to the specific age and treatment
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population.259 With improvements in technology it would be easier than
ever before to make and implement such a database. Medicare Part D can
set such standards by cataloging its data (while preserving confidentiality
and identifying data). It may be advisable for Medicare to create or utilize
compendia specific to the elderly or disabled, as well as compendia
devoted to psychiatric uses. A broad base of potential evidence sources,
provided they meet exacting standards, will also provide a complete picture
of which therapies are sound and advisable, and which are not. Generally
the government gives its agencies, such as HHS and CMS, broad discretion
and deference to their expertise as well as their reasonable interpretation of
their statutory directives.260 Prescription drug parity reform has the
opportunity to ensure equal access to care for the mentally ill by explicitly
directing the Secretary as to how drug coverage standards and exceptions
thereto should be constructed. They should be based on scientific evidence
and medical standards of care. Such measures will make Medicare more
just and efficient, and possibly cheaper too.
Some reports have found that Medicare has lower administrative
costs than the private insurance industry.261 Conversely, one analysis found
that Medicare’s administrative costs were greater than those of private
insurance, and it also found that coverage claims were a relatively small
proportion of those costs (although the study did not evaluate Part D claims
nor directly examine Part D administrative costs).262 Either way, it seems
intuitive that a clearer and more flexible coverage regime could reduce the
number of coverage appeals that exhaust multiple steps in the process. By
more accurately analyzing meritorious drug use earlier in the process, costs
may be reduced. Also, an optimally treated patient is likely to be healthier
and less expensive than one who is sick and unstable. For example, an
untreated patient with depression has higher healthcare costs across the
259
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board than one who does not.263 Clearly, successful treatment could
mitigate the heightened healthcare costs of such a patient. Therefore
preventing patients from having medically necessary off-label medication
due to a lack of a reasonable, and expressly provided for, exception process
makes little sense. This is not just because it seems unfair to the patient,
but also because the appeals process and untreated or undertreated (and
therefore sicker) patients also cost money.
V.

CONCLUSION

As general policy, close scrutiny of off-label prescribing is wise.
Assuming arguendo that FDA approval is a guarantor of safety and
efficacy, then all inappropriate drug use is off-label. However, as
established in this note, off-label use is frequently appropriate
commensurate with the medically necessary standard of care. Because
bias, error, and suggestibility are endemic to the human experience it is
folly to allow disparate compendia to absolutely dictate what uses should
be coverable. There need to be exceptions for unforeseen contingencies
and compendia inaccuracy or mistake. To deny or delay coverage of a
medically necessary off-label drug is detrimental to enrollees’ health and
antithetical to the legislative purpose of the Medicare Part D program. A
program that doesn’t adequately satisfy its objectives is a waste. Moreover,
patients deprived of their medicines are likely to have deterioration of
health and the resultant rise in other health costs. Also, such enrollees are
likely to file appeals, some of which may make it through to federal
jurisdiction with meritorious cases that prevail. It is obvious that both
worsening health from a lack of drug coverage and the appeals process cost
the government, the plan providers, and the beneficiaries money and time.
If coverage ultimately is, or should be, granted to such enrollees, it would
be more efficient and therefore cheaper to fairly and accurately reach this
outcome as quickly as possible without unduly delaying coverage or
exhausting multiple steps in the appeals process.
In the instance of rare or complicated conditions where the ideal
standard of placebo controlled, peer-reviewed, evidence is difficult to
obtain, the individual patient’s record, the results of less stringent but
nevertheless statistically significant peer reviewed studies, clinical
evidence, and medical industry best practices should also be factors. Such
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clear factors and exceptions will allow coverage determinations and
exceptions to be made quickly pursuant to what is demonstrably the
medical industry’s standard of care. While incompetent, negligent, and
unscrupulous doctors are definitely out there, in general a physician’s
ethical and professional interests are aligned with providing their patients
with the safest and most effective healthcare. These standards should be
built into any legislative reform or should be taken into account in the event
that the compendia only requirement is obviated by litigation.
However, off-label use in the treatment of psychiatric conditions is
distinct. The interests of the mentally disordered are still marginalized.
Mental health has historically had disparate coverage and this is a pity
given that mental well-being is integral and essential to total healthiness.
Recent healthcare reform and proposed legislation, coupled with the aging
of the baby-boomers, are very likely to profoundly increase the use of
psychiatric medications under Medicare Part D. Moreover, because some
off-label uses in the mental health field are dangerous and unsupported it
would be easy to categorically deny off-label psychiatric drugs, even
medicines with a safe and medically necessary indication. This foreseeable
problem can be prevented with the utilization of psychiatry specific
compendia and express provisions for compendia exceptions.
An
evidentiary framework for coverage of off-label mental health drugs would
establish parity under Medicare Part D for all, while also giving due
consideration to the unique needs of patients with mental disorders.
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